Naming is Not Knowing: Why Cognitive Warfare Studies Need a Methodological Reset

Small Wars Journal | Oriane Cohen

NATO's 2020 cognitive warfare study triggered an unprecedented expansion of speculative military concepts that now outpaces actual operational understanding. This rapid conceptual inflation risks undermining Western strategic decision-making by replacing empirical analysis with redundant terminology. Scholars and defense institutions increasingly prioritize publishing novel taxonomies over verifying real-world operational efficacy.

Historically, doctrines like Soviet reflexive control from the 1960s and the Chinese People's Liberation Army's 2003 'three warfares' framework established clear boundaries by linking perception management directly to statecraft. Modern literature, however, treats the human brain as an isolated battlefield. This approach ignores how distributed cognition actually filters information through external organizational layers. Terminology must explain reality. Consequently, the gap between theoretical classification and actual tactical capability continues to widen. By failing to anchor new concepts in observable gray-zone mechanisms, the defense community risks installing institutional arbiters of truth rather than enhancing cognitive security through practical, evidence-based joint military defense measures.

Comment

The proliferation of abstract terminology in Western cognitive warfare studies contrasts sharply with the highly structured application of the Chinese People's Liberation Army's 'Three Warfares' doctrine. While Western analysts focus on categorising psychological phenomena, Beijing integrates public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare directly into its operational planning. This conceptual divergence leaves Western forces ill-equipped to counter coordinated gray-zone campaigns that exploit systemic institutional vulnerabilities rather than individual cognitive biases.

Consequently, Allied Command Transformation faces a growing disconnect between theoretical research and actual tactical readiness. This gap delays the integration of defensive countermeasures into joint exercises like Steadfast Defender, where forces remain trained for kinetic engagements rather than multi-domain information confrontation. Ultimately, the lack of a standardised, empirically verified doctrine prevents the deployment of effective defensive capabilities across the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If Western military academies continue to generate speculative cognitive warfare taxonomies, what are the operational consequences for Allied Command Transformation when attempting to counter the Chinese People's Liberation Army's 'Three Warfares' doctrine in the Indo-Pacific?

The current trajectory indicates that Western forces will remain reactive, struggling to translate academic theories into actionable defence plans. My assessment is that this doctrinal gap allows adversaries to exploit institutional seams before Allied Command Transformation can establish standardised countermeasures. Consequently, the lack of empirical validation ensures that joint exercises will continue to overlook the non-kinetic dimensions of modern conflict.

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