We’ve left Iraq. But we haven’t learned its lessons.

The Washington Post | Max Boot

The United States military completed the withdrawal of its final 1,500 personnel from Iraq last week, ending a 23-year deployment that saw more than 1.5 million American service members cycle through the country. This historic exit leaves a security vacuum that local actors, including Iran-allied Popular Mobilization Forces, are poised to exploit.

Initiated by the 2003 invasion to foster regional democratization, the protracted campaign ultimately demonstrated the limits of imposing external political dogma on complex local realities. Strategic assumptions failed to match on-the-ground friction. The departure highlights unresolved questions regarding regional stability and the enduring influence of Tehran-backed militias, which recently held a symbolic funeral procession on October 1 to project power. As Washington reflects on these costly lessons, the long-term geopolitical alignment of Baghdad remains highly uncertain, leaving the region vulnerable to renewed proxy conflicts and shifting balances of power.

Comment

The conclusion of Operation Inherent Resolve exposes a fundamental doctrinal friction in Western counter-insurgency theory regarding host-nation dependency. The transition of United States forces from active combat to advise-and-assist roles failed to build a self-sustaining Iraqi security apparatus. Instead, the departure from Baghdad reveals that security assistance cannot overcome deep-seated political fragmentation within host-nation institutions.

This systemic vulnerability is demonstrated by the integration of the Popular Mobilization Forces into the state's official security budget while they remain loyal to external patrons. Consequently, the institutionalisation of these militias bypasses the formal command structures established by joint training initiatives. This structural bypass ensures that tactical proficiency gains do not translate into strategic cohesion for the Iraqi Security Forces.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the institutionalisation of the Popular Mobilization Forces continues to bypass formal command structures, what happens to the operational viability of future Western advise-and-assist missions in politically fragmented environments?

The pattern suggests that future advise-and-assist missions will face severe operational limits, as security assistance cannot compensate for a lack of political consensus. My assessment is that Western planners will increasingly view host-nation military integration as a liability rather than a metric of success when parallel command structures exist. Consequently, future interventions are likely to pivot toward transactional, over-the-horizon counter-terrorism capabilities rather than long-term institutional capacity building.

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