We Are in World War Xi

Real Clear Defense | Karen Siegemund & Bradley A. Thayer

The People’s Republic of China is leveraging the Russo-Ukrainian war as a strategic mechanism to deplete Western military resources and secure its own geopolitical dominance. By sustaining Moscow's war effort through diplomatic, economic, and dual-use military assistance, Beijing successfully diverts American strategic focus and drains critical U.S. munitions stockpiles.

This calculated support cements Russia's systemic dependence on its eastern neighbor. Consequently, the Kremlin increasingly operates as a subordinate partner, relinquishing regional influence in Central Asia and serving as a geopolitical distraction. Meanwhile, the depletion of American Patriot missiles, ATACMS, and 155mm artillery rounds severely weakens conventional deterrence in the Western Pacific. Beijing has secured its northern and western flanks. This consolidation allows the Chinese Communist Party to prepare for potential kinetic aggression against Taiwan, India, Japan, and the United States, utilizing its United Front Work Department to subvert these adversaries from within.

Comment

The consumption rate of Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors and 155mm artillery rounds in Ukraine exposes the fragility of the Western defence industrial base when forced to support a prolonged high-intensity conflict. This rapid depletion directly compromises the United States Indo-Pacific Command's operational readiness, as replenishment timelines for these critical munitions span several years. Consequently, the transfer of these stockpiles to European and Middle Eastern theatres creates a window of vulnerability in the Western Pacific, where the logistical footprint for a potential conflict over Taiwan requires pre-positioned, high-volume precision munitions.

This logistical strain forces a reassessment of the Pentagon's global ammunition allocation strategy, particularly regarding the pre-positioning of Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-4) in Northeast Asia. As production lines for critical components like solid rocket motors face severe bottlenecks, the strategic reserve margins intended for a contingency in the Taiwan Strait are systematically eroded. Ultimately, this supply-chain deficit limits the operational endurance of the U.S. Seventh Fleet and allied forces during the critical opening phase of any maritime interdiction campaign in the East China Sea.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the depletion of Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors continues at its current pace, does the operational utility of Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-4) in Northeast Asia break down, or can alternative air-defence doctrines compensate for the supply deficit?

The available evidence points toward a severe degradation of the APS-4 framework, as pre-positioned assets cannot easily offset a systemic shortage of advanced interceptors. My assessment is that allied forces in Northeast Asia would be forced to transition from a denial-based air defence posture to a highly distributed, passive survivability doctrine. This shift would inevitably increase the vulnerability of fixed installations like Kadena Air Base to concentrated ballistic missile salvos.

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