The Race For The White House Is About To Begin – OpEd

Eurasia Review | Corey Smith

Democratic and Republican prospective contenders began positioning themselves for the 2028 US presidential nomination following the 2026 midterm contests. A Siena poll for The New York Times revealed that 45 percent of Democratic voters remain undecided on a preferred nominee. Former Vice President Kamala Harris recorded 12 percent support, while California Governor Gavin Newsom registered 9 percent.

Former Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg and Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez followed with 7 percent and 6 percent respectively. Georgia Senator Jon Ossoff received 4 percent despite disavowing presidential ambitions. This early maneuvering exposes growing party rifts. Meanwhile, Republicans navigate dilemmas after losing both congressional chambers. An Echelon Insights survey placed Vice President J.D. Vance ahead with 38 percent, followed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio at 20 percent, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis at 12 percent, and Donald Trump Jr. at 7 percent. GOP candidates must now weigh defending Donald Trump's record against attracting moderate voters.

Comment

The loss of both congressional chambers in the 2026 midterm elections creates an immediate structural friction between executive foreign policy objectives and legislative purse strings. Divided government forces the executive branch to rely increasingly on non-binding executive agreements rather than formal treaties passed through the US Senate. This institutional constraint narrows the scope for long-term bilateral defense commitments, as foreign partners anticipate potential policy reversals in subsequent presidential cycles.

Downstream, this dynamic compresses the legislative runway for statutory authorisations such as the National Defense Authorization Act. Budgetary impasses between Capitol Hill and the White House typically delay multi-year procurement contracts for strategic platforms. Consequently, allied planning within frameworks like NATO faces compounding uncertainty regarding US resource allocations and long-term troop deployments.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If divided government after the 2026 midterm elections delays passage of the National Defense Authorization Act, which mechanism suffers greater operational friction — multi-year weapons procurement programs or persistent NATO rotational deployments?

The available evidence points toward multi-year procurement programs incurring the more severe long-term operational disruption. While rotational deployments under NATO can be maintained temporarily through continuing resolutions, delayed National Defense Authorization Act enactments directly disrupt supplier cash flows and industrial base scaling for complex platforms. This friction ultimately compounds cost growth across major defense acquisition programs.

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