Pakistan experienced a significant surge of foreign capital between 2001 and 2008 under General Pervez Musharraf's military rule, fueled by post-9/11 strategic rents, debt relief, record remittances, foreign direct investment, and privatization. This period saw accelerated real GDP growth, increased foreign exchange reserves, and a booming stock market, with per capita income roughly doubling.
However, the author argues this economic boom failed to durably improve the lives or long-term prospects of most Pakistanis. Gains in poverty reduction were shallow, human development modest, and the underlying economic structure remained unchanged. The ruling class converted this opportunity into a cycle of debt, speculation, consumption, and institutional erosion. When inflows slowed after 2007, the economy proved astonishingly fragile, leading to a swift return to the International Monetary Fund and a national crisis, demonstrating how a captured state can turn generosity into dependency without building lasting economic foundations.
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