Another US-led international coalition is needed to secure the freedom of navigation around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

National Interest | Thomas Bergeson, Karen Gibson, Sam Mundy, Robert Sofge

Houthi forces seized control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait during a 48-hour offensive on September 10-11, capturing critical Red Sea coastlines and the Hanish and Perim islands. This sudden territorial expansion threatens 25 percent of global container traffic and immediately drove international crude oil prices above $100 per barrel.

Historically, the United States has maintained a two-century commitment to open seas, as codified in successive National Security Strategy documents. However, the group's newly acquired coastal footholds allow them to target commercial shipping using close-range artillery, rockets, and heavy machine guns rather than relying on long-range drones or missiles. This shift severely complicates maritime protection efforts. Hostile actors in the Bering Strait, Black Sea, and South China Sea may exploit this perceived American hesitation. While Saudi-backed Yemeni forces reportedly recaptured the port of Mokha on October 5, the authors argue that a robust, US-led international coalition remains essential to permanently secure these vital global trade routes.

Comment

The collapse of the 2018 Stockholm Agreement has allowed Houthi forces to transform Hodeidah into a heavily fortified launchpad for coastal interdiction. By securing physical terrain along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the group bypasses the need for sophisticated long-range strike assets. Instead, they can now employ low-cost, unguided artillery and anti-tank guided missiles from coastal positions to interdict commercial shipping. This tactical transition renders traditional naval escort missions, which rely on expensive air-defence interceptors, economically and operationally unsustainable.

Consequently, Western maritime coalitions are forced to adapt their defensive doctrines to counter close-range, high-volume shore-to-ship fires. This operational reality is likely to force a shift toward proactive land-based strike operations to neutralise mobile artillery batteries before they can target passing vessels. Ultimately, securing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait depends on sustained amphibious or special operations to deny Houthi forces physical custody of key coastal high ground.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the collapse of the 2018 Stockholm Agreement permanently establishes Houthi coastal control, does the traditional model of international naval escort operations remain viable, or does it force a shift toward land-based denial strategies?

The trajectory indicates that traditional naval escorts are increasingly obsolete against persistent, shore-based interdiction. My assessment is that the collapse of the 2018 Stockholm Agreement will compel maritime coalitions to transition from passive sea-lane defence to active, land-oriented denial operations. This shift will likely require sustained targeting of coastal infrastructure and localised amphibious interventions to neutralise mobile shore-to-ship threats.

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