The Taliban after five years in power

IISS

Five years after returning to power in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime has established de facto diplomatic links across Central and South Asia while remaining broadly isolated by Western nations over severe domestic human rights restrictions. Although Moscow remains the sole government granting formal recognition, Kabul now hosts accredited ambassadors from Beijing, Tehran, Islamabad, Ankara, and Jakarta.

This regional normalization persists despite acute friction with Pakistan over cross-border attacks by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants operating from Afghan sanctuaries. Tensions remain high. Meanwhile, Islamic State–Khorasan Province (IS-KP) continues targeting foreign entities, exemplified by a 19 January 2026 suicide bombing against Chinese nationals in Kabul's Shahr-e-Naw district. Diplomatic engagement with the United States has further contracted following Special Representative Thomas West's October 2024 departure, leaving interactions largely confined to hostage releases. Despite internal policy debates, Supreme Leader Mullah Akhundzada continues enforcing total bans on female secondary education and United Nations employment, perpetuating severe economic isolation.

Comment

The Taliban’s protection of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan demonstrates the primacy of ideological cohesion over regional state relationships. Refusing to enforce Mullah Akhundzada’s decree ending external jihad risks severe military retaliation from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. However, suppressing cross-border TTP raids would trigger internal fractures within the Afghan Taliban’s militant base. This friction reveals the operational trade-offs governing Kabul's security posture.

This internal dilemma is exacerbated by the threat of ideological defections to Islamic State–Khorasan Province. Should command structures in Kandahar forcibly disarm TTP cadres, disaffected fighters would readily migrate toward Islamic State–Khorasan Province networks operating in eastern Afghanistan. Consequently, Kabul accepts airstrikes and border closures from Islamabad rather than risking TTP defections to Islamic State–Khorasan Province.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If Pakistani airstrikes and border closures against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan sanctuaries intensify, which risk poses a greater structural threat to Taliban authority in Kandahar — military escalation with Islamabad or mass fighter defections to Islamic State–Khorasan Province?

The available evidence points toward internal fragmentation as the more existential threat to Mullah Akhundzada's regime. While Pakistani border closures inflict severe economic strain, confronting Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan directly risks driving veteran commanders into Islamic State–Khorasan Province ranks. Consequently, Kandahar is likely to absorb external pressure from Islamabad to preserve ideological cohesion within its armed forces.

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