It’s Time to Debate How the Army Fights

Modern War Institute | Robert G. Rose, Patrick Sullivan

The United States Army published its "How the Army Fights" operational concept in October 2026, seeking to modernize force preparation through four central elements: convergence, strike, close battle, and endurance. Proponents frame the document as an essential distillation of multidomain operations meant to align service echelons against pacing threats like China.

However, critical analysis indicates the framework lacks a coherent theory of victory grounded in the 2025 National Security Strategy's mandate for deterrence by denial across the first island chain. Unlike General Donn Starry's 1981 AirLand Battle concept—which countered Warsaw Pact deep operations—the new doctrine omits tactical specifics regarding People's Liberation Army methods or littoral amphibious defense. This leaves inside forces without clear operational guidance before air and maritime dominance is established. The framework remains fundamentally divided. Furthermore, its centralized command echelons risk directly misaligning with the PLA's post-2016 decentralization into agile combined arms brigades.

Comment

Doctrinal centralization of targeting and strike authority at higher echelons creates a severe command-and-control friction against high-tempo adversaries. When operational doctrine pulls sensor-to-shooter loops up to corps and division headquarters, it expands command post footprints that modern electronic intelligence systems easily locate. In a high-intensity maritime or island fight, relying on centralized convergence nodes creates single points of failure across degraded communications links.

This structural tension is evident in how headquarters architectures interact with modern electromagnetic signatures. During V Corps command exercises evaluating active defense protocols, communication nodes proved vulnerable whenever high-power radio transmissions were required to coordinate multi-echelon maneuvers. Centralizing strike execution today similarly requires continuous data links back to division headquarters, exposing theater command hubs to Chinese anti-radiation missiles and PLAF electronic warfare assets.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which element creates greater operational vulnerability for forward-deployed forces—the electromagnetic signature of centralized division command nodes or the bandwidth latency of disaggregated sensor networks targeting PLA formations?

The primary vulnerability stems from the high electromagnetic footprint of consolidated command nodes, which provides Chinese long-range precision strike complexes with fixed targeting solutions early in a conflict. While disaggregated networks face bandwidth constraints under heavy jamming, decentralized unit execution historically mitigates total command failure when main headquarters are rendered inoperable. My assessment is that signature management at division level remains the primary friction point for operational survival in the first island chain.

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