India Needs A Littoral Manoeuvre Warfare Concept

Eurasia Review | Siddharth Anil Nair

The Indian Armed Forces currently lack a dedicated littoral manoeuvre warfare doctrine, leaving coastal and island defences reliant on static, unidirectional sea-to-land operations. Modern conflicts in the Black Sea and Red Sea demonstrate how dispersed, land-based precision strike systems and autonomous unmanned platforms can contest maritime domains effectively.

Establishing a formal land-to-sea manoeuvre framework is essential for India to secure critical maritime chokepoints. While amphibious doctrine established in historical operations like Operation Beaver in 1971 emphasised concentrated force projection, contemporary multi-domain warfare requires distributed expeditionary sensor-shooter networks. India already possesses relevant capabilities, exemplified by its export of the BrahMos missile system to the Philippines for archipelagic defence. Current operations remain siloed. Developing a unified joint doctrine through the Integrated Defence Staff will enable emerging theatre commands to transform the Andaman and Laccadive Seas into dynamic sea-denial zones against eastern maritime adversaries.

Comment

Transitioning from traditional amphibious assault to mobile littoral manoeuvre shifts the primary function of shore installations from static coastal defence to active sea denial. Deploying land-based anti-ship cruise missiles like the BrahMos alongside mobile radar nodes converts peripheral islands into offensive interdiction zones rather than isolated outposts. This structural shift requires operational integration across service branches that current doctrine treats as sequential sea-to-shore actions.

A formal doctrine for land-to-sea manoeuvre fundamentally alters the procurement priorities of the Andaman and Nicobar Command. Instead of prioritizing heavy amphibious landing craft, procurement shifts toward long-range uncrewed surface vessels, mobile transporter-erector-launchers, and low-observable sensor relays. Consequently, joint targeting architectures across the Malacca Strait become reliant on distributed tactical nodes rather than centralized naval task groups.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the Andaman and Nicobar Command shifts toward distributed land-to-sea strike nodes across the Malacca Strait, which factor presents a greater operational limit — joint target-data latency between service branches, or the logistical sustainment of isolated island launch teams?

The available evidence points toward target-data latency as the primary operational vulnerability for distributed forces. While mobile launch teams can maintain organic sustainment on isolated land features for extended periods, maintaining real-time sensor-to-shooter telemetry across disparate service networks under active electronic jamming remains technically unproven. Consequently, kill-chain integrity in contested littoral corridors depends far more on secure data-sharing protocols than on forward supply logistics.

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