Country Guidance: Pakistan

European Union Agency for Asylum 

The European Union Agency for Asylum issued Country Guidance on Pakistan in October 2026 to assist EU+ decision-makers under the Qualification Regulation. Leaders and prominent members of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, leaders of groups advocating Baloch rights, journalists critical of the Pakistan armed forces, persons formally charged with blasphemy, and persons with diverse SOGIESC are assessed as highly likely to qualify for refugee status.

State actors of persecution include the armed forces, Federal Investigation Agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, paramilitary groups and police. Non-state actors include Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, Islamic State Khorasan Province, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan and Balochistan nationalist groups. Risk-impacting circumstances are listed for PTI supporters, protesters, other human-rights defenders, education personnel, polio-vaccination workers, Pashtuns, Baloch, Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, Shia Muslims including Hazaras, women and girls, and children. No areas of mere presence or high-level indiscriminate violence were identified. Indiscriminate violence not at a high level is noted for Balochistan and south and west Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; other regions, including Islamabad Capital Territory, Punjab and Sindh, present no real risk under Article 15(c). Subsidiary protection and internal protection alternative assessments remain available where refugee status is not established.

Comment

The guidance draws a clear distinction between profiles that meet the refugee threshold almost automatically and those that require case-specific risk factors. That distinction rests on the documented reach of both state institutions and regionally anchored non-state groups such as Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan and Islamic State Khorasan Province. The resulting framework channels most claims into an individualised assessment once the highest-risk categories are set aside.

A second-order consequence appears in the provincial mapping of indiscriminate violence. By recording no areas of high-level or mere-presence risk, the guidance shifts residual claims toward subsidiary protection or internal protection alternative analysis, particularly for applicants from Balochistan or south and west Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where violence is present but not ranked as high. The same mapping therefore shapes the practical burden of proof for large volumes of Pakistani caseloads.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the absence of high-level indiscriminate violence zones continues to structure Article 15(c) assessments, which factor would weigh more heavily for applicants from Balochistan: the documented presence of Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan and Baloch nationalist groups or the guidance’s finding of violence not at a high level?

The pattern suggests the guidance’s violence ranking carries greater procedural weight. Even where non-state actors remain active, the classification of indiscriminate violence as not high-level channels most residual claims toward individualised subsidiary-protection or internal-protection analysis rather than a general grant under Article 15(c).

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