After Putin: Russia’s Coming Succession Crisis

Foreign Affairs | Julian G. Waller

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s entrenchment of an aging gerontocracy within key state security organs has created a structural blockage that threatens a chaotic power struggle upon his eventual departure. By concentrating authority among septuagenarian loyalists in the Federal Security Service, Security Council, and General Staff, the Kremlin regime actively prevents generational turnover while denying younger officials essential administrative experience.

This institutional stagnation mirrors the post-Stalin succession struggle of 1953, where an informal selectorate operating inside the Soviet Union’s formal constitutional apparatus engaged in years-long factional maneuvers to seize ultimate executive authority. Without a designated heir or a vice-presidential office, any transitional acting leader, such as Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, would face severe resistance from competing security elites. Consequently, bypassing middle-tier bureaucrats to rapidly promote elite scions elevates intergenerational friction, greatly increasing the risk of internal regime destabilization during a presidential transition.

Comment

Parallels between contemporary Kremlin dynamics and the 1953 purge of Lavrenty Beria demonstrate how informal elite networks subvert official constitutional procedures during Russian leadership transitions. Following Stalin's death, institutional control over internal security apparatuses proved insufficient without the collective backing of competing bureaucratic factions inside the Soviet Presidium. The modern concentration of security functions within the Federal Security Service and Security Council reflects a similar vulnerability, where formal authority remains subordinate to personalist alignment among aging power brokers. That structural architecture guarantees that any future succession will be decided through opaque elite bargaining rather than constitutional mechanics.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If an unexpected transition forces the Federal Security Service into a coalition similar to the 1953 Soviet Presidium, which specific institutional leverage point—control over domestic security forces or administrative authority over executive ministries—is likely to dictate the initial outcome?

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