Jaishankar’s Baku Visit Opens a New Chapter in Azerbaijan–India Relations

The Jamestown Foundation | Vasif Huseynov

Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar visited Baku on 23 October, marking the first bilateral visit by an Indian foreign minister to Azerbaijan in eight years. The diplomatic engagement seeks to repair relations strained after Baku backed Pakistan following Indian military strikes in May 2025. Tensions had triggered a 56 percent drop in Indian tourist arrivals alongside diplomatic friction over Azerbaijan’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization bid.

Both governments are now prioritizing economic cooperation, with bilateral trade reaching approximately $600 million in nine months, up from $401 million in 2025. Azerbaijan exported 524,338 tons of crude oil to India during this period, representing a fourfold increase. Energy trade leads the bilateral economic recovery. Over 1,000 Indian companies currently operate in Azerbaijan, while ONGC Videsh holds a 2.925 percent stake in the Azeri oil fields. Transport connectivity along the International North-South Transport Corridor remains central to New Delhi’s strategy. However, unresolved Indian defense sales to Armenia continue to test the bilateral thaw.

How Chinese Investments in Afghanistan Are Aiding the Taliban—and Hurting the People

The National Interest | Natiq Malikzada

China has rapidly expanded commercial and diplomatic engagements in Afghanistan following the August 2021 US military withdrawal, securing long-term resource extraction rights across multiple provinces. The Taliban leadership directly coordinates these investments by deploying Chinese-speaking Afghan officials through key ministries to guide corporate delegations toward lucrative mining concessions.

In January 2023, Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company secured a 25-year contract committing $540 million to develop the Amu Darya oil basin. Subsequent gold extraction projects in Takhar and Badakhshan provinces became active by January 2026. Local populations face severe environmental costs. This institutional coordination provides crucial non-Western revenue for Kabul while expanding Beijing's footprint across regional resource networks. Diplomatically, Beijing hosted Taliban-Pakistan peace talks in Urumqi in April 2026. President Xi Jinping accepted credentials from the Taliban ambassador in January 2024, despite withholding formal state recognition. These developments consolidate Chinese economic influence in post-withdrawal Central Asia.

The Taliban after five years in power

International Institute for Strategic Studies

The Taliban has consolidated domestic control across Afghanistan over five years in power, avoiding state collapse while building diplomatic links across Central Asia, China, India, and the European Union. Host capitals accept de facto Afghan ambassadors, yet Russia is the sole nation offering formal diplomatic recognition. Operational sanctuary granted to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan insurgents fuels severe conflict with Islamabad.

Cross-border logistics and safe havens sustain TTP strikes in Pakistani cities like Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan. Border closures strain trade. Islamabad uses mass Afghan refugee deportations, prolonged border blockades, and airstrikes to leverage Kabul. Internal Taliban friction complicates negotiations, as leaders such as Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who spent eight years in Pakistani custody before his 2018 release, harbour deep resentment toward Islamabad. Ideological ties to Mullah Akhundzada and rising Afghan nationalism ensure Kabul resists severing operational ties with TTP fighters along the Durand Line.

Whoever Controls the Water May Decide the Next War

RealClearWorld | Colton Overcash

Pakistan warned in April 2025 that stopping treaty-protected river flows constitutes an act of war, illustrating how upstream hydropolitics drives military escalation risks across critical transboundary basins. India subsequently placed the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance following a Kashmir security crisis, prompting an August 2026 Court of Arbitration ruling that New Delhi rejected.

Structural vulnerabilities extend globally across key riparian choke points. In July 2025, China initiated a major hydropower project on the Yarlung Tsangpo, heightening security anxieties in downstream India and Bangladesh. Meanwhile, dams along the Mekong River have shifted up to 20 percent of seasonal water volumes, undermining downstream agriculture. Hydrological disruption triggers intense geopolitical friction. Similarly, Ethiopia inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in September 2025, creating strategic friction with water-dependent Egypt during potential drought cycles. Consequently, infrastructure control allows upstream states to exert decisive leverage, forcing downstream nations to treat river management as a vital national security imperative.

The Rising Threat of Great Power War and the Lessons of 1914

Council on Foreign Relations | James M. Lindsay

Great power competition and rising autocracies are rapidly eroding post–Cold War stability as Russia wages war in Ukraine and China expands its military forces near Taiwan. Yale historian Odd Arne Westad warns that contemporary multipolarity closely mirrors the structural instability of pre-World War I Europe. Shifting economic power and intensifying regional nationalism create systemic vulnerabilities across volatile geopolitical chokepoints.

Dispersed power and rapid military expansion can trigger unintended escalation without leaders explicitly choosing conflict. In 1914, European powers miscalculated how localized Balkan instability could instantly trigger a continental catastrophe. War can ignite without deliberate intent. Today, instantaneous global communications, complex security alliances, and emerging artificial intelligence further compress decision-making time, making accidental escalation even more dangerous. Avoiding a wider regional or global crisis requires state leaders to actively resolve localized peripheral conflicts before rapid strategic dynamics push opposing coalitions past the point of no return.

China’s Economics of Denial

Foreign Affairs | Oliver Melton, Logan Wright

China’s Communist Party leadership continues to prioritise state-directed investment in manufacturing and advanced technologies despite acute deflation, collapsing real estate activity, and weak domestic household consumption. Beijing acknowledges that its export-reliant growth model generates severe trade friction with international partners, yet policymakers resist switching to consumption-led stimulus. Government-guided capital channels low-cost credit through state bank relending facilities and public equity funds directly into strategic industrial sectors.

Planners believe controlling physical capital and advanced technology will automatically trigger long-term productivity gains and wage growth. This state-centric approach fails when industrial output remains decoupled from aggregate demand. China’s export growth barely slowed despite American tariffs and European duties on electric vehicles. Central planning depresses total productivity. Consequently, state intervention ossifies domestic markets, limits enterprise bankruptcies, and forces excess industrial output onto global markets at discounted prices, escalating trade tensions across both developed and emerging economies.

The Dual Threat: Why Beijing’s Collapse Is Just As Dangerous as Its Rise

Real Clear Defense | Efraín Vázquez-Vera

Beijing’s structural economic deterioration and lingering property crisis present Western democracies with a dual strategic threat: an internal regime collapse or an entrenched illiberal hegemony. China’s growth accelerated significantly following its 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization, yet expanding multipolar ambitions and massive local government debt now severely strain its financial foundations.

Severe economic distress creates acute regime instability. Declining autocracies facing internal legitimacy deficits often resort to manufactured external conflicts to sustain domestic control. Nearly one in five young Chinese workers currently faces unemployment. Consequently, strategic flashpoints such as the Taiwan Strait could trigger from Beijing’s domestic desperation rather than external military provocations. Meanwhile, Tokyo’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific initiative offers a debt-free economic alternative to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, demonstrating how networked democracies can build regional resilience against Chinese state collapse or revisionist expansion across vulnerable theaters like Latin America.

Can China tame its war machine?

South China Morning Post | Chow Chung-yan

China's expanding anti-corruption drive has targeted top military-industrial leaders, sweeping through state-owned aerospace enterprises and the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force. High-level discipline probes brought down Politburo member Ma Xingrui alongside nearly two-fifths of alternate Central Committee members representing the defence sector. This purge highlights a fundamental structural dilemma facing Beijing's military modernisation strategy.

Technocratic representation of defence and aerospace engineers on the Central Committee doubled from 13 members in 2007 to 26 by 2022. One credible interpretation views this deep political integration of technical specialists as essential for closing critical high-technology capability gaps with Washington. Conversely, evidence of widespread procurement graft suggests that empowering an autonomous military-industrial complex risks generating self-serving bureaucratic rot reminiscent of Soviet and American historical precedents. Beijing faces severe strategic trade-offs. The party leadership seeks to enforce rigorous civilian oversight and financial discipline without crippling long-term defence innovation.

Buy, Don’t Steal: The Economics of Cognitive Warfare

Small Wars Journal | Robert Green

Chinese state-backed actors downloaded voter registration records from six US states in January 2022 without breaching any cyber defences, incurring negligible acquisition costs. Commercial availability allowed Chinese intelligence to acquire millions of personal data points legally for less than a standard six-figure price tag. In contrast, covert inbox compromise via contractors like i-Soon costs between $10,000 and $75,000 per target account, while zero-day exploits reach up to $7 million.

Data-driven influence campaigns exploit this asymmetry by converting cheap personal records into tailored targeting engines for digital psychological operations. This creates an unpriced national security liability across democratic populations. A single drone costs $35,000. Data acquisition costs even less, allowing hostile powers to scale personalised disinformation while avoiding sanctions, attribution, or exploit burning. Expanding bulk-data transfer restrictions under Executive Order 14117 raises foreign acquisition costs, forcing adversary collection back into expensive covert channels.

The Suez Crisis and the Iran War

The National Interest | Trevor Filseth

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Franco-British Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956 to fund the Aswan Dam after the United States cancelled its financial aid. The unilateral declaration ended a 99-year lease negotiated in the 1860s and triggered severe diplomatic outrage from British Prime Minister Anthony Eden.

Secret collusion followed. In mid-October 1956, British, French, and Israeli officials convened at a covert conference in Sèvres, France, to execute a coordinated military deception scheme. Under the secret plan, Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula to provide a pretext for British and French forces to land near the canal under the guise of protecting international shipping. This covert arrangement sought to regain control over the vital Red Sea passage and force Nasser from power. The crisis highlighted how clandestine coordination and deliberate attribution manipulation can obscure operational motives in major maritime chokepoint disputes.

Preparing for the Next Crisis

Center for Strategic and International Studies | Josiane Atallah

Saudi Arabia’s public warning systems failed to alert civilians prior to the deadliest single attack on a Gulf Arab state since the start of the Iran war. This silence highlighted dangerous structural gaps in regional emergency preparedness as missile and uncrewed aerial vehicle strikes intensify across urban centres.

Following the June 2025 12-day war and subsequent escalations, governments in Iran, Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait deployed new Cell Broadcast mobile alert networks to transmit rapid evacuation notifications. Meanwhile, emergency management authorities in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar modified system notification frequencies after initial acoustic alerts caused widespread public panic. Conversely, conflict-torn Levant nations including Lebanon and Syria lack unified national warning architecture entirely. Darkness compounds these operational vulnerabilities. Expanding early warning coverage across the Middle East represents a crucial shift toward active passive defense, enabling populations to reach shelters before incoming warheads detonate.

Iran’s Maritime Threat And The Conflict In Yemen – Analysis

Eurasia Review | Can Kasapoğlu

Iranian security officials threatened to target Middle East undersea cables if US or Israeli military strikes against Tehran resume. The Red Sea maritime corridor carries approximately 90 percent of Europe–Asia internet capacity and 3 percent of global bandwidth demand. A previous February 2024 Houthi missile attack on the bulk carrier MV Rubymar caused a dragging anchor to sever three undersea cables.

To support seabed operations, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is developing underwater platforms including Nazir-series unmanned vehicles and Sabehat-15 swimmer delivery craft. Operational deployment remains unverified. Concurrently, the Guards conducted at least 23 maritime attacks near the Strait of Hormuz in October 2026, including five engine-room strikes disabling commercial tankers. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations recorded 135 total incidents by 16 October 2026. Engine strikes disable ship propulsion. These persistent asymmetric attacks highlight growing Iranian capabilities to disrupt critical maritime transit while operating under technical constraints and unproven deployment capacities.

Inside the Democrats' Plans to Take On Trump

TIME | Nik Popli, Julia Terruso

Democratic candidates won control of both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate in the 2026 midterm elections, flipping at least 29 House seats and seizing key red-state Senate contests. This sweeping victory positions Representative Hakeem Jeffries to become the first Black Speaker of the House, creating a formidable legislative barrier to President Donald Trump.

Widespread voter discontent over inflation, cuts to Medicaid, sweeping tariffs, and the war in Iran drove the decisive partisan alignment shift. Congressional power dynamics have shifted dramatically. Democrats are now preparing an aggressive investigative strategy focused on executive branch corruption, presidential business ventures, and military decision-making. Congressional committees plan to subpoena executive records concerning cryptocurrency ventures, presidential aircraft donations from Qatar, and tariff exemptions granted to major campaign contributors. While presidential veto threats will block major Democratic legislative proposals, party leadership intends to leverage congressional subpoena powers to shape the strategic environment for the 2028 presidential election.

The Pentagon’s AI Rush Needs Adult Supervision

Real Clear Defense | Michael Aaron Cody

A reported security incident involving a defense contractor connecting a personal commercial artificial intelligence agent to a sensitive Pentagon network has exposed severe operational vulnerabilities in military software adoption. According to a 29 October report by WIRED, an unauthorized account for Claude Code—a commercial coding tool that automates software tasks—operated undetected for two months on multi-agency intelligence systems, allegedly transmitting credentials and network topologies to a high-risk external site.

Security discipline failed over two months. This operational failure demonstrates how routine reliance on commercial software undermines institutional access controls across unclassified national security infrastructure. While the contractor's employer disputes the allegations and no classified network compromise occurred, the event reveals systemic governance gaps across Department of Defense workflows. Over-reliance on contractor-managed environments creates unmonitored pathways for data exfiltration. The CIA, NSA, and military leadership face growing scrutiny over whether existing accreditation framework controls can safely accommodate rapid corporate artificial intelligence integration.

What Are U.S. Military Options in Iran?

Center for Strategic and International Studies | Benjamin Jensen

The United States military is evaluating six operational options against Iran to support ongoing negotiations while maintaining its existing economic sanctions and naval blockade. Building upon previous actions such as Operation Midnight Hammer, Washington seeks to leverage military coercion without triggering an uncontrollable regional escalation. Implementation faces severe operational constraints.

These limits include low US precision-munition stockpiles and potential Iranian ballistic missile retaliations against critical regional infrastructure. Proposed courses of action range from coercive diplomacy involving carrier strike group deployments to high-risk options like large-scale special forces raids on underground uranium enrichment facilities. Crucially, counter-regime strike campaigns modeled after Operation Allied Force risk drawing US forces into a protracted ground war across a territory 151 times larger than Kosovo. Furthermore, a sustained sea control campaign targeting fast attack craft and anti-ship cruise missiles competes directly with strategic deterrence priorities against China, Russia, and North Korea.

How AI Backlash Shaped the 2026 Midterms

Time | Andrew R. Chow, Harry Booth

Democratic candidates won pivotal 2026 midterm races across Ohio, Kansas, and Wisconsin by leveraging voter backlash against artificial intelligence data centers and Big Tech expansion. An NBC exit poll revealed that 56% of electorate members considered AI infrastructure a major factor in their congressional voting decisions. Local friction over rising energy bills, ambient noise, and environmental consumption transformed data center development into a decisive electoral liability.

Municipal voters recalled supportive mayors and enacted local construction moratoriums in multiple states. Industry super PACs failed to translate massive capital expenditures into electoral victories despite tech executive Elon Musk contributing $446 million to political campaigns. Money did not buy votes. Meanwhile, pro-safety advocacy groups outmanoeuvred accelerationist donors in high-profile congressional races. Although federal legislative gridlock may impede sweeping congressional bills, state-level regulatory measures, particularly in California, are poised to establish national operational standards for frontier AI systems.

Seventy years ago today marked the beginning of the “Suez Crisis”—and the end of the British Empire as a global superpower. What can American strategists learn from it?

National Interest | Staff Writer

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956 after the United States cancelled funding for the Aswan Dam. In response, Britain, France, and Israel executed a secret military plan on 29 October 1956 to seize the waterway and depose Nasser. The crucial turning point arrived not on the battlefield, but when Washington intervened economically.

US President Dwight D. Eisenhower blocked Emergency IMF funding and threatened to sell British government bonds, forcing a complete Anglo-French ceasefire by 6 November 1956. Britain's superpower status collapsed overnight. The historical sequence highlights a critical flaw repeated in recent strategic planning. During 2026 air strikes against Iran, American and Israeli forces killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to prompt regime collapse. However, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps quickly consolidated power and maintained its chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz, demonstrating that military dominance cannot guarantee political capitulation without viable post-conflict strategies.

'This is a disaster': Angry Republicans blame Trump for midterms defeat

BBC | Daniel Bush

The US Democratic Party secured majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate during the November 2026 midterm elections, defeating Republicans in traditional strongholds including Texas, Kansas, and South Carolina. This defeat leaves US President Donald Trump facing legislative investigations, stalled judicial appointments, and blocked executive initiatives for the remainder of his second term.

Republican strategists attributed the losses to a tension between Trump's focus on personal legacy projects—such as White House construction and self-promotions—and the operational demands of mid-term campaign outreach. Turnout dropped across competitive districts. Economic dissatisfaction, high fuel prices, and ongoing military entanglements in Iran further depressed GOP turnout despite hundreds of millions spent by the MAGA Inc. Super PAC. While White House allies noted historical mid-term headwinds facing incumbent presidents since 1934, party figures cited off-message rallies and controversial decisions, including an October Russian diesel agreement, as decisive factors in shifting voter sentiment toward moderate Democratic candidates.

Anthony Zurcher: Midterm carnage weakens Trump but he still wields power for now

BBC News | Anthony Zurcher

The US Democratic Party secured majorities in both houses of Congress during the 2026 midterm elections, severely curtailing President Donald Trump's domestic legislative pathway. While the shift restricts legislative initiative, executive power operates through unilateral mechanisms that require no congressional approval, including presidential orders for trade tariffs and direct military deployments.

In practice, executive authority allows a president to issue binding directives to federal agencies and command armed operations abroad, as demonstrated in Venezuela and Iran. Presidential vetoes require two-thirds congressional majorities to override. However, mounting political friction within Republican ranks—highlighted by Vice-President JD Vance attributing electoral losses to the war in Iran—undermines executive leverage. Reports regarding the potential replacement of Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth parallel George W. Bush's 2006 dismissal of Donald Rumsfeld following midterm setbacks. While constitutional mechanisms preserve presidential decree authority, diminishing party discipline inherently limits effective executive control during a final term.

The New Congress Can Repair Civil-Military Relations

Foreign Affairs | Peter D. Feaver, Heidi Urben

Article I of the United States Constitution grants Congress expansive authority to raise, maintain, and equip the armed forces, yet recent executive actions have systematically eroded established civil-military norms without significant legislative oversight. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth addressed military personnel at Quantico, Virginia, in September 2026, exemplifying a period dominated by executive-led initiatives that threaten to reshape military professionalism for a generation.

Congress holds formal authority. Unilateral executive maneuvers over the preceding two years operated with minimal parliamentary intervention or institutional pushback from Capitol Hill. This structural imbalance leaves open questions regarding how lawmakers will reassert legislative prerogatives. While mid-2020s civil-military governance faces growing strain, the available source excerpt cuts off before identifying specific legislative strategies or statutory remedies. Restoring constitutional balance requires active congressional assertion, yet the precise mechanism for reclaiming statutory oversight remains unstated within the truncated commentary, highlighting an unresolved institutional tension in American defence governance.

After midterm defeat, Trump faces mostly bad options in Iran

Axios | Barak Ravid

Following significant Republican losses in the U.S. midterm elections, President Donald Trump faces conflicting internal pressures to either resume bombing Iran, negotiate a settlement, or maintain a prolonged economic blockade. Vice President JD Vance publicly attributed the political defeat to elevated energy costs stemming from the conflict. The political fallout has intensified strategic debate within the administration.

Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent advocate sustaining naval blockades and economic sanctions to compel regime degradation over time. Qatari mediators are attempting to broker a draft agreement, though public celebrations by Iranian officials—such as Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei—risk prompting Washington to restart major offensive operations. Meanwhile, U.S. military forces are finalizing preparations for potential combat operations if diplomatic avenues collapse. High domestic energy prices remain a key vulnerability. Ultimately, Washington must balance immediate political liability against long-term nuclear proliferation risks.

Two Tracks To Tehran: The New Efforts To Stop Another US-Iran War – Analysis

Eurasia Review | Ellie Geranmayeh

European and Middle Eastern powers convened in Istanbul on 23 October 2026 to launch diplomatic initiatives designed to prevent a high-intensity war between the United States and Iran. Representatives from the E4 group, comprising Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, alongside the R4 alliance of Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, addressed key security priorities, including defending Saudi territory against Houthi strikes and safeguarding the Strait of Hormuz.

Middle powers are increasingly managing regional security independent of Washington. Tensions escalated following the activation of collective deterrence measures under the Mecca Defence Alliance to protect critical energy infrastructure. Additionally, senior security chiefs from Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia met Iranian leaders in Tehran to avert escalating hostilities and mitigate global supply chain disruptions. The E4 and R4 seek to utilize targeted sanctions, post-sanctions commercial investments, and drone component interdictions to constrain Iranian and Israeli military actions while maintaining regional trade route stability.

Pulling The Funding: Trump, Israel And US Military Assistance – OpEd

Eurasia Review | Binoy Kampmark

US President Donald Trump announced on 3 November 2026 that Washington and Jerusalem had agreed to end the ten-year, $38 billion military aid package established under the Obama administration after 2026. The decision curtails annual provisions of $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and $500 million in missile defence funding while leaving ad-hoc assistance and bilateral arms sales open.

This planned termination aligns with evolving Israeli defense doctrines outlined by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Institute for National Security Studies Director Tamir Hayman. Both figures argue that heavy strategic dependence on American funding creates existential operational vulnerabilities. Autarky has become necessary. Hayman advocates mending these vulnerabilities by accelerating domestic production in sovereign defense technology, artificial intelligence, and cyber capabilities to mitigate foreign embargoes and supply chain disruptions. Despite ending direct grant funding, core military cooperation and defense industrial transactions between both nations will persist.

Eisenkot Gains Arab Joint List Backing To Form Israeli Government

Eurasia Review

Israeli opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot has secured potential endorsement from 67 lawmakers in the 120-member Knesset after two Arab-led parties backed his bid to form Israel’s next coalition government. Following the inconclusive 27 October parliamentary election, the 11-seat Joint List and eight-seat United Arab List endorsed the former military chief to block Benjamin Netanyahu’s return to power.

Arab-majority lists won a record 19 seats. Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc secured 53 seats while Eisenkot’s centrist Yashar party and its allies won 48, leaving neither major faction with an independent majority. President Isaac Herzog initiated formal faction consultations to determine which leader receives the recommendation mandate. During ongoing discussions, Netanyahu asserted unproven claims of foreign electoral interference, while Arab lawmakers denounced political persecution following illicit foreign funding allegations against one representative. The potential anti-Netanyahu coalition relies on ideological opposition, leaving operational policy consensus across these diverse factions unconfirmed and highly uncertain.

Ending a War With Iran’s Regime Does Not Necessarily Mean Peace

RealClearWorld | Hamid Enayat

The 14-point memorandum of understanding signed on 17 June 2026 between Donald Trump and Masoud Pezeshkian failed to secure lasting peace, as military attacks and maritime threats quickly resumed. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei conditioned Iran's compliance on protecting the strategic interests of its regional proxy network. This outcome mirrors the 20 August 1988 ceasefire under UN Security Council Resolution 598, which halted the Iran-Iraq War without establishing a permanent peace settlement.

Systemic reliance on external confrontation allows the Iranian leadership to justify domestic repression while insulating its security establishment from political accountability. Ceasefires leave military supply chains intact. A Reuters investigation revealed over 5,000 Defense Ministry-linked procurement entities, including one importing 2.3 billion dollars in dual-use goods between January 2025 and June 2026. Ongoing Qatari-mediated talks face severe structural limits unless future diplomatic agreements explicitly enforce curbs on state violence and military logistics.