Greater Than the Sum: Considerations for Framing Force Modernization

Small Wars Journal | Ian Whitfield

United States military services are concurrently executing independent force modernisation plans while the joint integration mechanism remains in transition following the 2025 dismantling of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. These uncoordinated efforts risk prioritising service-specific autonomy over joint operational requirements, which potentially compromises future combat readiness.

Recent operations like the $4 billion Joint Task Force-Southern Spear and the $34 to $42 billion Operation Epic Fury have already depleted critical munitions reserves, exposing vulnerabilities in the assumption that near-peer-focused forces can easily handle lesser contingencies. Munitions depletion remains a critical vulnerability. To reconcile these disparate designs, a proposed four-function model maps modernisation across strategy, tactics, theory, and practice. This framework tracks how the Army's Transformation Initiative, the Navy's Golden Fleet, and the Marine Corps' Force Design translate environmental assumptions into capabilities. Ultimately, comparing these service-specific hypotheses of success allows observers to evaluate structural assumptions before budget disputes arise.

Comment

The 2025 dismantling of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System exposes a fundamental vulnerability in joint force integration. Without this central reconciling mechanism, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council lacks the institutional leverage to prevent individual services from prioritising autonomous designs. Consequently, initiatives like the Navy's Golden Fleet and the Army's Transformation Initiative risk developing incompatible tactical networks. This divergence directly threatens the realisation of unified multi-domain operations.

The downstream effect of this integration deficit will likely manifest as severe data-sharing failures during joint operations within the First Island Chain. Specifically, the lack of a unified requirements framework will prevent the seamless sharing of targeting telemetry between Marine Corps littoral regiments and Air Force strike packages. Ultimately, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council will find itself unable to synchronise these disparate service-specific kill webs during a Taiwan Strait contingency.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the Joint Requirements Oversight Council continues to operate without a centralized reconciliation mechanism like the dismantled JCIDS, does the concept of joint multi-domain command and control still hold, or does it break down into isolated service-specific networks?

The current trajectory indicates that joint multi-domain command and control will likely fragment into incompatible service-centric architectures. Without the enforcement power of a centralised requirements system, individual services are reverting to proprietary data standards to protect their institutional autonomy. Consequently, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council will likely be reduced to managing budget disputes rather than ensuring operational interoperability.

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