At October 7 Anniversary, Israelis Face an Election and an Unfinished Reckoning

Council on Foreign Relations | Elliott Abrams

Israel's impending national election and the third anniversary of the October 7, 2023, attacks have intensified domestic debates over political accountability and the nation's long-term security doctrine. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a tight legislative race as the public grapples with unresolved failures surrounding the initial Hamas incursions, highlighted by a blocked national commission of inquiry.

This political friction occurs alongside a fundamental shift in Israeli defense strategy away from deterrence toward preemptive, capability-based assessments of regional adversaries. Deterrence has largely been abandoned. While military operations have degraded Hamas and Hezbollah, disrupted Iran's nuclear program, and altered the Syrian conflict, they have also exposed Israel's critical dependence on United States military supply chains, including F-35 jets and interceptors. Consequently, any incoming coalition must address growing international political isolation, manage strategic partnerships, and resolve domestic disputes regarding the military conscription of ultra-Orthodox Haredi men to meet expanded manpower requirements.

Comment

Israel's shift from psychological deterrence to a capability-based preemptive doctrine exposes a fundamental operational paradox. While the Israel Defence Forces successfully degraded regional adversaries, this aggressive posture demands an uninterrupted supply of precision munitions. The reliance on foreign-made platforms like the F-35 Lightning II reveals that unilateral preemption is structurally unsustainable without external logistical underwriting.

This Ben-Gurion-style doctrinal transition operates through a mechanical calculation of adversary missile inventories rather than political intent. To execute this, the Israeli Air Force relies on real-time target acquisition systems integrated with American-supplied munitions. Consequently, the interception rates of the Arrow 3 system remain tethered to joint industrial production timelines rather than domestic tactical decisions.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the Arrow 3 system remains dependent on joint industrial production timelines, how does this reliance affect Israel's ability to execute unilateral preemptive strikes against peer adversaries?

The pattern suggests that a constrained supply of interceptors forces a prioritisation of defensive targets, limiting the scope of sustained preemptive campaigns. My assessment is that this dependency effectively grants external suppliers a silent veto over the duration of Israeli offensive operations. Consequently, the operational utility of the Arrow 3 system is bound as much by diplomatic alignment as by tactical necessity.

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