The New Energy Stalemate in Ukraine

Foreign Affairs | Tatiana Mitrova and Sergey Vakulenko

The Trump administration has demanded that Ukraine suspend attacks on Russian refineries, one of Kyiv’s most effective means of pressuring Moscow, as the fifth winter of war approaches. It has also struck a deal with Moscow that temporarily waives US sanctions on Russian diesel exports, and its envoys have proposed that Europe buy more Russian gas, Mitrova and Vakulenko write.

Ukraine has adapted with batteries and distributed generation, yet 2,500 to 3,000 of Kyiv’s 12,000 apartment buildings could enter winter without alternative heat. Ukrainian drones have cut Russian refinery throughput by roughly 30 percent since mid-2025, leaving a gasoline shortfall of about ten percent. Moscow has room to manoeuvre, having loosened fuel standards and subsidised imported gasoline. Neither side has a decisive edge. The authors judge that energy strikes alone are unlikely to force either side to accept the other’s terms, and only a true cease-fire can break the cycle.

Comment

A Russian refinery has two layers of plant, and Ukraine’s drones have damaged the layer that is harder to replace. Primary distillation units split crude oil into streams, and secondary units convert those streams into finished gasoline and diesel. Complex units of that kind can take six to eight months to fix, according to Mitrova and Vakulenko. Spare distillation capacity therefore gives Moscow slack in crude handling but little in finished fuel.

Ploiești in Romania offers a documented precedent. Operation Tidal Wave, the American low-level bombing raid of 1 August 1943, cost the attackers heavily, yet Romanian oil kept reaching the Axis. Repeated raids through 1944 cut output far more than the single large raid of 1943 had. The comparison suggests that return visits matter more than the size of any one strike, which bears directly on how Ukraine uses its drones.

The parallel has limits. Russia can subsidise imported gasoline and send crude to Belarus for processing, so each lost conversion unit raises costs before it causes shortage. Kapotnya, which resumed work after the June strikes and was halted again in September, shows the repeat-strike pattern at a single site.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If Ukrainian strikes keep returning to the Kapotnya refinery before repairs finish, what gives way first in Russia: the federal budget that funds subsidised imports, or civilian fuel supply?

The pattern suggests civilian supply would give way before the budget, since Moscow can use higher prices and rationing to keep the military supplied while consumers cut back. Mitrova and Vakulenko judge that the costs of the strikes are unlikely to make the war prohibitively expensive for the Kremlin. A regional fuel shortage in Crimea, which they describe as already squeezed, would probably be the first visible sign.

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