Escaping the Hormuz trap: What should an agreement to reopen the Strait look like?

Chatham House | Nitya Labh

The United States and Iran remain locked in an unstable maritime standoff following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, where only 16 vessels crossed the Strait on Monday compared to the pre-war average of 138 daily. This disruption has resulted in 85 maritime incidents and 24 seafarer deaths across the Gulf region.

To resolve this crisis, any future agreement must establish a technically precise, reciprocal, and verifiable process rather than a vague grand bargain like the failed June memorandum of understanding. Trust is not enough. A durable arrangement requires defining specific routes, vessel eligibility, and communication protocols between Omani, American, and Iranian maritime authorities. Furthermore, a progressive pause in hostilities must be paired with joint mine-clearance operations and multilateral monitoring by regional actors like Oman. Ultimately, while approaching elections in the US and Israel may interfere with progress, establishing a durable traffic management mechanism is vital to prevent renewed confrontation.

Comment

The operational friction of maintaining a bifurcated transit regime in the Strait of Hormuz directly constrains US Fifth Fleet assets. Escorting UAE-flagged commercial vessels along the newly established southern route while avoiding Iranian territorial waters restricts the tactical manoeuvre space of CTF Sentinel. This geographic compression increases the vulnerability of surface combatants to shore-based anti-ship cruise missiles near Bandar Abbas. Consequently, the daily co-ordination required to prevent accidental incursions into Iranian-claimed waters near Qeshm Island places an unsustainable burden on CTF Sentinel's watchstanders.

This tactical strain downstream degrades the wider maritime security mission across the broader Bab al-Mandeb and Red Sea theatres. As Fifth Fleet redeploys Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to secure the Hormuz corridor, the security umbrella protecting shipping lanes against Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles in the Gulf of Aden weakens. The resulting dispersion of escort vessels leaves commercial traffic vulnerable across the Bab al-Mandeb, demonstrating how localised containment in the Persian Gulf compromises broader sea control across the US Central Command area of responsibility.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If Fifth Fleet continues to commit Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to escort duties along the southern route of the Strait of Hormuz, how will the resulting security deficit in the Gulf of Aden alter the viability of commercial transit through the Bab al-Mandeb?

My assessment is that a prolonged redeployment of these destroyers will force commercial shipping firms to entirely bypass the Red Sea in favour of the Cape of Good Hope route. The available evidence suggests that without the Aegis combat system's area-defence capabilities, merchant vessels transiting the Bab al-Mandeb will face unacceptable risks from Houthi drone and missile salvos. This shift would effectively seal the southern maritime approach to the Suez Canal, compounding the economic shock of the Hormuz closure.

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