The Plight of Russia’s Air Power in the Ukraine War: Drone-Driven Innovations and Transformation of Traditional Air Force

Ifri | Pavel Baev

The Russian Aerospace Forces have failed to establish air superiority in Ukraine despite maintaining overwhelming numerical advantages since the 2022 invasion. This operational paralysis has forced Moscow to pivot toward massive tactical and long-range drone production, creating a newly independent Unmanned System Forces command to manage these rapidly expanding capabilities.

This structural shift has severely cannibalised the financial and industrial resources required to modernise Russia's traditional tactical and strategic aviation fleets. The bomber fleet faces irreplaceable attrition. Consequently, the effectiveness of traditional cruise missile strikes has steadily declined. While tactical aviation has adapted by deploying standoff glide bombs, it remains incapable of providing dynamic close air support along the 1,250-kilometre front line. This uneven mix of rapid technological adaptation and systemic industrial degradation ultimately limits Moscow's conventional options, forcing a reliance on combined drone-missile strikes to threaten European NATO allies in future confrontations.

Comment

The creation of the Unmanned System Forces (VBS) as an independent branch reveals a fundamental doctrinal fracture within the Vozdushno-Kosmicheskie Sily (VKS). By separating drone operations from traditional piloted aviation, Moscow has institutionalised a parallel command structure rather than achieving true multi-domain integration. This bureaucratic bifurcation prevents the seamless coordination of tactical air assets and unmanned platforms in contested airspace. Consequently, the VKS struggles to execute complex, synchronized joint-strike packages.

This doctrinal division manifests operationally in the rigid separation of glide-bomb missions from tactical drone reconnaissance. Without a unified command layer, the targeting cycle for Su-34 fighter-bombers remains too slow to exploit real-time telemetry generated by VBS reconnaissance units. This structural friction ensures that VKS Su-34 crews remain restricted to static, pre-planned strikes rather than dynamic battlefield interdiction.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the structural division between the VKS and the newly formed VBS persists, how will Moscow resolve the targeting latency that currently prevents Su-34 crews from executing dynamic battlefield interdiction?

The available evidence points toward a reliance on automated data-sharing links to bridge the command gap, though Russia's domestic microelectronics bottlenecks limit widespread deployment. My assessment is that Moscow will likely bypass deep structural integration, choosing instead to attach dedicated VBS liaison officers directly to Su-34 regiments. This tactical workaround will likely reduce sensor-to-shooter timelines for specific high-priority sectors without resolving the systemic doctrinal friction between the two branches.

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