The BRICS+: rebels without a common cause

Engelsberg Ideas | Ved Shinde

The BRICS+ summit in New Delhi exposed deep strategic divisions among China, Russia, and India, pulling the expanded ten-member bloc in conflicting directions. Beijing leverages the forum to project global statesmanship, Moscow seeks an anti-Western coalition to bypass sanctions, and New Delhi utilises the platform as a multilateral economic hedge.

This institutional friction traces back to the group's 2006 founding, when shared suspicion of Western financial dominance initially united the emerging economies. However, China's massive economic rise has since fractured this peer-group dynamic. Cohesion has further deteriorated. Despite representing 45 per cent of the global population and 35 per cent of global GDP, the expanded bloc suffers from internal bilateral disputes. Tensions persist between Egypt and Ethiopia, while Saudi Arabia avoids formal commitment. Meanwhile, India cultivates European ties with Germany and Poland to balance its position. Ultimately, the bloc remains a contradictory diplomatic club.

Comment

New Delhi's participation in the BRICS+ summit reflects a calculated hedging strategy designed to preserve strategic autonomy while managing its primary security challenge along the Line of Actual Control. By maintaining its footprint in the forum, India prevents the bloc from transforming into a cohesive, Beijing-led instrument of geopolitical revisionism. This diplomatic balancing act allows India to leverage its relations with the Global South without compromising its deep security integration with the United States through the Quad framework.

The downstream consequence of this dual-track diplomacy is a more pronounced reliance on bilateral European security partnerships to offset continental vulnerabilities. New Delhi's recent engagement with Polish Deputy Prime Minister Radosław Sikorski and the deepening of the India-Germany strategic partnership serve as critical counterweights to both Russian defence supply disruptions and Chinese regional assertiveness. Ultimately, these European linkages, particularly co-development projects under the India-Germany defence agreement, provide New Delhi with the technological alternatives necessary to sustain its long-term deterrence capabilities against the People's Liberation Army.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If New Delhi's reliance on the India-Germany defence agreement fails to offset Russian supply bottlenecks, how will India balance its commitments to the Quad framework against its continental deterrence requirements along the Line of Actual Control?

The trajectory indicates that New Delhi would likely accelerate its domestic defence manufacturing under the 'Make in India' initiative while selectively expanding joint exercises with Quad partners to signal maritime resolve. However, a prolonged shortfall in critical spares for Russian-origin platforms would force a tactical reallocation of resources, prioritising immediate border readiness over long-term blue-water naval expansion. Ultimately, this shift would compel India to seek rapid, short-term technology transfers from European partners like France and Germany to plug critical capability gaps.

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