The Taliban Five Years On: Winning the War, Losing the State

Geopolitical Monitor | Muhammad Amir

The Taliban’s transition from insurgency to government in Afghanistan has consolidated territorial control but severely eroded state capacity. While the regime successfully collects domestic revenues reaching 17 percent of GDP, its ideological rigidity systematically dismantles institutional memory and professional expertise, threatening long-term governance, economic viability, and basic public services.

This structural decay stems from a fundamental tension between the ideological preservation demands of Kandahar and the operational realities of Kabul. Consequently, decrees like the exclusion of 2.4 million girls from education act as a multiplier of state weakness, starving the bureaucracy of future specialists. Control is not capacity. Furthermore, the economy remains stagnant as 3.7 million Afghans pushed back from neighboring countries flood a jobless market. Meanwhile, security challenges persist as ISIS-K targets high-profile officials, and ongoing support for the TTP has triggered border clashes with Pakistan, freezing vital trade crossings and escalating regional tensions.

Comment

The dual-power structure between the supreme leadership in Kandahar and the ministries in Kabul severely degrades the Taliban's command and control efficiency. Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada's centralised decrees bypass the formal cabinet, creating a parallel authority that paralyses administrative decision-making. This friction prevents the Rahbari Shura from establishing a unified bureaucratic hierarchy. Consequently, field commanders and ministers operate in a state of paralysis.

This institutional bifurcation mirrors the post-1979 Iranian dual-power model, where the clerical authority in Qom consistently overrode the executive decisions of the presidency in Tehran. Just as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Guardian Council insulated the regime from pragmatic state adaptation, Kandahar's ideological veto prevents the Kabul ministries from normalising external trade and security relations. Ultimately, this divide ensures that Akhundzada's ideological preservation remains prioritised over the functional survival of the Kabul-based ministries.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If Akhundzada's centralised decrees continue to bypass the formal cabinet, does the Rahbari Shura possess any viable mechanism to prevent the complete institutional collapse of the Kabul-based ministries, or is a formal split inevitable?

The available evidence points toward a prolonged administrative stagnation rather than an abrupt split, as the Rahbari Shura remains deeply bound by wartime loyalty to Akhundzada. My assessment is that the Kabul-based ministries will continue to function as hollowed-out administrative shells, executing ideological decrees while losing the technical capacity to manage basic state functions. This trajectory indicates that the regime will prioritise internal cohesion over institutional efficiency, accepting state decay as the price of movement survival.

Share your assessment in the comments below.

To read in details click here