6 September 2026

Can Israel End Its Forever Wars?

Foreign Affairs | Amos Harel

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has adopted a strategic doctrine of continuous, preemptive warfare following Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack, prioritizing unilateral military intervention against regional security threats regardless of geopolitical costs. Preparing for national elections in October 2026 after three years of uninterrupted regional conflict, Netanyahu has openly rejected long-term diplomatic settlements in favor of perpetual military readiness.

Strategic exhaustion threatens national stability. The ongoing campaign has exacted immense economic tolls, severe societal friction, and eroding support within key Western alliance networks, particularly the United States. Even if opposition leaders such as former military chief Gadi Eisenkot challenge the government, the underlying defense posture of continuous military action has become deeply embedded within Israel’s political and military establishment. Consequently, the operational footprint of this proactive security doctrine is likely to outlast Netanyahu's personal political tenure, permanently binding future leadership to an unending cycle of military engagements across Middle Eastern fronts.

Comment

The formalisation of institutionalised preemptive warfare marks a fundamental departure from the IDF's traditional operational concept of decisive, short-duration offensive manoeuvres established during Operation Defensive Shield in 2002. Rather than seeking clear tactical culmination through rapid force projection, the current doctrine embeds perpetual attrition directly into Israeli strategic planning. This structural shift redefines military victory from achieving political settlement to maintaining continuous operational dominance across hostile borders.

Mechanically, this doctrine relies on persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance networks paired with rapid-reaction strike packages managed by IDF Northern Command and Southern Command. By institutionalising low-intensity, high-frequency strikes, the IDF replaces periodic surge operations with a permanent baseline of military pressure. Consequently, IDF force structure requirements permanently privilege high-readiness standing brigades and rapid aerial targeting cycles over traditional reserve division mobilization.

Strategic Question for Discussion
If the IDF permanently shifts from the rapid culmination model of Operation Defensive Shield to continuous preemptive attrition, how does that structural load affect the long-term readiness and sustainment of Israel's reserve division system?
The available evidence points toward severe structural friction within the IDF's mobilization model as continuous preemptive operations erode the traditional citizen-soldier balance. Transitioning from short, high-intensity maneuvers like Operation Defensive Shield to indefinite deployment cycles risks overstretching reserve formations and degrading unit readiness. My assessment is that this shift will ultimately force an institutional transition toward a larger, highly professionalized standing force at the expense of Israel's historic reliance on mass reserve call-ups.
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