Why Trump will face a stronger Xi Jinping at November Apec forum in China

South China Morning Post | Alyssa Chen

Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump agreed to an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting in Shenzhen this November following a 42-hour Washington summit. This scheduled encounter marks their third face-to-face meeting in 2026, establishing a framework of bilateral stability reinforced by reciprocal tariff relief on US$30 billion in non-sensitive trade.

Host diplomacy in Shenzhen grants Beijing direct control over agenda setting and multilateral choreography, amplifying Chinese diplomatic influence across the Asia-Pacific region. To preserve top-level diplomatic momentum, Washington postponed a planned US$14 billion arms sales package to Taiwan. US regional partners now face strategic uncertainty. Allies from Tokyo to Manila risk reduced leverage against Beijing as Washington prioritises leader-level detente over unilateral security commitments. The bilateral trajectory will culminate at the December Group of 20 summit in Miami, testing whether economic truce agreements can survive domestic political pressures and persistent regional security frictions.

Comment

The decision to withhold a US$14 billion arms transfer to Taiwan in exchange for top-level summitry exposes a growing tension between presidential transactionality and formal defense commitments. Suspending scheduled arms deliveries to preserve diplomatic momentum compromises the predictability required for long-term force planning in Taipei. This practice destabilises deterrence mechanics across the Western Pacific by signaling that statutory security obligations remain subject to tactical executive trade-offs.

Downstream, this dynamic imposes strategic friction on sovereign defense planning among regional treaty partners. Defense ministries in Tokyo and Manila increasingly factor potential delays in foreign military sales into their own procurement baselines. Consequently, alliance coordination under the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty faces structural uncertainty when bilateral equipment transfers become contingent on summit schedules.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If executive summitry repeatedly delays agreed arms packages like the US$14 billion Taiwan transfer, how do regional allies under treaties like the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty adapt their defense procurement and operational planning?

The pattern suggests that treaty partners will increasingly hedge by accelerating domestic defense industrial investments and expanding minilateral security arrangements independent of Washington. Rather than relying solely on US foreign military sales, regional capitals are likely to diversify supplier relationships and establish co-production lines to insulate capability timelines from executive diplomacy. This trajectory indicates a shift toward a more fragmented regional security architecture where formal alliance guarantees are supplemented by autonomous deterrence capabilities.

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