The claim that wars are won solely by conquering and occupying ground is challenged as an enduring, overly simplistic, and misleading cliché. Modern military campaigns succeed through integrated capabilities across all domains—land, sea, air, space, and cyber—to achieve defined political objectives, which do not always necessitate occupation or territorial conquest.
The argument for "ground force primacy" often attacks the straw man of "airpower alone," a position no serious modern strategist holds. Defining victory narrowly as occupation rigs the argument for land power, ignoring campaigns where coercion, denial, disruption, or punishment suffice without "owning the ground." Jointness involves applying the most appropriate specialized service capabilities for a given contingency, not equal shares of action. The decisive service must be determined by the objective, not institutional tradition or budget battles. The author cites Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq as examples where land power failed to deliver decisive strategic success, highlighting its limitations and the potential liabilities of occupation.
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