Silk Cage Webinar Report-V: Hormuz in the Silk Cage: China’s Choke Point Strategy by 2030–35

Institute for Security and Development Policy | Gedaliah Afterman, Dominik Mierzejewski, Norah M. Huang, Kristian Alexander, In-bum Chun, Jagannath Panda, Anne Weiler, Sevil Khikmatova

The Strait of Hormuz is emerging as a critical node in China's evolving "strategic cage" as Beijing seeks to convert its commercial and energy dependencies into long-term geopolitical leverage by 2030–35. This maritime corridor, which handles a significant share of globally traded oil and liquefied natural gas, is increasingly integrated into China's broader Maritime Silk Road architecture.

The transition remains highly contested. Regional powers like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Qatar continue to balance expanding Chinese economic ties against their traditional security relationships with the United States. Meanwhile, the strategic utility of post-war Iran and the operational integration of Pakistan's Gwadar port remain pivotal to Beijing's long-term calculations. Ultimately, protecting these vital shipping interests may compel the People's Liberation Army Navy to assume a much larger operational role. This shift directly challenges the strategic interests of India, Japan, Europe, and the United States.

Comment

China's projected naval expansion around the Strait of Hormuz exposes the operational limits of its single regional outpost in Djibouti. Sustaining continuous escort operations and surface presence in the Gulf requires more than occasional anti-piracy task groups. Without dedicated logistics hubs closer to the chokepoint, Type 052D destroyers operating in these waters remain vulnerable to prolonged maintenance cycles and supply bottlenecks.

This operational deficit will likely accelerate Beijing's efforts to secure dual-use commercial-military access at Pakistan's Gwadar port. Integrating Gwadar into the PLA Navy's Indian Ocean logistics network would shorten transit times for replenishment vessels and provide a critical fallback option outside the Persian Gulf. Consequently, the success of this logistical pivot depends heavily on securing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor against persistent regional insurgencies.

Strategic Question for Discussion

How would persistent security disruptions along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor affect the viability of Gwadar port as a primary logistical node for PLA Navy operations near the Strait of Hormuz?

The available evidence suggests that overland disruptions would force Beijing to rely on vulnerable sea lanes to sustain Gwadar, undermining its utility as a rapid-response fallback. Consequently, the PLA Navy would remain dependent on its Djibouti base or direct deployments from the Eastern Theater Command, limiting its ability to project sustained power during a Gulf crisis. This vulnerability indicates that commercial port access cannot easily substitute for secure, contiguous land corridors.

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