Trump 2.0’s Indian Subcontinent Strategy

Takshashila Institution | Abhishek Kadiyala

The second Trump administration has shifted United States strategy across the Indian subcontinent by replacing formally defined regional goals with transactional burden-sharing frameworks. February 2026 congressional testimony by Assistant Secretary of State Paul S. Kapur outlined six core American interests focused on containing unnamed hostile regional powers and securing vital maritime chokepoints.

This approach reframes Indian Ocean security around maritime lanes critical to global trade, particularly amid ongoing escalation in the Strait of Hormuz. Strategic capacity building now prioritises shifting security costs onto partner states rather than deploying direct American capital. India remains Washington's primary regional anchor. However, diverging economic tariffs and the dismantling of USAID humanitarian initiatives have strained bilateral alignment across South Asia. While Washington seeks to leverage Delhi's independent posture against Beijing, domestic US fiscal priorities constrain security guarantees. Consequently, regional stability hinges on whether partner states can assume broader operational mandates without direct US financial backing.

Comment

Washington's pivot toward burden-shifting in the Indian Ocean creates a structural mismatch between American security expectations and regional partner capacities. By prioritizing chokepoint protection around the Strait of Hormuz while reducing USAID developmental funding, the United States risks undermining the broad institutional goodwill required for long-term maritime domain awareness. This transactional posture forces regional capitals like Colombo and Dhaka to recalculate their security dependencies. Consequently, strategic alignment becomes fragmented rather than consolidated around a shared anti-coercion doctrine.

The operational mechanics of this burden-shifting framework rely on partner militaries absorbing patrol costs without reciprocal trade access or technology transfers. While the 2025 National Security Strategy envisions regional allies securing sea lines of communication independently, the absence of preferential tariffs creates economic disincentives for deep defense integration. Without dedicated sustainment packages, naval capabilities across the Indian Subcontinent will remain constrained to coastal surveillance rather than open-ocean interdiction along critical choke points like the Strait of Hormuz.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which carries more weight in sustaining Indian Ocean maritime security under the 2025 National Security Strategy framework — bilateral trade concessions or direct defense industrial transfers — and what happens to partner compliance when neither is offered?

The available evidence points toward defense industrial transfers as the primary driver of operational compliance, given that partner navies require physical platforms to maintain sea-lane surveillance. However, my assessment is that withholding trade concessions creates an insurmountable political barrier, leading regional states to seek balance through secondary partnerships. Without economic offsets, burden-shifting frameworks in maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz will yield passive surveillance rather than active burden-sharing.

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