How the Army Fights: Insights from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

Small Wars Journal | Nathan Jennings

General Christopher LaNeve issued the United States Army’s new warfighting directive, *How the Army Fights*, in October 2026 to align tactical actions with strategic campaign outcomes. The doctrine establishes four core operational elements: convergence, strike, close battle, and endurance. Applying these principles to historical operations highlights how land forces overcome sophisticated integrated air defences, precision anti-tank fires, and contested gap-crossings.

During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egyptian forces initially neutralised Israeli armoured divisions along the Suez Canal using AT-3 Saggars and Soviet anti-air systems. However, rapid mobilization and tactical reconstitution enabled the Israeli Defense Force to adapt. Israeli armoured raids subsequently disrupted Egyptian missile networks, restoring air-ground convergence and isolating the Egyptian Third Army. Technical surprise rapidly degrades defensive posture. Modern commanders must integrate multi-domain fires with resilient ground forces to maintain offensive momentum and force durable strategic settlements in heavily contested operational environments.

Comment

The emphasis on rapid reconstitution in General Christopher LaNeve’s warfighting directive reflects a shift away from short-war assumptions toward high-attrition peer combat. In October 1973, the Israeli 252nd Armored Division suffered catastrophic tank losses within forty-eight hours when countering Egyptian Saggars without integrated infantry or suppression fires. Operational recovery required emergency unit reorganization and field maintenance before the 143rd Reserve Armored Division could attempt its Suez Canal crossing. Tactical durability under the *How the Army Fights* framework relies less on initial force readiness than on institutional capacity to absorb frontline destruction and reassemble coherent combat echelons.

This doctrinal mechanism depends directly on standardized combined arms integration within corps and division structures. When the Israeli Defense Force counterattacked on 6 October 1973, isolated armour formations were destroyed because air defence suppression and artillery fires functioned in silos. Subsequent success required binding tactical air sorties directly to armour-led raids against mobile SA-6 batteries, establishing localized windows where the 143rd Reserve Armored Division could force a Suez Canal crossing.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which carries greater operational risk when breaching modern integrated air defences — risking heavy armour losses like the 252nd Armored Division in 1973 to punch immediate holes in SAM belts, or delaying ground maneuvers until long-range strikes systematically dismantle missile networks?

The historical pattern from the Suez Canal campaign suggests that delaying ground action until air defences are completely suppressed invites operational stagnation against an adaptable opponent. While immediate armoured penetration risks severe initial attrition, localized ground thrusts often prove to be the primary mechanism capable of physically destroying mobile SAM networks like the SA-6. My assessment is that modern force design will increasingly prioritize rapid tactical reconstitution over pristine initial survivability to sustain contested gap-crossing operations.

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