The United States temporarily waived specified duties and sanctions under the Lindsey O Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act on October 16, easing immediate tariff pressure on India without removing the underlying threat. President Trump’s decision followed his October 9 statement that Russia would supply several million tons of diesel to US and global markets. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the administration would take around 60 days to assess the waiver’s implications. The relief remains reversible.
The Act authorises duties of up to 500 per cent on direct US imports from Russia and up to 100 per cent on goods from the five largest buyers of Russian crude and gas in the previous year if they make new purchases from October 18. The 100 per cent tariff is discretionary, making the legislation a potential bargaining instrument. India’s combined US duties reached 50 per cent in August 2025, including an extra 25 per cent linked to Russian oil, while a February 2026 interim agreement remains unsigned. The article connects this uncertainty with wider US tariff negotiations and the disruption to Gulf oil supplies following the US-Israel campaign against Iran, which began in February 2026. Rubio’s reference to Venezuelan crude offers another possible option for India’s oil mix, but neither the trade deal nor future sourcing arrangements has been settled.
The Lindsey O Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act illustrates how discretionary economic penalties can create uncertainty before they are imposed. For India, the central strategic trade-off concerns the relationship between crude sourcing and access to the American market. A tariff threat can influence negotiations even when the executive has not activated the full penalty. Its bargaining value therefore depends partly on whether the threatened cost appears credible and whether the target considers its alternatives viable.
The mechanism also complicates assessments of American policy intentions. A temporary waiver can indicate a negotiating pause, an opportunity for further concessions, or a reassessment of the costs associated with applying the measure. The waiver alone does not establish which explanation predominates. Rubio’s reported 60-day assessment period gives the administration time to evaluate consequences, but it leaves Indian decision-makers facing uncertainty over the durability of relief.
India’s consideration of Venezuelan crude adds another variable to this bargaining process, although the source does not establish how much substitution is commercially feasible. Alternative supply options matter only to the extent that they are available on acceptable terms. The Graham Act’s discretionary structure thus makes the credibility of the threatened penalty, rather than its maximum stated rate alone, central to the negotiation.
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