The Right Plan, the Wrong Clock: How the Iran War Exposed Europe’s Air Defense Timeline

Miro Sedlák

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The Iran conflict has turned a theoretical vulnerability into an operational crisis. Europe has the right plan. It just doesn’t have the time.

A few days into Operation Epic Fury – the joint US-Israeli campaign to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, missile production, and proxy networks – the war against Iran is already rewriting the economics of air defense. Not on a think tank whiteboard, but in real time, over real cities and under real missile threats. Not on a whiteboard in a think tank. In real time, over real cities, with real missiles.

Iran’s retaliatory strategy since the joint US-Israeli strikes began on February 28, 2026, has been neither reckless nor desperate. It is arithmetically precise. Tehran is launching mixed salvos – waves of $20,000 Shahed-136 one-way attack drones interleaved with ballistic missiles – across an unprecedented number of theaters simultaneously. The intent is not to overwhelm any single target. It is to drain the defender’s magazine. And it is working.

New weapons and technologies making their debut in the war against Iran

Frumentarius

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As the nearly month-long Israeli-American war against Iran approaches the end of its first month, let’s briefly examine some of the weapons systems, tactics, and strategies being employed by both sides in this first prolonged war since the Russia-Ukraine conflict kicked off in 2022. The latter can be seen as a watershed conflict in terms of the proliferation and prominence of unmanned systems (drones) employed in war. It was the First Drone War, as it were, and the 2026 Iran conflict can now accurately be described as the Second Drone War – although missiles are also featuring prominently, as well.

On the American-Israeli side, some of the innovative weapons and tactics being used include sophisticated and layered interceptor air defenses and directed high-energy weapons systems. Specifically, the U.S. military’s HELIOS and ODIN laser systems, and the Israeli Iron Beam, have been used successfully to take down Iranian attack drones. Such laser systems will surely feature in future military conflicts as more militaries develop their own versions.

Why Iran just committed a dramatic strategic error!

Donald Vandergriff

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Iran launched two intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs, ~4,000 km range) toward the joint US-UK military base there on or around March 20, 2026, in the ongoing Iran-US-Israel conflict. Neither missile hit the target: one failed in flight, and the other was intercepted (or at least engaged) by a US warship using an SM-3 missile.

The missiles achieved nothing militarily. Diego Garcia — a remote but critical US-UK hub for bombers, submarines, and operations in the Indian Ocean — suffered no hits, no casualties, and no disruption. This contrasts with Iran’s earlier regional strikes (e.g., on Israel or Gulf targets), where at least some effects were claimed. A failed strike on such a high-profile, distant target simply highlighted the limits of Iran’s missile reliability and accuracy against modern defenses.

The Forever War Playbook Returns

Alexander Langlois

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Former President George W. Bush once famously botched an old cliché as his administration painstakingly attempted to sell what would eventually be the illegal 2003 invasion of Iraq, stating “Fool me once … shame on … shame on you. Fool me … you can’t get fooled again.” Today, as the U.S. and Israel wage war on Iran, this hapless statement should serve as a lesson – that sloppy attempts to justify and rebrand military intervention abroad in the name of unachievable goals are likely to produce catastrophe.

Yet the same tactics and mistakes that characterized the misadventure in Iraq have returned in full force just weeks after the first Israeli and American bombs struck Iran. Take Vice President JD Vance’s words, for example: “The idea that we’re going to be in a Middle Eastern war for years with no end in sight — there is no chance that will happen.” Or consider the shaky response from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby during a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in which the Department of Defense’s number three official argued that operations against Iran are not “interventionism” or a “forever war.”

‘Operation Hidden Hand’: Iran-Russia military axis comes into view

Gabriel Honrada
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Emerging reports of Russian intelligence support to Iran in its war with the US and Israel are raising critical questions about the scope, credibility and strategic implications of deepening Russia–Iran military cooperation.

This month, reports citing US officials and sources familiar with intelligence assessments say Russia has provided Iran with targeting data on US troops, warships and aircraft in the Middle East, marking the first indication of Russia’s indirect involvement in the conflict.

What Trump May Do if He Loses in Iran

Suzanne Nossel

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U.S. President Donald Trump doesn’t like to lose. And as his chances of pulling off a win in the war on Iran look increasingly slim, the world may soon face the prospect of a volatile president confronting a foreign-policy dilemma that is utterly out of his control. To be sure, Trump may yet pull off a feat that is lauded by geopolitical analysts as advancing U.S. interests and justifying the human, economic, and political costs of the war. But as Trump finds himself in an increasingly tight corner, it’s time to anticipate how he might react to the specter of failure in Iran—and prepare for the possibility that his response could make the conflict even more dangerous.

The challenges of the Iran war seem to mount by the day. While the U.S. military, working together with the Israel Defense Forces, has been largely successful in destroying Iran’s air defense, naval, and ballistics capabilities, the country’s political system and sources of economic leverage have proved far less tractable. There is also the matter of Iran’s remaining fissile material and nuclear capabilities—not to mention the risk that Tehran emerges from the conflict determined that it can only properly defend itself with nukes. Hopes of either a mostly seamless Venezuela-style transition to a pliable leader or a widespread people’s revolution have faded.

US' and Iran's options for ending war narrow the longer it goes on

Amir Azimi

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For weeks, the US and Israel have insisted that Iran's military capacity has been severely degraded. US President Donald Trump and his defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, have repeatedly claimed that sustained strikes have crippled Iran's command structure and weakened its ability to respond. Yet the opposite appears to be happening. The escalation continues faster, sharper, and with fewer clear exit points.

It emerged on Saturday that Iran had launched two missiles towards the US-UK base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, a distance of around 3,800km (2,300 miles). Although the missiles did not reach the island, the incident has raised fresh concerns about Iran's capabilities. Until now, its missile range was widely believed to be about 2,000km.

Iran’s Next Move: How to Counter Tehran’s Multidomain Punishment Campaign

Benjamin Jensen

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Iran has adopted a multidomain punishment campaign to counter U.S. and Israeli attacks. An oil tanker does not have to sink for a weakened Iran to gain leverage. It only has to turn around. A liquefied natural gas terminal does not have to be destroyed by a barrage of drones. It only has to stop loading ships long enough to jolt markets, raise insurance costs, and create enough economic pain among energy-importing states to pressure the United States and Israel to end military strikes. From missiles to cyber-enabled wiper attacks that destroy computer systems and botnets that amplify propaganda, coercion takes many forms in modern war.

This is the logic of a multidomain punishment campaign. When a state cannot win a direct military contest, it looks for ways to impose costs indirectly by holding civilian and economic systems at risk from multiple domains. The goal is not battlefield decision. It is political pressure: to make the costs of continuing a campaign feel larger, wider, and harder to control. The objective transcends brute force and simply destroying critical infrastructure to create psychological and political pressure.

Easier to Kill Than to Text: A Mandate for Information Warfare Reform

Robert W. White

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The nature of global confrontation has fundamentally changed. It is now evident that the primary instrument of national power is the power of the national narrative; its foundation: diplomacy, information, military and economics (DIME). From the deception plans of the American Revolutionary War to the integration of space, cyberspace, drones and artificial intelligence (AI), the US military’s capabilities have evolved, but our core structures for manning and employing them have not kept pace. From the halls of academia to the front lines of statecraft, a clear consensus has emerged: we are in a persistent, global war of narratives. This is a battle of “narratives,” where adversaries seek to break beliefs, shape perceptions, sow division, and achieve their objectives before a single shot is fired. 

This call for change is not novel; it echoes a growing sentiment within professional military education advocating for “a return to information warfare” as a primary, not supporting, effort. This is the true nature of “gray zone” confrontation as it allows adversaries to avoid direct conflicts with the well-resourced US Department of War, a murky battlespace where ambiguity is a weapon, the line between peace and war is deliberately blurred, and our policies, systems, processes, and bureaucracy are exploited by our adversaries.

Fault Lines in the Horn of Africa: The Gulf States, Turkey, and Israel Battle for Red Sea Influence

Liam Karr

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Key PointsThe Gulf states and Turkey have become increasingly involved in the Horn of Africa, effectively splitting the broader Red Sea region into two coalitions: an Emirati-backed, Israeli-supported axis of revisionist state and nonstate actors arrayed against a coalition of status quo African states aligned with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Growing competition between these factions has raised the risk of a full-blown regional proxy war on both sides of the Red Sea. The United States cannot watch a proxy war unfold among US partners in the Red Sea. This would undermine US interests in maritime security, counterterrorism, and containing Iran, and it would allow malign actors such as Iran, Russia, al Qaeda, and ISIS to expand their influence.

Iran toughens negotiating stance amid mediation efforts, sources say

Parisa Hafezi and Angus Mcdowall

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Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi adjusts glasses during a press conference following talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow, Russia, December 17, 2025. REUTERS/Ramil Sitdikov/Pool/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

DUBAI, March 24 (Reuters) - Iran's negotiating posture has hardened sharply since the war began, with the Revolutionary ‌Guards exerting growing influence over decision-making, and it will demand significant concessions from the United States if mediation efforts lead to serious negotiations, three senior sources in Tehran said.

In any talks with the U.S., Iran would not only demand an end to the war but concessions that are likely red lines for ​U.S. President Donald Trump - guarantees against future military action, compensation for wartime losses and formal control of the Strait of ​Hormuz, the sources said.

Why the Iran War Should Not Cause Higher Gas Prices in the US

Frank N. Newman

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The Iranian IRGC is using the closure of the Strait of Hormuz to put economic pressure on the U.S., especially through higher gas costs for Americans. But America does not depend on oil sent through that passage, and the closure does not provide any good reason for U.S. gasoline prices to increase.

Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, and Bahrain have no alternative to shipment through the Strait of Hormuz. But that oil is shipped largely to Asia–notably China, India, and Japan. Only very small portions of the oil shipments sent through the Strait are destined for the U.S. There is no reason for U.S. consumers to face big increases in gas prices just because supplies from the Middle East to Asia have been impeded.

Iran Conflict Disrupts Central Asian Trade Routes

Syed Fazl-e-Haider

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Central Asian states have maintained neutrality while calling for de-escalation of the conflict in and around Iran. The conflict is indirectly impacting Central Asia, causing regional instability and economic uncertainty.

The conflict has disrupted vital trade and transit routes linking Central Asia to global markets via Iran, causing shortages and logistical delays while testing Central Asia’s resilience to energy price increases Escalation in the Persian Gulf, including threats to the Strait of Hormuz, has increased the importance of routes such as the Middle Corridor, which bypasses both Russia and Iran. This shift may reshape regional logistics, requiring major infrastructure investment.

European Union and Azerbaijan Deepen Strategic Cooperation

Vasif Huseynov

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European Council President António Costa’s March 11 meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev highlighted Baku’s growing role in the European Union’s efforts to diversify energy supplies and expand European connectivity with the South Caucasus.

Azerbaijan has increased natural gas exports to Europe since 2022 and now supplies 12 European countries with gas primarily via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline. Closer cooperation with Baku helps the European Union diversify energy supplies and reinforce stability across a region increasingly central to Europe’s security and economic interests. It helps Azerbaijan expand energy exports and connectivity projects.

Iran’s Escalation Strategy Won’t Work

Raphael S. Cohen

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The Iranian regime’s military strategy has always involved an underlying bet that it could control escalation. For the better part of half a century, this gamble mostly paid off. Whether it was taking hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, bombing U.S. Marines barracks in Beirut and Air Force housing in Saudi Arabia, or funding proxies from Afghanistan to Gaza to Iraq, Iran’s actions have, until very recently, never triggered serious blowback.

This month, Iran placed its biggest bet yet on its ability to control escalation. But this time, it appears headed toward calamity.

In recent bouts with the United States, Iran sought to control escalation spirals and pursued a rather restrained tit-for-tat use of violence. After the United States killed Quds Force leader Qassem Suleimani in 2020, Iran launched a missile strike on two U.S. military bases in Iraq, which notably did not kill any Americans. Similarly, after Operation Midnight Hammer last June, in which the United States struck Iranian nuclear sites, Tehran responded with another missile strike—this time at a U.S. air base in Qatar, again choreographed to make a point but not prompt a wider conflict. During these previous iterations, Iran seemingly cared more about the public statement made by its missiles rather than any actual military effect.

Israeli Settlers Carry Out Wave of Attacks on Palestinian Villages in West Bank

Rebecca Schneid

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Israeli settlers set homes on fire, smashed cars and beat several people in a wave of attacks on Palestinian villages in the occupied West Bank this weekend, witnesses and local rights groups said.

The Palestinian WAFA news agency reported that settlers stormed the village of Fandaqumiya and the town of Seilat al-Dahr, south of Jenin, late on Saturday. Other attacks were reported in the agricultural regions of Masafer Yatta and the Jordan Valley.

In the village of Fandaqumiya, a group of settlers set vehicles ablaze and smashed windows on houses, WAFA reported, citing local sources. In the central West Bank, at least three people were injured in a stone-throwing attack. In various parts of Nablus, 30 settlers targeted the al-Masoudiya archaeological area and set fire to a tourist tent, the agency reported.

Why U.S. Victory in Iran Would Be Bad for Washington—and the World

Howard W. French

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The current situation in the United States, like that of the United States in the world, is by no means normal. This should summon the American public and world opinion to take what may seem to be an unusual, even uncomfortable, position: Under the disturbing present circumstances, one should simply not wish for a U.S. victory in the country’s 3-week-old war against Iran.

So that there is no moral confusion about this statement, I must make explicit what I am not calling for: I do not wish for the death or injury of U.S. soldiers. Nor do I wish for the destruction of the state of Israel, whose right to security I have supported in column after column.

Electrostates vs. Petrostates China is building a new green bloc, while the United States is doubling down on oil.

Nils Gilman

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Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney didn’t come to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January to offer hope. He came to pronounce a death. The liberal international order—that elaborate architecture of institutions, norms, and U.S.-guaranteed public goods constructed in the aftermath of World War II—was over, he announced, and the rupture was irreversible. But Carney’s eulogy, sober and precise as it was, understated the depth of the break.

U.S. President Donald Trump isn’t merely ending a set of diplomatic arrangements or a particular configuration of great-power relations. He is presiding over the end of the fossil-fueled model of industrial civilization that made the liberal order possible, profitable, and, for a time, politically sustainable. Trump didn’t initiate the decline of fossil fuels’ global metabolic hegemony; it was instigated by the manifest instability posed by climate change and rivalrous oil-access impediments like the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. But he has ensured a rivalrous competition, rather than a smooth transition, to replace it.

Discovery Before Disaster: The Louisiana Maneuvers and the Untested Warfighting Concepts of Today’s Army

Matthew Revels and Eric Uribe

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This slogan is among the Army’s favorites, yet its application at the operational level remains uneven. Brigade combat teams rotate through combat training centers, maneuvering largely in isolation while simulated adjacent formations execute scripted roles that fails to introduce the friction that defines the real world’s battlefields. To compensate for the absence of field training at echelons above the brigade level, the Army increasingly relies on command post and simulation-based exercises. While such exercises are valuable for refining staff processes, they cannot replicate the uncertainty, degraded communications, and cumulative friction inherent in multidivision operations. The result is a training system optimized for confirmation rather than correction.

The Army’s shift toward preparing for large-scale combat operations has necessitated that the combat training centers reorient from training brigades on counterinsurgency doctrine to implementing the Army’s new operational concept, multidomain operations. Doctrine manuals make it clear that divisions and corps are the central maneuver elements under the new concept. To better align with its operational doctrine, the Army developed the Army of 2030 plan to reorganize the force, shifting responsibility away from brigade commanders by allocating additional resources to division and corps commanders, effectively centralizing an increasing number of resources and assets within higher echelons to limit brigade commanders’ span of control.

Begging Hamas to Disarm - The Misguided Approach of Trump's 'Board of Peace'

Khaled Abu Toameh

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Hamas leaders have instead proposed long-term truces (5-10 years) rather than total decommissioning of arms. Another thing the "Board of Peace" and Mladenov do not seem to understand is that Hamas uses ceasefires with Israel to rebuild, regroup, and restock its arsenal and tunnel networks.

To ask Hamas politely to disarm is fantasyland.

The notion that the "Board of Peace," no matter how well-intentioned, can persuade Hamas to relinquish its arsenal through dialogue alone ignores decades of evidence to the contrary.

Rethinking India’s Energy Security And A Window For Cooperation

Sai Sowmya Dendukuri

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Following the joint offensive against Iran, the Gulf region has witnessed heightened geopolitical tensions that disrupted the energy supply chain. Considering Iran’s strategic cushion, provided by its proxy groups, has been weakened, it is employing its last card, blocking the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow passage connecting the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, is considered an important sea lane of communication in global trade. Sources such as EIA and Kpler state that 40% of India’s crude oil imports transit through the Strait of Hormuz. The figure underscores its strategic significance in India.

Despite the commendable strides India has made in the renewable energy sector, primary energy consumption remains heavily weighted towards coal and oil. As per the Energy Statistics published by MOSPI, the share of crude oil has hovered between 30% and 33% over the past five years. During this period, the top suppliers of crude oil are Russia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the US, and Kuwait, highlighting India’s import dependency on the Gulf region.

How China Forgot Karl Marx

Yasheng Huang

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In the early 1980s, rural Chinese workers saw their incomes surge amid the country’s economic liberalization. It was the beginning of one of the most remarkable feats in history as hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens rose out of poverty. But while many watched in awe, one high-ranking official in the Chinese Communist Party was worried by what he saw happening.

Deng Liqun (no relation to Deng Xiaoping, China’s leader at the time, who had initiated the economic reforms) noticed that many rural businesses had started to hire a large number of workers. Deng, citing Das Kapital by

Why is China Sitting Out the War on Iran

Ali Wyne

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Aquestion has become ubiquitous since President Donald Trump started the war against Iran: Why is Beijing not doing more to support Tehran? There are many answers, and they begin with a practical one. Given the intensity, pace, and scope of American and Israeli strikes, it is far from clear what assistance China could provide that would meaningfully enhance Iran’s capacity to retaliate in the short term.

But the more significant answer lies in China’s security priorities. China may have the world’s second largest defense budget, but its military modernization remains overwhelmingly oriented toward its objectives within Asia. The paramount objective for Beijing is advancing unification with Taiwan, followed by pressing its territorial claims across its disputed border with India, and across the contested waters of the East and South China Seas.

America Has No Good Options in Iran

Ilan Goldenberg

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Three weeks into the joint U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, the outlines of a familiar and dangerous pattern are emerging. The current conflict may for now be significantly different than American wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Vietnam—it has not yet drawn in U.S. ground forces in great numbers. But the Iran war shares a deeper strategic reality with these predecessors. Washington is once again fighting a weaker regional power without having clear objectives, a defined theory of victory, and a viable exit strategy.

The result is a different kind of quagmire, but a quagmire nonetheless. U.S.

Iran’s Chokehold On Hormuz And The Limits Of Military Force

Kian Sharifi

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The Strait of Hormuz, a 33-kilometer-wide chokepoint through which roughly a third of the world’s seaborne oil passes, is effectively closed to normal commercial traffic. Iran has not blockaded the strait with a chain or a fleet. Instead, it has made the waterway ungovernable through a combination of kinetic strikes, mines, electronic warfare, and market fear — creating a closure that is arguably harder to reverse than a conventional blockade.

“I can think of no way to reopen and keep open Hormuz militarily and easily,” Richard Allen Williams, a retired US Army colonel and former NATO Defense Investment Division official, told RFE/RL.

Geology as warfare: Iran put its missiles where physics, not diplomacy, keeps them safe

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Three weeks of intensive US and Israeli strikes on Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure have destroyed radar systems, collapsed tunnel entrances, and cratered ventilation shafts across dozens of sites. Iran keeps firing. The reason, according to satellite analysis by CNN and assessments by Israeli security research centre Alma Research, lies not above the ground but hundreds of metres beneath it; inside a network of underground missile cities connected by internal railways, carved into mountains that no bomb in the current American or Israeli arsenal can fully reach.

Iran’s underground missile programme is not a recent improvisation. Reports that emerged as far back as 2020 claimed an automated railway system running through cavernous tunnels, transporting ballistic missiles between assembly halls, storage vaults, and blast-door exits. What is becoming clearer now, as Operation Epic Fury enters its fourth week, is the scale of what was built and the limits of what air power alone can do against it.

The Gulf States’ Iran Dilemma

Abdulla Al Junaid, and Paul J. Saunders

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The US-Israeli strikes in Iran have put the Gulf States in Iran’s crosshairs. In an effort to divide the United States, Israel, and the Gulf monarchies, Iran has blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, potentially severing a fifth of the global oil supply, targeted cities like Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha, and, more recently, struck critical oil and natural gas refineries and infrastructure throughout the Gulf. The consequent oil market chaos is raising questions about the long-term viability of the Gulf States as economic powers and US security partners.

How are the Gulf States reacting to the conflict’s escalation? How will the war affect the Gulf states’ view of the United States as a security and economic partner? Is there still a way out of the conflict at this point? In this episode of Three Questions, CFTNI President Paul Saunders discusses how the Iran War has impacted the Gulf States with Abdulla Al Junaid, a longtime analyst of the region. Mr. Al Junaid is a former official of Bahrain’s National Unity Party.

Iran War Has Put Putin in Zugzwang

Igor Desyatnikov

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Moscow cannot abandon Tehran without undermining a military partnership that has been vital to its war in Ukraine and weakening its carefully cultivated image as a champion of the Global South. Yet providing meaningful support risks provoking Washington, especially Donald Trump, whose unpredictability and willingness to escalate have made the Kremlin more cautious than before.

Whatever Russia does, its strategic room for maneuver is shrinking.

Iran has been more than a diplomatic partner for Moscow during the Ukraine war—it has been a critical military enabler. Early in the conflict, Russia’s drone capabilities were rudimentary and lagged behind Ukraine’s. Iranian-designed Shahed drones helped close that gap and soon became central to Russia’s campaign of long-range strikes against Ukrainian cities and civilian energy infrastructure.

Trump Has Made a Fundamental Miscalculation about Iran

Phil Klay

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I have plenty of complaints about the war I served in two decades ago: the Iraq war was ill-conceived, hubristic and marred by poor leadership at the highest level. But I did know why I was there. What exactly do our service members think we’re trying to do in Iran?

The justifications for the war have been stunningly incoherent. Maybe the war is about regime change, about Iran’s nuclear program, about the narrow military objectives of degrading their ballistic missile and drone capabilities, or perhaps it was because Israel was about to attack and we’d be at risk, or because the United States was under imminent threat from Iran, or to achieve peace in the Middle East, and so on.

Maybe it’s not a war at all. Maybe it’s an “excursion that will keep us out of a war” or an incursion or maybe it’s only a “little excursion.” In President Trump’s America, there may be only two genders, but our military adventures can identify however they please.

The rise of the ‘leadership first’ strike — and why it’s so important in warfare

John Spencer

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Imagine if Allied intelligence had located Adolf Hitler in late May 1944 and killed him before the Normandy invasion. Imagine that in the same hour, strikes eliminated Hitler’s designated successor, the head of the German Armed Forces High Command, the chief operational planner of the war effort, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, responsible for defending Western Europe, and the rest of Germany’s field marshals and senior commanders.

Imagine that the officers publicly announced to be replaced were struck within hours as well.

Before a single Allied soldier stepped onto the beaches of Normandy, the brain directing Germany’s war effort would have been destroyed. The Wehrmacht would still have possessed tanks, aircraft, and divisions. But it would have been operating without its central nervous system.

Why Iran does not appear ready to give in, despite heavy losses

Susannah George

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As the war in Iran enters its fourth week, with U.S. operations increasingly focused on global energy flows, Tehran is rebuffing efforts to identify a diplomatic off-ramp from the war launched by the United States and Israel, according to officials in the region.

Instead, Tehran is escalating attacks on its neighbors, betting it can ratchet up global economic pain faster than the Trump administration can relieve it with military force, according to an Iranian diplomat, two European diplomats stationed in the region and a senior Arab official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to brief the media on sensitive details.

Iran’s unwillingness to capitulate is wrapped up in the power it exerts over the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s fuel shipments transit, that Tehran has largely closed, roiling energy markets. President Donald Trump gave Iran a 48-hour deadline on Saturday to reopen the critical waterway, threatening to “obliterate” the country’s power plants if Tehran doesn’t comply.

The Elder’s Gambit and the Practice of Narrative Warfare

Paul Cobaugh

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For years, the U.S. national security apparatus has grappled with influencing adversaries by confronting their ideological convictions head-on. This approach often hardens resistance rather than dissolving it. But what if, instead of attacking a hostile narrative, we could activate a deeper, more resonant one within the subject?

This approach is the essence of population-centric warfare, which prioritizes understanding and influencing the human domain over purely kinetic action. While the doctrine is widely discussed at the strategic level, its tactical application remains less understood.

This article argues that identity-based narratives—especially those rooted in honor and social obligation—are more powerful than ideological persuasion in tactical engagements, and that practitioners can deliberately activate these narratives to achieve effects in the human domain.

Interests And Armageddon: The Third Gulf War Shakes Middle East

Jose Miguel Alonso-Trabanco

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War has broken out in the Middle East once again, but this time the writing on the wall brings an unusually ominous message. Although the Third Gulf War is unlikely to be the last showdown between Iranian and Israeli-US forces, this ongoing conflict is heading in a dangerous direction. What both sides are fighting over is the strategic prerogative to redraw the very balance of power in West Asia, so the aftermath could produce a prolonged local ‘Cold War,’ a new hegemonic cycle, or widespread anarchy. The ripple effects are not just encouraging the proliferation of regional seismicity in multiple overlapping layers. This front is a facet of a broader chessboard in which the multipolar great game of high politics plays out. But perhaps the most troubling aspect of the war is that its politico-strategic logic of statecraft is interwoven with the incendiary grammar of religious millenarianism.

Geopolitical Outlook

The current US-Israeli Iran war is the culmination of a long-range trajectory. As the late Shabtai Shavit, former Mossad chief, noted, Israel and Iran have been locked in a low-intensity war for decades. In the multidimensional operational theatres of this dispute, both sides have relied on grey-zone tactics and mosaic warfare, but no checkmate has occurred.

The Fault Lines Of A New Middle East: The 2025-2026 US-Israel-Iran War And The Reordering Of Regional Geopolitics

Dr. Mohamed Chtatou

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The 2026 Iran War — formally initiated on February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched coordinated airstrikes targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, military infrastructure, and senior leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — represents a watershed in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Building upon the precedent established by the June 2025 Twelve-Day War, the current conflict has detonated a cascade of secondary crises: the near-total closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian retaliatory strikes across nine Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, the reactivation of Hezbollah on the Lebanese front, the effective dismantling of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, and unprecedented disruptions to global energy markets.

This analysis examines the structural fault lines exposed by the conflict across five interlocking domains: (1) the origins and escalatory ladder of the US–Israel–Iran confrontation from October 2023 to February 2026; (2) the strategic logic and operational dimensions of the combined air campaign; (3) the fracturing and realignment of Gulf Arab state security postures; (4) the energy-economic shock radiating from Hormuz closure; and (5) the wider implications for international order, including the responses of China, Russia, Turkey, and the Global South. The paper concludes that the conflict has irrevocably dismantled the post-2015 JCPOA architecture and catalyzed a new regional security order whose contours remain deeply uncertain.

In Lebanon, Israel Wants Dominance, Not Deterrence

Alexander Langlois

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As the American and Israeli war on Iran expands across the Middle East, Lebanon faces its nightmare scenario. Israel has invaded the country once again, supposedly to disarm Lebanese Hezbollah, its non-state rival to the north. This specific component of the broader war is ultimately critical, as it could become the primary focus of the warring parties in the coming weeks, especially if direct confrontation with Iran yields diminishing returns.

It is no secret that Israeli officials have long wanted to apply more pressure on Lebanon to solve the Hezbollah problem. After a year of exchanging fire, Israel opted to invade Lebanon in 2024 to directly combat the group, severely hampering Hezbollah’s ability to conduct serious military operations while killing most of its senior leadership. Following the November 2024 truce that was supposed to constitute a true ceasefire but rather fostered near-daily Israeli strikes on Lebanon, Beirut began the effort of disarming Hezbollah.