Ukraine and Iran Wars Expose the Flaws in Nuclear Deterrence | Opinion

Newsweek  |  Melissa Parke

Ukraine's deep-strike campaign inside Russia using long-range missiles and drone attacks has exposed critical vulnerabilities in traditional nuclear deterrence doctrine. By striking targets deep inside Russia without triggering a nuclear response, Kyiv has demonstrated that atomic arsenals do not reliably deter conventional military actions, fundamentally challenging long-held global security assumptions.

This breakdown of deterrence is not an isolated anomaly but aligns with historical precedents, including the 1973 attack on Israel, the 1982 Falklands conflict, and conventional clashes between India and Pakistan in 1999 and 2025. Similarly, Iran's willingness to launch ballistic missiles against Israel and United States bases demonstrates that conventional actors remain undeterred by nuclear-armed adversaries. Rather than preventing conflict, nuclear ownership frequently emboldens states to aggressively flout international law. Deterrence is a dangerous illusion. Consequently, disarmament advocates promote the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as a verifiable, fair pathway toward the complete elimination of these weapons to prevent global self-destruction.

Comment

The persistent failure of nuclear deterrence to prevent conventional military operations, as seen in Ukraine, exposes a fundamental flaw in classical strategic stability models. Conventional incursions during the 1999 Kargil War demonstrated that nuclear-armed states can engage in localised conflicts without triggering strategic escalation. This pattern is reinforced by Kyiv's ongoing strikes against Russian early-warning radar stations and strategic bomber bases. These actions reveal that non-nuclear states do not view atomic arsenals as credible barriers to conventional self-defence.

This doctrinal breakdown occurs because the extreme destructive potential of nuclear weapons creates a credibility gap, rendering their use highly implausible in response to sub-strategic conventional provocations. Consequently, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) gains diplomatic traction by framing these arsenals as liabilities rather than instruments of security. The treaty exploits this credibility gap to challenge the legitimacy of deterrence frameworks within United Nations forums.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the stability-instability paradox demonstrated during the 1999 Kargil War continues to govern modern conventional conflicts, does the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) possess the realistic leverage to dismantle deterrence doctrines, or does it merely codify a symbolic norm?

The available evidence suggests that while the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) successfully establishes a humanitarian norm, it lacks the enforcement mechanisms to compel nuclear-armed states to disarm. As demonstrated by the conventional clashes of the 1999 Kargil War, states prioritise immediate survival and deterrence over non-binding international treaties. Consequently, the treaty is likely to remain a symbolic instrument rather than a practical tool for dismantling strategic arsenals.

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