Pakistan's governments, since 1958, have consistently engaged in sovereign borrowing, framing each instance as a "victory" despite a lack of tangible improvement in national performance. The article critically examines Pakistan's "sovereign debt machine," highlighting the significant issue of undisclosed fees associated with these loans. It points out that successive administrations have failed to provide transparency regarding these financial charges, deliberately avoiding direct questions on the matter. This systemic lack of disclosure and accountability perpetuates a cycle of debt, raising concerns about the nation's long-term economic stability and governance. The continuous reliance on syndicated loans, presented as proof of international confidence, masks underlying financial vulnerabilities and a persistent failure to address core economic challenges. This pattern suggests a deep-seated problem in Pakistan's fiscal management and its engagement with international financial markets.
Indian Strategic Studies
22 May 2026
How The 2026 Iran War Deepens Polycrisis In Myanmar
Eurasia Review | Khant Eaint Hmoo
The 2026 Israel-Iran war, initiated on February 28, 2026, by coordinated Israeli and U.S. attacks, has profoundly impacted global energy markets, leading to severe fuel shortages and rising costs in Myanmar. Myanmar, heavily reliant on over 90% imported fuel and with only 3% domestic production, faces extreme vulnerability due to instability in the Strait of Hormuz, which blocks a quarter of global crude oil shipments. This crisis has disrupted agriculture, increasing fertilizer costs (Myanmar imports over USD 500 million annually) and threatening food security, with farmers struggling with diesel prices nearing 4,000 kyats per litre. The junta, led by President Min Aung Hlaing, implemented ineffective measures like odd-even license plate policies and a flawed QR fuel distribution system, while crony-controlled EV markets saw prices surge from 195 million to 285 million kyats. The National Unity Government's fuel transit permit system, aimed at weakening the regime, has also caused local shortages.
The Trump–Xi Summit: Defining Favorable and Unfavorable Outcomes
Heritage Foundation | Andrew Harding, Jeff Smith
The upcoming May 14-15, 2026, summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping in Beijing is framed as a compliance checkpoint, not a breakthrough, following their October 30, 2025, meeting in Busan, South Korea. The Trump Administration aims to assess compliance with previous agreements, including China's commitments to halt fentanyl precursor flow, eliminate rare earth export controls, end retaliation against U.S. semiconductor companies, and open markets to U.S. agricultural exports. China, in turn, seeks greater U.S. market access, tariff reductions, and eased sanctions, potentially pushing for a shift on Taiwan. While China has met some verifiable commitments, like soybean purchases, its actions on fentanyl and the Nexperia semiconductor dispute suggest a pattern of tactical cooperation rather than fundamental policy shifts. The U.S. must remain vigilant against China's strategy of horse-trading on negotiable items while avoiding concessions on strategic priorities like intellectual property theft, cyberattacks, and military coercion.
America Gave Up the Factory. China Made It the Weapon.
China, facing US export controls on advanced semiconductors, has achieved significant technological self-sufficiency and algorithmic innovation, particularly in AI. In January 2025, DeepSeek V3 released an open-source AI model trained for less than $6 million, outperforming American systems and causing a $600 billion drop in Nvidia's market cap. By April 2026, DeepSeek V4, partly trained on Huawei’s domestically produced Ascend processors made by SMIC, performed near leading American models at a tenth of the cost. This demonstrates how US restrictions inadvertently accelerated China's vertical integration across its technology stack, from chips to AI. Furthermore, China's dominance in manufacturing, exemplified by BYD and CATL in EVs and batteries, and its control over critical minerals like gallium and rare earths, has created strategic leverage. Beijing has weaponized this by imposing export controls on key minerals, impacting US defense supply chains for systems like the F-35 and Tomahawk missile, highlighting the military consequences of American deindustrialization and reliance on Chinese production.
Improving the U.S.-China Trade Relationship
RealClearWorld | Shanker A. Singham, Alden F. Abbott
The May 14-15 summit between President Trump and President Xi Jinping in Beijing produced familiar outcomes, including discussions of a new U.S.-China “Board of Trade,” anticipated Chinese purchases of American agricultural products, and potential tariff reductions on non-sensitive goods. However, the summit failed to secure meaningful commitments on industrial subsidies, state-directed overcapacity, or broader distortions within China’s economic system. Beijing's state-directed economy leverages capital, credit, land, energy, and regulation to fuel industrial policy, resulting in chronic overcapacity in sectors like steel, aluminum, solar panels, shipbuilding, electric vehicles, and batteries. This surplus is pushed globally at non-market prices, undermining American manufacturers who cannot compete against state-backed rivals. The U.S. should avoid a repeat of the 2020 Phase One deal's managed trade approach, instead focusing the proposed Board of Trade on market distortions. Washington must press China for comprehensive subsidy accounting, sector-by-sector capacity discipline, an end to discriminatory local-content requirements, and allowing loss-making firms to exit. Enforcement mechanisms, including deadlines, benchmarks, and automatic tariff snap-backs for noncompliance, are crucial. Coordination with allies is also vital to prevent excess capacity from being rerouted. A durable trade peace necessitates structural reform, transparency, and equal competitive conditions.
Xi Just threw Iran Under the Bus—Russia Should be Worried | Opinion
Newsweek | Joseph Epstein
President Donald Trump's Beijing summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping revealed China's opposition to any Iranian militarization or toll charges in the Strait of Hormuz, a stance tacitly accepted by Beijing despite its own readout omitting the detail. This exposed the China-Russia-Iran "axis" as a partnership of convenience, suggesting Beijing could also be pried from Moscow. Russia, fixated on the West, overlooks China's growing long-term threat, particularly since the Ukraine invasion. China surpassed Russia as Central Asia's largest trading partner in 2023, with trade hitting a record $106 billion by 2025, more than double Moscow's regional turnover. Chinese capital now finances significant infrastructure across Central Asia and the South Caucasus, prioritizing the Middle Corridor, which saw cargo volume jump roughly 70 percent in 2024, bypassing Russia and Iran. Inside Russia, dependency is structural: Chinese goods comprise around 40 percent of imports, supplying 60-90 percent of key sanctioned war economy sectors. Beijing is Moscow's largest creditor and energy customer, forcing steep discounts. Leaked Russian military files from 2008-2014 show war-game scenarios rehearsing tactical nuclear strikes against China in the event of a southern invasion, including nuclear strikes on Chinese cities.
When Two Superpowers Meet: A Conversation With Nicholas Burns
Donald Trump's impending summit with Xi Jinping in China has significantly disrupted the previously established bipartisan consensus on a hard line against Beijing in American foreign policy, creating considerable uncertainty regarding his objectives and Xi's reciprocal aims. Dan Kurtz-Phelan engaged Nicholas Burns, who served as U.S. Ambassador to China until January 2025, to provide insights into China's strategic posture for the summit and the array of policy options available to U.S. decision-makers. In this special bonus episode, recorded on Thursday, May 7, Burns meticulously discusses the central issues poised to take center stage during the Trump-Xi encounter, encompassing critical areas such as trade, advanced technology, Iran's nuclear program, the status of Taiwan, and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The discussion emphasizes the profound and enormous stakes for the future trajectory of U.S.-Chinese competition, underscoring potential shifts in global power dynamics.
Spheres by Default: How U.S. Concessions Are Quietly Becoming Chinese Influence
Foreign Affairs | Rebecca Lissner, Mira Rapp-Hooper
U.S. President Donald Trump's administration is inadvertently facilitating the expansion of Chinese influence in Asia through a de facto sphere of influence strategy, despite ongoing debates over its intentionality. While the Trump administration asserts its claim over the Western Hemisphere, including through military and influence campaigns in Venezuela and Cuba, it appears to be ceding ground for China to broaden its political, military, and economic sway across Asia. This strategic dynamic is highlighted by the "lavish but substantively modest" summit between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing in May 2026, which analysts suggest underscores a pattern where U.S. concessions, whether explicit or implicit, quietly contribute to the consolidation of Chinese power in its regional periphery. This approach risks establishing a new global order where great powers divide regions into privileged blocs, potentially undermining the sovereignty and interests of smaller states and reshaping the international system.
The Grey Rhino: Strategic Neglect and the Collapse of Energy Security – E-International Relations
E-International Relations | Mordechai Chaziza and Roie Yellinek
The global energy crisis, triggered by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and escalating confrontation with Iran, represents a "grey rhino" event—a predictable, high-impact threat that policymakers failed to adequately address. Western energy systems, optimized for short-term efficiency, lacked resilience due to an overreliance on deterrence, premature weakening of legacy redundancy during the energy transition, and democratic fiscal constraints hindering costly preparedness. This systemic failure has propagated price volatility across global supply chains, impacting agriculture and manufacturing, and causing a "triple shock" of rising energy prices, food insecurity, and slowing growth, particularly in developing economies. In contrast, China has pursued a comprehensive hedging strategy, diversifying supply sources, expanding overland pipelines, accumulating strategic oil reserves, and investing heavily in both fossil and renewable energy infrastructure. This approach prioritizes resilience alongside efficiency, creating an asymmetry where states with greater buffering capacity gain strategic leverage. Energy security must become a core component of grand strategy, focusing on diversification, long-term planning, technological innovation, and integrated economic security to manage future shocks.
A New Order for the Gulf: The Region Must Build Its Own Security, Not Buy It
Foreign Affairs | David B. Roberts
The U.S.-Israeli war with Iran has placed Gulf states in a precarious position, making American forces they host targets for Iranian attacks and necessitating a new regional security paradigm. Gulf leaders must abandon the century-old assumption that security is a commodity to be brokered, instead building their own capabilities and directly engaging Iran. A proposed treaty involves a phased U.S. military withdrawal from major Gulf bases (Al Udeid, Fifth Fleet HQ, Al Dhafra, Ali Al Salem, Camp Arifjan, Prince Sultan) over five years, serving as the cornerstone for a comprehensive regional bargain. In exchange, Tehran would offer concessions on its nuclear and missile programs, halt belligerence, and move towards diplomatic normalization, alongside phased international sanctions relief. Gulf militaries must retune for warfighting, developing capabilities like mine-hunting and counter-drone tactics, rather than relying on external patrons whose interests often diverge. This "win-win-win" scenario offers a dignified U.S. exit, economic recovery for Iran, and self-defined security for Gulf monarchies, who must be principals in the treaty.
Director of Pentagon’s secretive Strategic Capabilities Office lays out focus areas
DefenseScoop | Jon Harper
Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) Director Jay Dryer recently detailed the organization's focus areas, operating with a $1.7 billion budget this year to rapidly prototype and transition "game-changing" high-tech solutions for near-term challenges. The SCO collaborates with combatant commands and military services, prioritizing warfighter needs across air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains. Its three portfolios include long-range fires (kinetic systems), autonomy and AI (human decision-making, command-and-control), and "special and enabling capabilities" (cyber, electronic warfare, space, special operations forces). Eight key focus areas aim to enable "blue kill chains" and disrupt "red kill chains," encompassing precision fires, contested logistics, novel employment, deception, advanced kill webs, countering adversary kill chains, extended reach, survivability, and cost-effective air defense. Projects like Ghost Fleet USVs and the Pele nuclear power plant exemplify its work, emphasizing industry partnerships.
America Built Taiwan's Chip Industry. Now Washington Is Using It as a Weapon Against Taiwan
FrameTheGlobeNews | The Ren Way
The United States is leveraging Taiwan's semiconductor industry as a strategic weapon against the island nation, despite having played a foundational role in its development. Former President Trump's assertion that Taiwan "stole" America's semiconductor industry underpins a demand for its relocation, a claim the article labels as false. Washington is reportedly enforcing this relocation demand by withholding weapons packages that the U.S. Congress had already approved for Taiwan. This policy creates significant tension in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, potentially undermining Taiwan's economic sovereignty and its defense capabilities against external threats. The strategic implications extend to global supply chains and the geopolitical balance in the Indo-Pacific, particularly concerning China's ambitions. The article highlights a complex interplay of economic leverage and security assistance, raising questions about the long-term stability of U.S. commitments to its allies.
AI and the Future of Work
Special Competitive Studies Project | Mike Rounds, Mark Warner, Chris Malachowsky, Ylli Bajraktari
The Special Competitive Studies Project's Task Force on AI and the Future of Work identifies artificial intelligence as a general-purpose technology rapidly reshaping the American economy and workforce. AI's unprecedented speed and scope, diffusing twice as fast as the internet, are creating both productivity gains and significant pressures, particularly on entry-level roles. The report emphasizes that AI's impact is concentrated at the task level, necessitating a fundamental reconfiguration of roles and a shift in required skills, including digital capabilities and durable human attributes like critical thinking. Traditional educational pathways are deemed insufficient to meet these evolving demands. The Task Force advocates for proactive, coordinated national action across government, industry, and academia to ensure AI augments workers rather than displaces them, fostering broad economic opportunity and sustaining U.S. leadership in AI innovation. Without timely policy choices and investment in workforce development, the benefits of AI could become concentrated, exacerbating existing economic disparities.
From Hedgerows to Kill Webs: The Soldier Leads Army Transformation - Modern War Institute
Modern War Institute | James Mingus, Dwayne Steppe
The US Army's transformation is primarily driven by individual soldiers and squads, not headquarters or acquisition bureaucracies, a principle exemplified by Sergeant Curtis G. Culin III's hedgerow plow in 1944. This bottom-up innovation is evident in recent changes, such as the transition to the more compact M7 carbine based on urban combat feedback, the development of lighter Load-bearing Soldier Armor Protection Initiative plates, and the introduction of the Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) to reduce maintenance and enhance mobility. Underpinning these advancements is an investment in Holistic Health and Fitness, ensuring soldiers are physically and mentally prepared. While advanced sensors, unmanned systems, and networked fires are crucial enablers, they do not substitute for the disciplined soldier's mastery of fundamentals. A culture where soldiers at every echelon believe they own the Army's future accelerates transformation, fostering excellence and ensuring the institution remains adaptable and lethal in future conflicts.
Leaked Russian Documents Reveal Growing Strain Inside Russia’s Economy
Unmasking Russia | Olga Lautman
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy revealed on May 18, 2026, that Ukrainian intelligence obtained internal Russian documents exposing significant economic strain across Russia's oil sector, banking system, federal budget, and industrial base. The documents detail efforts to bypass sanctions, attract foreign investment, and involve outside companies in sustaining Russia’s wartime economy. One Russian oil company alone shut down approximately 400 oil wells, contributing to a projected 10% decline in Russian oil refining this year and an anticipated fourth consecutive year of overall oil production decline in 2026, reaching a 17-year low. Major energy companies like Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, and Lukoil report substantial profit reductions or losses. Eleven Russian financial institutions are preparing for liquidation, with eight others requiring external support, and the federal budget deficit approached $80 billion within five months. The defense industrial sector, exemplified by Angstrem's near-collapse under $2.5 billion debt, also faces severe strain. Russia is actively using foreign companies, including those connected to the United States, to evade sanctions, facilitate stolen grain exports from occupied Crimea, and funnel investment into Arctic oil and gas projects.
Russian nuclear weapons, 2026
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists | Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight-Boyle
Russia's nuclear modernization program, despite being in its late stages, is experiencing significant delays and technical challenges, impacting the deployment of newer systems. As of March 2026, Russia possesses an estimated 4,400 nuclear warheads for strategic and non-strategic forces, a slight increase from the previous year, with approximately 1,796 strategic warheads deployed. This modernization is driven by a desire for parity with the United States, national prestige, and to offset perceived conventional force inferiority and US missile defense threats. The recent successful test of the Sarmat ICBM on May 12, 2026, follows years of setbacks. Russia's use of dual-capable precision weapons in Ukraine, some de-nuclearized, raises concerns about its nuclear strategy and intentions, contributing to increased defense spending and nuclear modernization efforts in other nations. The expiration of the New START treaty in February 2026, and the US rejection of Russia's offer to voluntarily adhere to its limits, significantly reduces transparency regarding Russia's nuclear force structure, making future open-source estimations more challenging.
Ukraine’s AI Gambit Shows Middle Powers How to Play a Weak Hand
Lawfare | Jake Steckler, Sam Winter-Levy
Ukraine's Minister of Defense, Mykhailo Fedorov, announced on March 12 that the Ukrainian military would share millions of drone videos and battlefield data with Ukrainian companies and allied nations to train artificial intelligence (AI) models. This initiative aims to accelerate Ukraine's autonomous drone development and deliver new capabilities, outperforming Russia in technological cycles. The strategy positions Ukraine as a "middle power" leveraging unique assets—a rapidly iterating domestic drone manufacturing ecosystem and high-quality, continuously refreshed combat data—in a global AI race dominated by the United States and China. Ukraine's data, annotated by operators and reflecting high-intensity conventional warfare, addresses a deficit in specialized military data for U.S. AI development. By structuring data access to prevent one-time transactions and ensure continuous engagement, Kyiv creates dependencies that raise the cost for partners to disengage, securing access to advanced AI capabilities in return. This approach offers a model for other middle powers to find indispensable niches in the AI supply chain.
Empires of Flow Control
The New York Review of Books | Nicholas Mulder
The Strait of Hormuz, a critical global maritime chokepoint, has been effectively closed by Iran since late February using its drone and missile arsenal in response to the US–Israeli war, while the US under Trump imposed its own blockade on Iran since mid-April. This conflict highlights the concept of "flow control," where states manipulate crucial transit points to regulate and profit from trade, rather than completely block it. Iran, for instance, demanded a toll payment of about $1 per barrel of oil for passage through Hormuz as of early April. This situation exposes the vulnerability of populous, fast-growing economies in South, Southeast, and East Asia, including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and China, which are heavily reliant on Gulf energy imports. Many of these Asian states have already made arrangements with Iran to secure access, prioritizing energy over adherence to "freedom of navigation" principles. This emerging post-American network of global trade, with its own internal balance of power, reflects historical traditions of Eurasian economic exchange and the re-evaluation of maritime control doctrines.
Intelligence Officer Training For Network-Centered Warfare In Ukraine And The United States
Line of Departure | Anton Maksymov
The Russo-Ukrainian War has profoundly reshaped military intelligence (MI) training requirements, exposing the critical inadequacy of analog methods in a transparent, network-centric battlespace. Major Anton Maksymov, a Ukrainian Army intelligence chief, highlights how the conflict, characterized by widespread use of reconnaissance and strike unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Starlink satellite internet terminals, and artificial intelligence (AI), necessitates a radical shift from traditional training based on past conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan. Ukrainian soldiers, despite training abroad, found themselves unprepared for the real-time digital intelligence demands of modern warfare. To address this, MI training must transition to unified digital battlespace management systems, incorporate updated enemy doctrine and tactics, prepare officers for persistent surveillance and precision strikes, and integrate AI tools for rapid data processing and enhanced decision-making. This continuous adaptation is crucial for any military force aiming to win the "first battle" of future conflicts.
The Andes hantavirus ship outbreak: Lessons from a dress rehearsal
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists | Georgios Pappas
A hypothetical hantavirus outbreak on the MV Hondius cruise ship, originating from an ornithologist in the South American wilderness, serves as a critical "dress rehearsal" for future pandemics. This Andes virus strain, characterized by a high mortality rate (three deaths among 10 confirmed infections), demonstrated limited person-to-person transmission, unlike SARS-CoV-2. However, the incident exposed significant strategic vulnerabilities in global health security, particularly the delayed international response. Passengers disembarked and traveled worldwide before the World Health Organization (WHO) initiated evacuations, leading to potential global dispersal of the highly lethal virus. While the virus's protracted incubation period slows epidemic evolution, it simultaneously complicates containment and necessitates challenging, extended quarantines. This scenario underscores the urgent need for improved rapid global health coordination, robust surveillance, and effective international protocols to manage emerging infectious diseases, even those with lower transmissibility, to prevent widespread disruption and fatalities.
Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons – Analysis
Eurasia Review | Kelley M. Sayler
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is actively developing hypersonic boost-glide weapons, which are maneuverable vehicles launched by rocket boosters, distinct from traditional ballistic missiles due to their ability to change course and follow depressed trajectories. Despite a reduced FY2026 budget request, the DOD views these systems as crucial for prompt, accurate strikes against priority targets, capable of evading advanced air and missile defenses. Concurrently, the U.S. expresses significant concern over advancements by Russia and China in this domain. Russia has deployed the nuclear-armed Avangard HGV on SS-19 missiles, designed to penetrate U.S. ballistic missile defenses, while China has operationalized the DF-17 medium-range HGV and is developing a nuclear-capable HGV for the DF-41 ICBM, including a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) variant to evade northern early warning. Analysts debate whether this constitutes an "arms race" and if these weapons are truly "game-changing," given existing ballistic missile threats. The technology raises concerns about crisis instability, potentially incentivizing first strikes due to short flight times. The U.S. is also pursuing defensive systems like Golden Dome, though their feasibility and cost are debated, alongside potential arms control mechanisms.
The future of war arrived. We aren’t ready.
DefenseScoop | Rear Adm. (Ret.) Lorin Selby
The United States military's operational plans (OPLANs, CONPLANs) are largely obsolete, built on assumptions from five to ten years ago that fail to account for the rapid evolution of warfare driven by autonomous systems and artificial intelligence. Ukraine's conflict demonstrated compressed kill chains, the vulnerability of million-dollar platforms to cheap FPV drones, and the critical role of electronic warfare, rendering fixed assets and predictable basing liabilities. Companies like Anduril, Palantir, and Shield AI are now providing AI-enabled logistics, autonomous ISR, and software-defined weapons that reshape battlefields faster than current plans can adapt. The author, a former Chief of Naval Research, argues that institutional resistance, slow acquisition timelines, and risk aversion prevent the necessary transformation. Meaningful change requires rewriting plans from first principles, shifting significant funding from legacy programs to autonomous capabilities, updating doctrine (e.g., Air Force's Agile Combat Employment, Army's excavation methods), and empowering new leadership trained in the realities of modern, distributed warfare. The institution must adapt or face obsolescence in future conflicts.
Rethinking Survivability
Line of Departure | Jonathan Taylor
The proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the Russia-Ukraine War necessitates a fundamental reevaluation of traditional military survivability operations, particularly for U.S. Army engineers. Conventional survivability measures, primarily focused on side cover against artillery fragmentation, are proving inadequate and sometimes counterproductive against the pervasive aerial reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities of modern UAVs. The article highlights that UAVs are responsible for 60-70% of damaged or destroyed Russian systems, emphasizing the critical need for overhead protection. Engineers must adapt by incorporating anti-UAV overhead cover, which can be less resource-intensive than anti-artillery solutions, and by critically weighing concealment versus cover based on the specific operational context and prevalent threats. Disturbing earth with heavy equipment for traditional dug-in positions can inadvertently increase visibility from the air, making concealment paramount. While acknowledging that future conflicts may not perfectly mirror Ukraine, the insights gained underscore that UAVs are a permanent fixture, demanding tailored, context-specific survivability strategies that integrate both overhead protection and optimized concealment.
Designing AI Integration: A Process Based Approach
Line of Departure | Alex Noll, Richard A. McConnell
The U.S. Department of War (DoW) is actively exploring Artificial Intelligence (AI) integration into military workflows, exemplified by a Command and General Staff School (CGSS) platform test. This experiment utilized a commercial AI model, Claude, to assist a student group in an intelligence collection Practical Exercise (P.E.) by acting as a collaborative "thinking partner." The methodology involved designing specific AI "skills" like Synch-Matrix and Intel-Estimate, establishing clear project instructions, and implementing guardrails to ensure context, accuracy, and prevent hallucination. During execution, the AI processed 40 Master Scenario Event List (MSEL) injects, correlating information, assessing Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), and evaluating Threat Course of Action (TCOA) probabilities. This allowed students to focus on critical thinking and debate the AI's outputs, fostering deeper understanding and analytical rigor. The results demonstrated AI's capability to produce comprehensive G2 assessment reports and multi-tabbed trackers, effectively shifting the analytical burden from data collection to judgment and decision-making, thereby enhancing military staff planning and intelligence processes.
The Quick and the Dead: How Adaptation in Contact Drives Military Advantage
Hudson Institute | Bryan Clark, Ian Crone, Dan Patt
Military forces gain significant advantage through rapid adaptation during direct engagement, a critical factor in modern warfare. This capability, termed "adaptation in contact," allows units to quickly adjust tactics, technology, and doctrine in response to evolving battlefield conditions and enemy actions. It emphasizes decentralized decision-making, agile logistics, and continuous learning cycles, moving beyond rigid pre-planned strategies to dynamic, real-time adjustments. This approach is vital for maintaining superiority against peer and near-peer adversaries, particularly in complex, contested environments where traditional advantages may be negated by technological parity or asymmetric threats. Nations investing in flexible command structures, modular equipment, and extensive training for improvisation will be better positioned to achieve operational success and strategic objectives. The ability to learn and evolve faster than an opponent directly correlates with survivability and effectiveness, making it a cornerstone of future military doctrine and a key determinant of military advantage in contemporary conflicts. This strategic imperative necessitates a cultural shift towards embracing uncertainty and fostering innovation at all levels of command.
Drone Warfare Is Breaking the Economics of the Tank
RealClearDefense | Michael Aaron Cody
Drone warfare is fundamentally altering battlefield economics, rendering expensive armored platforms like tanks increasingly obsolete. Drones costing $400-$1,000 are repeatedly destroying M1 Abrams tanks valued between $8-$10 million, creating a 1:1000 cost asymmetry. This reality is evident in Ukraine, where Russian FPV drones swarm armored vehicles, and the Royal United Services Institute found tactical drones account for 60-70% of damaged and destroyed Russian systems. The U.S. Marine Corps, under Commandant General David Berger, eliminated all 452 tanks from its inventory in 2020, replacing them with rockets and drones, a decision validated by the Ukraine conflict. Despite this, the U.S. Army continues Abrams modernization, increasing costs and deepening supply chain constraints without addressing the core economic imbalance. Institutional resistance, driven by procurement pipelines and career structures, hinders adaptation. Nations must prioritize scalable, consumable systems like drones over legacy platforms for effective defense modernization.
21 May 2026
Unseen Perils of US Alignment: Safeguarding India’s Strategic Autonomy in a Fractured Global Order
Niti Shastra | Navroop Singh, Himja Parekh
India's strategic autonomy faces significant perils from its increasing alignment with the United States, particularly concerning energy security and economic stability in a fractured global order. The article argues that most Indian experts overlook Russia's role as a global commodity backbone and China's as a manufacturing hub, which together underwrote decades of low-inflationary global economics. The Ukraine war and the 2026 Iran conflict, exacerbated by US-Israeli actions and Strait of Hormuz disruptions, have shattered this consensus, exposing India's vulnerability to rising energy and input costs critical for its "Make in India" initiative. Washington is strategically leveraging these crises, deploying conditional waivers for Russian oil, sanctions, and trade deals to compel India into dependence on more expensive American LNG and arms, mirroring Europe's costly shift away from Russian gas. This broader US playbook aims to subordinate India's foreign policy, integrate it into American supply chains, and position it as a frontline node against China, ultimately eroding India's strategic independence and economic competitiveness. Refusal to comply risks tariffs and destabilization, while compliance means forfeiting strategic independence.
The Island-Chain Allies
The Wire China | Chris Horton
The Philippines and Japan are significantly deepening their defense cooperation, as evidenced by the Balikatan 2026 military exercises where Japanese troops for the first time sank a foreign naval vessel in Philippine waters. These exercises, held near northern Luzon and the Bashi Channel, involved 17,000 troops from seven nations, including the U.S., Australia, Canada, France, and New Zealand, with Japan's contingent swelling to 1,400. This enhanced interoperability and coordination among "First Island Chain" democracies—Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan (which sent observers)—aims to deter an increasingly belligerent China, especially concerning a potential Taiwan contingency. Key developments include the 2024 trilateral summit between the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines, and the subsequent Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between Tokyo and Manila. These agreements establish a legal and logistical framework for mutual troop deployment and sustainment, transforming the northern Philippines and southwestern Japanese islands into a single, mutually supporting operational space. This "quasi-alliance structure" markedly shifts deterrence calculus by enabling coordinated action independent of immediate U.S. intervention, complicating PLA planning and widening the geographic scope of potential conflict.
Hellscape Defense in Taiwan: Would It Work?
Modern War Institute | Wes Hutto
Taiwan's proposed "hellscape" defense strategy, championed by Admiral Samuel Paparo, envisions saturating the Taiwan Strait with low-cost, uninhabited aerial and maritime systems to deter or attrit a Chinese invasion. Operationally, this multi-layered robotic defense would target invading forces from eighty kilometers out to the beaches, employing long-range drones, anti-ship missiles, sea mines, and short-range FPV drones at landing zones. However, the strategy faces significant political and organizational hurdles. Taiwan's military is unlikely to fundamentally retool its force structure from traditional "exquisite" capabilities (e.g., F-16s, submarines) to a massive drone arsenal, primarily due to sovereignty considerations and established military professionalism, unless US security guarantees are completely withdrawn. Furthermore, public confidence, essential for potential insurgency, is linked to perceived military capabilities, and a shift to a "hellscape" might erode this. Politically, the strategy requires broad public consensus and approval from Taiwan's civilian government, which is improbable given current political polarization and the societal implications of transforming the island into a "garrison state."
The Thucydides Trap, Xi Jinping, and America’s Strategic Blind Spot
LinkedIn | Ken Robinson
Chinese President Xi Jinping strategically invoked the "Thucydides Trap" during a summit with then-President Trump, signaling China's demand for recognition as a coequal civilization-state and warning against escalating confrontation. This deliberate act was not merely diplomatic theater but a profound message to the American national-security establishment, underscoring China's long-term strategic thinking, which operates on dynastic timelines rather than short-term political or economic cycles. Beijing demonstrated its capacity to absorb economic damage from tariffs and retaliate by restricting critical rare earth exports, asserting its status as a peer competitor capable of imposing reciprocal costs. Xi's subsequent pivot to conciliation represents strategic sequencing, a calibrated approach to diplomacy that applies pressure, absorbs friction, and then offers stability once leverage is established. The article highlights a fundamental misunderstanding in the West regarding China's structural, rather than emotional, interpretation of diplomacy, framing the competition as one rooted in strategic culture and the architecture of the 21st-century global order.
Why China Is Now a Peer Competitor to the United States in Cyberspace
Center for Strategic and International Studies | Nikita Shah
China has systematically evolved its cyber capabilities over the past 15 years, establishing itself as a peer competitor to the United States in cyberspace, surpassing other adversaries. Utilizing a "whole-of-society" approach, China demonstrates sophistication in targeting and persistence, deeply penetrating U.S. critical infrastructure and public sector systems, including the U.S. Treasury and military installations. Campaigns like Salt Typhoon and Volt Typhoon highlight advanced technical capabilities, potentially leveraging large language models for precise targeting and even developing scalable AI tooling superior to U.S. counterparts, such as a version of Mythos Preview. The scale of China's talent pipeline, cultivated through competitions, universities, and research institutes, feeds hundreds of thousands into state institutions like the MSS and PLA. This is amplified by a private sector compelled to supply zero-day vulnerabilities, creating an agile offensive cyber supply chain. China's stealthy tactics, including targeting edge devices, living-off-the-land techniques, cloud environment exploitation, and widespread use of covert networks, make attribution and defense challenging. Strategically, China's clear intent, anchored in plans like "Made in China 2025" and its 15th Five-Year Plan, contrasts with perceived U.S. strategic ambiguity. The article suggests the U.S. must seize the post-Trump Beijing visit window to reinvigorate its cyber strategy, reverse agency cuts, and publish an implementation plan to re-establish superiority, moving beyond failed deterrence models.
After Trump-Xi Summit, Taiwan Breathes a Sigh of Relief
The Diplomat | Brian Hioe
Taiwan breathed a sigh of relief following the May 13-15 summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, as initial fears of a "grand bargain" that would compromise Taiwan's security did not materialize. Prior to the summit, concerns were high that Trump might negotiate U.S. arms sales to Taiwan with Beijing, potentially violating the long-standing Six Assurances, or adopt a stance against Taiwanese independence. The Trump administration had notably stalled a $14 billion arms package for Taiwan, prompting bipartisan calls from U.S. senators for its approval. Additionally, there were apprehensions that Kuomintang (KMT) chair Cheng Li-wun's planned visit to the U.S. could lead to reduced American commitments to Taiwan. However, the summit concluded without any new deals announced regarding Taiwan, and the U.S. and Chinese readouts even diverged on the issue, indicating no explicit concessions. Despite the immediate relief, Taiwan remains awaiting Trump's approval of the delayed arms package, highlighting ongoing strategic uncertainties in cross-strait relations.
US shows Taiwan non-negotiable: analysts
The White House's deliberate omission of Taiwan from its official summary of talks between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping signals Washington's view that Taiwan is not a negotiable issue, according to analysts. During Trump's state visit to China, the two sides' summaries diverged sharply; China's Xinhua news agency emphasized Xi's warning that Taiwan is "the most important issue" and mishandling it could lead to "clashes and even conflicts," while the US summary focused on economic cooperation and Iran. This reflects differing messaging strategies and a fundamental "gap in interpretation" regarding the US' "one China" policy. While the US does not support Taiwanese independence, it maintains security cooperation and arms sales to prevent Taipei from negotiating under duress, a stance Beijing views as encouraging independence. Analysts suggest the US omission itself conveys non-negotiability, advising Taiwan to focus on long-term strategic value and shared interests with the US, remaining alert to subtle shifts despite policy reaffirmations. The summit highlighted Beijing's attempt to frame Taiwan as central to "constructive strategic stability," with experts noting "stability never equals peace, and silence never equals commitment."
PRC in International Organizations
The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission's publication, "PRC Representation in International Organizations," meticulously identifies Chinese nationals holding top leadership positions across a wide array of international governmental organizations as of April 23, 2026. This comprehensive document details Chinese heads within UN Principal Organs, UN Funds and Programs, UN Specialized Agencies, other UN entities, international trade and financial institutions, and various other international bodies. The Commission undertakes this research to fulfill its legislative mandate, specifically to monitor and assess the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. The ongoing tracking of China's increasing presence in global governance structures underscores a strategic concern regarding Beijing's expanding influence and its potential impact on international norms and decision-making processes. The data will be updated annually, reflecting the dynamic nature of this geopolitical development.
Why China Waits: Beijing Is Playing a Long Game on Taiwan
Foreign Affairs | Amanda Hsiao and Bonnie S. Glaser
China is pursuing a long-term strategy for unification with Taiwan, predicated on the belief that time and a shifting balance of power favor Beijing. Rather than an imminent military invasion, China seeks to compel Taiwan's capitulation at the lowest possible cost, leveraging its growing military and economic capabilities to deter U.S. intervention. Beijing perceives its rise and Western democratic dysfunction as reinforcing its position, despite internal economic challenges. It actively employs legal, economic, military, and diplomatic pressure, noting declining independence sentiment among Taiwan's youth and the increasing influence of pro-unification opposition parties like the Kuomintang (KMT). Furthermore, China assesses that U.S. commitments to Taiwan are eroding, citing ambivalent statements from figures like Donald Trump and concerns over semiconductor dependence. This patient approach aims to deepen Taiwan's economic and social integration through "integrated development" while continuously constraining Taipei's policy space, ultimately shaping conditions for unification on Beijing's terms without a costly conflict.
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