Under the New Logic of Drone Warfare, Is Unmanned No Longer a Key Capability?

Small Wars Journal | David Sterman

Myanmar’s military junta conducted over 1,600 aerial strikes using light manned recreational aircraft and paramotors between 2025 and late 2026, marking a pivotal turn in low-cost aerial warfare. This operational shift reflects a broader evolution in aerial combat since the United States launched its first drone strike in Afghanistan in October 2001.

While early American operations prioritised casualty aversion, recent conflicts in Ukraine, Ethiopia, and Sudan redefined unmanned aerial systems as tools for cheap, massed firepower. In Myanmar, low-altitude air defense gaps allowed the military government to discard the unmanned requirement entirely to maximize weapon delivery against civilian and insurgent targets. That transition altered combat economics. Manned ultralights now outnumber the 1,459 drone strikes and 7,500 conventional air strikes recorded by the National Unity Government. Light aircraft proved particularly effective across flat terrain in the Sagaing and Mandalay regions. This trajectory highlights how low-cost combat logic can paradoxically drive armies away from automated platforms.

Comment

The operational deployment of manned paramotors in Myanmar demonstrates that the primary utility of low-cost aerial strike assets stems from attrition management rather than autonomous flight controls. In airspaces devoid of short-range air defence systems, the vulnerability of human pilots becomes secondary to the immediate tactical advantages of payload capacity and simplified flight maintenance. Units operating across the Sagaing Region exploit this absence of anti-aircraft weapons to drop improvised munitions with higher delivery accuracy than commercial quadcopters.

This substitution mechanism functions because opponent infantry forces, such as local People's Defence Force militias, lack man-portable air-defence systems like the FIM-92 Stinger. Where electronic warfare suites routinely sever radio-frequency links of command-guided drones, direct human piloting eliminates susceptibility to signal jamming along the Mandalay combat envelope. Consequently, direct pilot control circumvents the signal-jamming vulnerabilities that otherwise disable commercial quadcopters across the Mandalay combat envelope.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which factor plays a more decisive role in driving combat forces toward ultra-light manned platforms over commercial quadcopters in the Mandalay and Sagaing regions — resilience against electronic warfare jamming or the complete absence of man-portable air-defence systems?

The available combat evidence indicates that the absence of ground-based air defence remains the indispensable prerequisite for deploying manned ultralights effectively. While resistance to signal jamming provides a notable tactical benefit, any proliferation of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles among People's Defence Force units would immediately restore the necessity of unmanned platforms. Consequently, the operational viability of paramotors remains strictly bound to low-threat air environments.

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