Close Combat

Marine Corps Gazette | Charles D. Melson

The United States Marine Corps developed its individual close combat doctrine through bayonet techniques and hand combat skills refined across twentieth century conflicts. Pioneered by Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, these methods prepared Marines to locate, close with, and destroy enemy forces at point blank range when manoeuvre ceased.

Biddle adapted boxing, fencing, and Asian martial arts into a structured curriculum, instructing recruits at Parris Island and Quantico during both World Wars. These methods proved vital in jungle warfare. Veterans such as William A. Lee applied Biddle's knife fighting and marksmanship during thirty-six ambushes in Nicaragua. Biddle published his supplementary manual Do or Die in 1937 before returning to active duty in 1941 to train World War II instructors. Although critics questioned techniques based on exhibition rather than combat results, his systematic instruction established a lasting foundational legacy for Marine Corps combative doctrine.

Comment

Institutionalising sub-tactical combative methods within the Marine Corps reflects an effort to standardise individual lethality when crew-served weapons and structured fire-and-manoeuvre break down. Early formalisation under instructors like Anthony J. Drexel Biddle transformed eclectic martial techniques into standardised doctrine, ensuring basic combat survival across dispersed amphibious units. The integration of Biddle's Do or Die curriculum demonstrates how small-arms and bayonet proficiency were treated as fundamental infantry requirements rather than optional physical conditioning.

This doctrinal emphasis relied on institutionalising repeatable physical reflexes through intensive training regimes established at Parris Island. By embedding hand-to-hand drills into formal Marine Corps Recruit Depot curricula, the institution mitigated the operational friction of rapid wartime mobilisation. Consequently, these standardised drills enabled reserve regiments deployed during World War II to maintain immediate lethal proficiency without requiring prolonged specialised retraining.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which factor contributed more to preserving individual infantry lethality during rapid force expansion — the standardisation of close-combat doctrine under Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, or the baseline marksmanship drills embedded at Parris Island?

The historical pattern suggests that standardised manuals like Do or Die provided essential baseline consistency, but the physical repetition enforced at Parris Island was what translated abstract doctrine into instinctive combat capability. While written manuals allowed rapid dissemination across expanding officer cadres, unmanaged mobilisation strain routinely degraded tactical compliance without rigorous institutional drill. My assessment is that institutional depot training remained the primary driver of close-combat survivability during major power conflict.

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