Indian Strategic Studies

22 March 2026

Iran’s Escalation Strategy Won’t Work

Raphael S. Cohen

The Iranian regime’s military strategy has always involved an underlying bet that it could control escalation. For the better part of half a century, this gamble mostly paid off. Whether it was taking hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, bombing U.S. Marines barracks in Beirut and Air Force housing in Saudi Arabia, or funding proxies from Afghanistan to Gaza to Iraq, Iran’s actions have, until very recently, never triggered serious blowback.

This month, Iran placed its biggest bet yet on its ability to control escalation. But this time, it appears headed toward calamity.

In recent bouts with the United States, Iran sought to control escalation spirals and pursued a rather restrained tit-for-tat use of violence. After the United States killed Quds Force leader Qassem Suleimani in 2020, Iran launched a missile strike on two U.S. military bases in Iraq, which notably did not kill any Americans. Similarly, after Operation Midnight Hammer last June, in which the United States struck Iranian nuclear sites, Tehran responded with another missile strike—this time at a U.S. air base in Qatar, again choreographed to make a point but not prompt a wider conflict. During these previous iterations, Iran seemingly cared more about the public statement made by its missiles rather than any actual military effect.

Saudi Arabia’s Outreach to Central Asia Grows

Emil Avdaliani

On February 18, Kazakh Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia, where he met with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud to discuss developing political dialogue, expanding trade, economic cooperation, and cultural and humanitarian ties.

The visit is illustrative of the growing ties between Saudi Arabia and Central Asia, in which Riyadh is particularly interested in tapping into shifting connectivity in the heart of Eurasia, especially with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Burgeoning Saudi Arabia–Central Asia ties illustrate how middle powers increasingly shape regional order, operating through flexible partnerships rather than rigid blocs and challenging the assumption that great powers will dominate post-Soviet Central Asian geopolitics.

The Iran conflict edges the world closer to a new drone arms race

Dominika Kunertova

On the last day of February, the United States and Israel launched nearly 1,000 joint strikes on Iran to decapitate its regime. Even after US-Israeli military action blunted Tehran’s retaliatory capacity, Iran launched sweeping drone salvos across almost every country in the Persian Gulf. Iranian drones targeted not only US embassies and military facilities abroad––from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to Kuwait, Lebanon, and Iraq––but also key energy infrastructure, commercial airports, and luxury hotels. Even Azerbaijan and Turkey intercepted drones from Iran. After an Iranian drone struck Akrotiri, the British military air base on Cyprus, several European nations sent naval vessels to defend the island from further strikes.

By March 5, Iranian drone attacks had fallen by 83 percent, but the scale of the campaign is staggering. In total, more than 2,000 low-cost, one-way-attack Shahed-136 drones have entered the Gulf region since the war began. Out of these, nearly half targeted the UAE in the first few days. This number is slightly higher than the 810 Shahed-136-type drones that Russia launched at Ukraine in a single strike during the peak attacks of late 2025. These days, Russian strikes on civil infrastructure in Ukraine average 143 attack drones per day.

What the Iran Crisis Means for Middle Powers

EKREM İMAMOĞLU

SILIVRI PRISON, TURKEY – As I mark the first year of my confinement in Silivri Prison, events unfolding beyond these walls suggest that we are witnessing not merely a shift in policies, but the crumbling of the international order. The headlines are dominated by escalating violence in Iran and across the Middle East, offering a stark reminder that power politics is once again setting the terms of global affairs.

The Iran conflict epitomizes the “rupture” that Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney described so eloquently in his address at Davos. The comfortable assumptions that shaped the past three decades – that economic interdependence would prevent conflict, that global governance would deepen over time, and that technological progress would expand freedom – are rapidly losing credibility.

Iran Gets a Vote in This War The administration doesn’t seem to have planned for that.

Mark Hertling

THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION APPEARS to have gone to war against Iran with two assumptions: First, they assumed they could adjust their objectives as the war went on based on how much they thought they would accomplish; and second, they assumed that because the United States and Israel are, together, militarily superior to Iran, they would have complete control over the timing, intensity, domains, repercussions, and outcomes of the conflict, and they could determine the end of the conflict when they decided.

Those are dangerous assumptions. Just a few weeks into the war, they are being tested. While it’s common for war aims to shift over the course of a conflict, doing so is a complicated and delicate process that requires military leaders and politicians to balance political desires against military realities. This administration, which has repeatedly proven to be improvisatory in its approach to policy and rhetoric, has so far in this conflict not been able to manage that balance between political desires and military actions.

The Iran war is causing a global energy crisis - can China withstand it?

Osmond Chia

China has long braced for a Gulf oil supply shock - but the Iran war's disruption of a key global shipping route is now putting its resilience to the test. Energy shipments from the Middle East have been at a standstill following Iran's threats to attack vessels that pass through a critical trade waterway as retaliation against US-Israeli strikes.

The blockade has led to a global oil shortage which has rocked Gulf-reliant Asian countries hard - with the Philippines mandating four-day work weeks to save fuel, and Indonesia seeking ways to avoid burning through reserves that will last just weeks. China, the world's largest buyer of oil, is also feeling the strain. But the country sits in a better position than its neighbours, after years of statecraft that have prepared it for a global energy crisis.

'It Takes Money to Kill Bad Guys': Trump's Iran War Set to Boost Profits For These Defense Contractors

Brian Bennett

In November, the Pentagon released what it called its “Acquisition Transformation Strategy.” The 46-page document opens with the picture of a flapping American flag above images of missiles, torpedoes, and drones and lays out a blueprint for putting American weapons manufacturing “on a wartime footing.”

Now an actual war is accelerating that transformation, providing a boon to U.S. weapons manufacturers.

President Trump’s attacks against Iran have depleted stocks of key weapons amid concerns that the conflict could drag on for weeks or months. But the state of those stockpiles have been a source of alarm for federal officials for years, as Ukraine and other conflicts have sapped supplies. But expanding production lines of complex weapons takes time, years in some cases. The Pentagon’s November strategy memo calls for awarding weapons makers “bigger, longer deals, so they’ll be willing to invest more to grow the industrial base that supplies our weapons.”

The Chokepoint We Missed: Sulfur, Hormuz, and the Threats to Military Readiness

Morgan Bazilian, Macdonald Amoah and Jahara Matisek

The cascading effects of disrupted maritime chokepoints are no longer the subject of simulations; they are an active crisis. As the US-Israeli military operation against Iran and Tehran’s regional military response continue, missile attacks, drone swarms, airstrikes, and maritime threats complicate commercial shipping across the region. The ongoing disruption in the Strait of Hormuz affects about 20 percent of global petroleum and 20 percent of liquid natural gas transits. It is also the subject of decades of wargaming for just this occurrence. But a lesser-known chemical also is being halted: 41 percent of global sulfur is exported. While the United States produces significant sulfur domestically, the near-total disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which accounts for approximately 50 percent of global seaborne sulfur trade flows, has compounded an already tight market. US sulfur prices have increased 165 percent year-over-year to over $650 per metric ton; and now the price has surged by 25 percent just since the Iran war began. This makes domestic procurement fiercely competitive, while also threatening the import of specific ultra-high-purity grades required for advanced manufacturing. It is squeezing one of the most consequential inputs to modern industrial power.

Supply disruptions matter because the United States consumes about 90 percent of sulfur as sulfuric acid, and sulfuric acid enables production that sustains not only economic function, but also modern warfighting. This is because it is needed for everything from the copper in the American electrical grid to the semiconductors in precision-guided munitions. The effects of the current disruption at Hormuz, therefore, do not stop at the gas pump.

Trump May Not Be Able to End This War

Pegah Banihashemi and Paul Poast

President Trump appears to careen between two opposing visions for victory in Iran: He has demanded Tehran’s “unconditional surrender” and also has signaled that he might abruptly declare victory and leave. Neither scenario is likely to end this war, because neither reflects any real understanding of the adversary.

Washington appears to have begun the conflict on the assumption that sustained military pressure would either collapse the Iranian regime or force its leadership to concede to fundamental political and strategic demands. But the Islamic Republic has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to survive crises. In fact, past crises have strengthened rather than weakened the regime’s internal cohesion.

Putin: The real winner of the US-Iran war?

Ian Bremmer

Three weeks into the US-Israeli war against Iran, the list of losers is unusually long. Iran is getting devastated. The United States is trapped in an asymmetric conflict it can't exit. Gulf states are absorbing infrastructure damage they never signed up for. The developing world is facing food and energy crises. I could keep going.

Washington and Tehran may yet declare victory, but the biggest geopolitical winner is sitting in Moscow, and he didn’t have to do anything but watch.

President Vladimir Putin couldn’t have timed this better. Russia's budget was in crisis heading into March. Oil and gas revenues had collapsed by roughly 50% year-on-year by February due to US sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, declining purchases from India and China, and depressed energy prices. The Kremlin blew through nearly its entire full-year budget deficit target in just the first two months of 2026 and was preparing 10% cuts to non-essential spending – everything but military and social outlays. Sustaining the Ukraine war meant making tough choices.

How Europe sleepwalked into yet another energy crisis

Katya Adler

The knock-on eﬀects of the conflict now whipping through the Middle East are awakening ghosts of crises past that shook the European Union. Seven months into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, launched in February 2022, the President of the European Commission stood at her podium in the European Parliament and accused Russia of manipulating the EU's energy market. "They prefer to flare the gas than to deliver it," proclaimed Ursula von der Leyen, as spiralling energy prices hit consumers across the continent. "This market is not functioning anymore."

"This is a war on our energy, a war on our economy, a war on our values and a war on our future," she declared, insisting that Europe was already pivoting away from Russian gas and toward more dependable partners such as the US and Norway. But fast forward four years and you find deep energy-linked frustration in the heart of Europe once again. "We swore we'd learn. We promised things would change but here we are," a highly frustrated European diplomat told me. He asked for anonymity so as to be able to speak openly.

US and Israel’s strategy to kill Iran’s top figures may prove counterproductive

Israel’s decision to authorise its military to kill any senior Iranian official on its assassination list has raised significant new questions about its so-called decapitation strategy and what it is intended to achieve.

Privately, Israeli officials have briefed their US counterparts that in the event of an uprising, Iran’s opposition would be “slaughtered”. That appears to be at odds with Benjamin Netanyahu’s strategy to pursue regime change by targeting senior figures in Iran’s political and security apparatus. Even before the outbreak of full-scale war, however, Iran experts and analysts – and some former Israeli officials – were sceptical that Iran’s clerical regime could be toppled by such strikes.

Asia’s silence on Trump’s Hormuz call isn’t inaction

Nigel Green

US President Donald Trump’s remarks on Tuesday questioning why China, Japan and South Korea have not taken a more active military role in safeguarding key energy transport routes, namely the Strait of Hormuz, draw attention to a deeper shift already underway. Asia’s largest energy importers’ inaction signals a structural shift underway, one that’s already reshaping capital flows, supply chains, and geopolitical alignments across the region.

For decades, the security of global energy transit has rested heavily on US naval dominance. Asian economies, despite being the world’s most significant buyers of oil and gas, operated within this framework. Strategic dependence was tolerated because it worked. Energy arrived, costs remained predictable and risk was largely externalized. But, it appears that a new reality is emerging with the US and Israel’s war on Iran.

BRICS Is Divided on Iran. So Are NATO and the G-7.

Oliver Stuenkel

Since the United States and Israel launched strikes against Iran on Feb. 28, many analysts have rushed to declare that BRICS is little more than an illusion.

Iran joined the grouping as a new member in 2024. Yet BRICS has failed to articulate a unified response to the conflict. While some members—including Brazil and China—have condemned the U.S. and Israeli attacks, India has not. South Africa has remained on the fence. For the bloc’s critics, these differences have reinforced a familiar conclusion: BRICS is incoherent and “utterly ineffectual,” as Wall Street Journal columnist Sadanand Dhume argued last week.

Deepfakes Are Already Shaping Opinions Around Conflicts

Daniel Byman

The U.S.-Israeli war on Iran is just over 2 weeks old, and already the world is awash in deepfakes. The New York Times reports that a “torrent of fake videos and images generated by artificial intelligence have overrun social networks during the first weeks of the war in Iran.” Deepfakes on X, Facebook, and other platforms, especially TikTok, have garnered millions of views. The fake videos include massive explosions in Tel Aviv, successful missile attacks on U.S. warships, Israelis bemoaning their losses, and other images purporting to show how Iran is delivering pain to its enemies. Many of the videos have a Hollywood feel to them, with massive explosions and sonic booms. Other videos are more muted, such as one showing girls playing just before the U.S. attack that accidentally struck the Shajarah Tayyebeh elementary school, killing at least 175 people, most of them children. The attack was real, but the video was fake.

According to a recent report by Cyabra, a company that tracks influence campaigns, Iran is behind the deepfake effort. Iran’s efforts are designed to sway audiences at home and abroad, convincing those populations that Iran is striking back while undermining the legitimacy of the U.S. and Israeli operations. The best response involves a coordinated effort between governments and private companies, working together to detect, debunk, and remove deepfakes. Even then, however, deepfakes are likely to spread widely and shape broader perceptions of the war.

U.S. Air Force deploys EC-130H Compass Call aircraft to jam Iranian military communications.

On March 12, 2026, the U.S. Central Command confirmed the operational use of the EC-130H Compass Call electronic warfare aircraft during Operation Epic Fury, a large-scale U.S. military campaign launched against Iranian military infrastructure beginning on February 28, 2026. The operation targets elements of Iran’s security and military command structure and includes strikes against command and control centers, IRGC headquarters buildings, intelligence facilities, ballistic missile sites, air defense systems, anti-ship missile sites, and weapons production locations. By March 12, the campaign had struck about 6,000 targets across Iranian territory. Naval operations damaged or destroyed more than 90 Iranian vessels, including more than 60 ships and over 30 minelayers.

The operation integrates strategic bombers, tactical aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, missile defense systems, and electronic warfare aircraft. Within this structure, the EC-130H Compass Call provides airborne electronic attack capabilities intended to degrade communication networks used by Iranian military forces. Operation Epic Fury involves a layered set of U.S. military assets operating simultaneously across several operational domains. Long-range strikes are conducted by B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers, while F-15, F-16, F-18, F-22, F-35, and A-10 aircraft carry out tactical precision attacks against military installations. Electronic warfare operations include EA-18G electronic attack aircraft and EC-130H Compass Call aircraft targeting communication systems.

Do Alliances Still Matter in a Multipolar World?

Robert S. Burrell and Joseph E. Long,

This article evaluates the role of coalitions (partners, allies, and micro-level populations) inthe current dynamics of the international relations environment. It questions if Americanpartnerships offer the best choice for achieving a decisive advantage within an evolvinginternational order. It explores foreign policy approaches in global competition as a lead-ership problem where great powers compete within coalitions rather than the traditionalrealist focus on state power. As a superpower, the United States (U.S.) has tradition-ally leveraged global leadership through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),which was previously sufficient for achieving success in the Cold War. Not only did theU.S. develop the most powerful military in history, but their investment in NATO alsoprovided a leadership frame that the Soviet Union could neither militarily, economically,nor diplomatically overcome to attain global domination.

While neo-isolationism presents a tempting alternative in a world grappling with com-plex challenges, an American leadership frame offers a more compelling and ultimatelybeneficial approach for both the United States and the global community. As the U.S. ex-periences a dilemma in balancing previous international interests with increasing costs ofinterventionism and shifting global power dynamics, with increasing domestic challenges,increased American soft power offers a more nuanced approach to global security and or-der. Specifically, this leadership frame leverages attraction rather than force to influenceglobal stability by prioritizing diplomacy and economic statecraft while reserving militaryinterventions for specific targeted engagements

Silicon Valley Bet on War. The Bets Are Paying Off.

Sheera Frenkel

Drones created by a defense tech start-up in Arizona have emerged as a key piece of the U.S. war arsenal. And anti-drone systems made by a California start-up have been deployed to protect U.S. forces in the region. Silicon Valley made risky bets in recent years on developing defense-related technology and providing services to the U.S. military establishment. Now those bets are paying off. From behemoths providing data systems to smaller companies offering novel weapons, tech firms such as Google, Palantir and OpenAI have found themselves at the heart of the U.S. war effort.

Their central role amounts to an “I told you so” moment. For years, the tech industry’s efforts on defense-related offerings faced skepticism and opposition, with no clear or immediate business rewards. Many Silicon Valley engineers opposed the use of powerful technologies for killing, battles and other military purposes — concerns that persist.

Larijani Shows Israel Is Addicted to Pointless, Flashy Assassinations

Ori Goldberg

Israel announced today, March 17, that it had assassinated Ali Larijani, who became the de facto interim leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran after Israel assassinated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on Feb. 28. Also today, Israel assassinated Gholamreza Soleimani, the commander of the Basij forces, the domestic militia that enforces public modesty laws (among others). Larijani and the Basij are broadly believed to have orchestrated the massacre of thousands of Iranian protesters in January, with Larijani the one who persuaded the supreme leader to provide authorization and Soleimani responsible for executing the order.

Larijani came from an illustrious and well-connected family within Iran’s Shiite religious establishment. He was an important member of the Islamic Republic’s leadership, primarily because of his ability to build coalitions behind the scenes during times of brash rhetoric and mass demonstrations. Throughout its nearly half-century of existence, the Islamic Republic has always been ruled by such coalitions. The supreme leader, of whom there have been only two since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, is first among equals, but he is no Kim Jong Un.

Revisionism at Fordow: Why the WSJ is wrong about the history—and future—of Iran’s nuclear program

Richard Nephew

On Monday, the Wall Street Journal’s editorial board came to the defense of President Donald Trump’s use of force against Iran, focusing specifically on the nuclear issue. The editorial essentially called Trump’s decision to attack Iran the only option to address the festering sore of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and capabilities. To buttress its version of events, it recounted a skewed version of the history of nuclear diplomacy with Iran.

It’s possible to go point by point, arguing over the various elements that are misstated or exaggerated in this editorial. For example, the Obama administration hardly “did little” in response to Iran’s nuclear and regional activities, executing the very same sanctions that Trump claims credit for as “maximum pressure” today. In fact, his expansion of sanctions identified in the editorial was mainly just a reimposition of the aggressive sanctions imposed under President Barack Obama but suspended pursuant to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal. But much ink has been spilt over these topics in the last few years and to little avail; views on topics such as the JCPOA are probably too entrenched at this point to be shifted by facts or honest debate.

The perils of perpetual geopolitics

Vladislav Zubok

During the past year, numerous pundits and politicians have proclaimed the eclipse of a ‘rules-based global order’ and a ‘return to geopolitics’. Greenland, which Trump wants to acquire from Denmark, is now seen ‘in a geopolitical light’. On television channels, experts explain the importance of the Arctic region with the help of an electronic map of the entire polar area, almost as if we were living through a remake of the Cold War classic Dr Strangelove. Commentators also refer to the geopolitics of Russia’s war in Ukraine, previously considered only as a battle between ‘freedom’ and ‘autocracy’. To paraphrase The Communist Manifesto, ‘a spectre is haunting the world – the spectre of geopolitics’.

What is geopolitics? For many in the commentariat, the concept is just a soundbite, a shorthand for inter-state conflicts about borders and territories. They do not explain why some places on the map loom large in international affairs, while others do not. Many new converts to the geopolitical lingo know little about its troubled intellectual and historical baggage.

What’s Really Driving the Strategy Behind Trump’s War on Iran

Ilan Berman

With the Iran war in its third week, questions are swirling over the administration’s aims, its conduct of the conflict and the trajectory that Iran itself might take. The White House, which by most accounts anticipated a quick victory over the Islamic Republic, now finds itself faced with an entrenched adversary that does not appear prepared to compromise—at least not yet. At the same time, a number of other variables are also shaping Washington’s strategic calculus.

The Current Conflict Is Very Much an Information War

In recent years, the information domain has emerged as an increasingly important arena of global competition. Thus Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been accompanied by a veritable deluge of disinformation designed to sow disorder in the West and generate sympathy for Moscow’s objectives among Global South nations. Narrative warfare likewise played an outsized role in the recent Gaza conflict, with terror group Hamas adroitly capturing—and then shaping—the global narrative.

Are We Facing an AI Nightmare?

RAGHURAM G. RAJAN

CHICAGO – The small equity-research shop Citrini recently sent a panic through financial markets when it outlined a scenario in which AI ends most white-collar employment by 2028, with dire consequences for the broader economy. But this forecast is surely too pessimistic in some respects. Outside a few sectors, like software, frictions to adoption and sheer inertia will probably slow the pace of change. This has always been the case. For example, although automated telephone exchanges were possible in the 1920s, the last human telephone operator in the United States was not replaced until the 1980s.

21 March 2026

Defending the skies of the Arab Gulf states

Albert Vidal Ribe

Since the beginning of the current war in Iran on 28 February, the Arab Gulf states have used hundreds of missile interceptors to counter Iranian missiles and one-way attack uninhabited aerial vehicles (OWA UAVs). They have already consumed a significant portion of their stockpiles of long-range interceptors. These air-defence systems have protected the Arab Gulf states while the United States and Israel prioritised the destruction of Iran’s ballistic-missile launchers and effectively eliminated most of Iran’s launch capabilities, which led to a sharp drop in the rate of Iranian ballistic-missile fire after the first few days of hostilities.

Though Iran’s UAV attacks have also decreased in intensity, drones continue to enter the skies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states by the dozen. Compared with ballistic missiles, these are cheaper systems and easier to launch, and Iran possesses a much larger stockpile of them. In the absence of a durable diplomatic settlement to the conflict – which is unlikely, at least in the short term – Iran is likely to rely on UAVs as a major part of its harassment strategy.

You Cannot Bomb Iran Into Regime Change

Ericka Feusier

The killing of senior Iranian leaders may satisfy the fantasies of regime-change planners in Washington and Tel Aviv, but it will not deliver the political outcome they imagine. Assassinations can disrupt chains of command. They can deepen fear. They can even create moments of confusion at the top of a state. What they do not do, at least not in any stable or durable way, is erase a nation’s political identity or break a society into accepting foreign-engineered change. The U.S.-Israeli war has already entered a dangerous phase in which targeted strikes on Iran’s leadership are being treated as strategy rather than escalation. That is not strength. It is desperation disguised as doctrine.

There is a familiar arrogance behind this approach. It assumes that Iran is merely a collection of officials waiting to be removed, rather than a state with institutions, memory, ideology and a population that will respond to outside attack in ways outsiders rarely predict correctly. Washington has made this mistake before. It has confused shock with legitimacy, military reach with political intelligence, and coercion with consent. The result, again and again, has been a wider war, a harder adversary and a region pushed deeper into disorder.

How to Raise the Odds of Regime Change in Iran

Kenneth M. Pollack

The decision U.S. President Donald Trump made to attack Iran was a high-stakes gamble. The gamble is not really in the military campaign itself, which is unfolding in jaw-droppingly competent fashion. The two most capable, battle-tested air forces in the world, those of Israel and the United States, are working seamlessly together to hammer a variety of targets in Iran with remarkably few unintended civilian casualties or other gaffes. When the campaign ends, whether in a week or in a month, it seems highly likely that Iran will have been stripped of much of what was left of its

Death of Ali Larijani deepens crisis at heart of Iran's leadership

Amir Azimi

The Israeli air strike which killed Iran's security chief, Ali Larijani, has removed one of the Islamic Republic's most experienced and influential policymakers at a critical moment. Larijani was not a military commander, but he was a central figure in shaping Iran's strategic decisions. As secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, he sat at the heart of decision-making on war, diplomacy, and national security.

His voice carried weight across the system, particularly in managing Iran's confrontation with the United States and Israel. After the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on 28 February, Larijani struck a defiant tone, signalling that Iran was prepared for a long conflict. His death, now confirmed by state media, comes amid a broader campaign in which several senior Iranian officials and commanders have been killed within a matter of weeks. This pattern suggests a sustained effort to weaken Iran's leadership structure during wartime.

How Does Saudi Arabia See the War with Iran?

Michael Ratney

For Saudi Arabia, the Iran war in its scale, intensity, and potential impact is as unsettling as it is unprecedented. The Saudi leadership finds itself simultaneously trying to protect and prioritize its own economic and societal transformation, to navigate its relationship with an impulsive and unpredictable U.S. president, and to manage the geographic reality of living a drone’s flight away from a country that is likely to remain its principal antagonist for the foreseeable future. Not surprisingly, Saudi views of this war are complicated.

The question of how Saudi Arabia views this war has drawn considerable speculation, misunderstanding, and wishful thinking. The Saudi government communicates principally through official statements, and to the frustration of international journalists, unauthorized leaks are rare. Media reports citing unnamed and ambiguously defined sources with claims about Saudi intentions or their communications with President Donald Trump should be read cautiously. And so, to understand actual Saudi thinking, the best place to start is with what their government is saying publicly.

Interests and Armageddon: The Third Gulf War Shakes West Asia

Jose Miguel Alonso-Trabanco

War has broken out in the Middle East once again, but this time the writing on the wall brings an unusually ominous message. Although the Third Gulf War is unlikely to be the last showdown between Iranian and Israeli-US forces, this ongoing conflict is heading in a dangerous direction. What both sides are fighting over is the strategic prerogative to redraw the very balance of power in West Asia, so the aftermath could produce a prolonged local ‘Cold War,’ a new hegemonic cycle, or widespread anarchy.

The ripple effects are not just encouraging the proliferation of regional seismicity in multiple overlapping layers. This front is a facet of a broader chessboard in which the multipolar great game of high politics plays out. But perhaps the most troubling aspect of the war is that its politico-strategic logic of statecraft is interwoven with the incendiary grammar of religious millenarianism.

How the Iran War Ignited a Geoeconomic Firestorm

Edward Fishman

The economic consequences of the U.S.-Israeli war in Iran are coming into sharper focus as the conflict enters its third week. As the fallout expands beyond the Middle East and ripples through the global economy, markets and supply chains are being increasingly reshaped by the drones and missiles buzzing over the Gulf—and the United States has few options to de-escalate the conflict.

The Strait of Hormuz, which is critical to the oil and gas industry, is at the center of this disruption. But it’s not just energy markets that depend on the strait. Fertilizer and high-tech supply chains are also negatively affected, widening the crisis further. If the war develops into a protracted conflict, these issues could become lasting structural shocks to the world economy.

Gen. Wesley Clark: This is how Iran war could end, but not the best way

Wesley Clark

More than two weeks into the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran, no end is in sight. But all wars do; this one will eventually end. So how did we get to this point, and how will the conflict be stopped? As NATO Supreme Allied commander in Europe in 1999, I led a sophisticated air campaign against Serbia to halt ethnic cleansing and faced continuing questions of how long it would last and how it might end. With that experience, I have thoughts about where this is heading.

In this campaign against Iran, American and Israeli airpower has been dazzlingly efficient. Having largely eliminated Iran’s air defenses in June, U.S. and Israeli aircraft now have free rein in the skies over most of Iran. Iran’s ballistic and drone strikes have been greatly reduced, and U.S. and Israeli air strikes are working up the supply chain to destroy storage sites, factories and workshops. Israel is targeting the regime itself by attacking police stations and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps positions.

Trump’s coalition of the unwilling: a long time in the making

Swaran Singh

There is a certain historical irony unfolding in the waters of the Strait of Hormuz. For decades, the United States has been the principal architect of maritime security in this narrow artery through which a fifth of the world’s oil and quarter of gas flows, mostly to various rapidly growing Asian nations.

However, as President Donald Trump last week called upon nations to help secure shipping lanes amid escalating tensions with Iran, the response has been tellingly muted. This silence is beginning to speak louder than words. What is emerging is not a “coalition of the willing” but something far more revealing of our times: a coalition of the unwilling.

The Lasting Wounds of the War in Ukraine Both Sides Will Struggle to Reintegrate Millions of Veterans

Dara Massicot

As the war in Ukraine enters its fifth year, it remains unclear when or how the conflict will end. But it will end, as all wars do, and when it does, both Ukraine and Russia will face the challenge of reintegrating thousands of soldiers back into their societies. Some veterans will return home resilient and ready to rejoin their communities; others will need physical, mental, and financial support for the rest of their lives. Both countries will face reintegration challenges requiring significant policy attention and financial resources, and Kyiv and Moscow are aware that there is no alternative to tackling

How Iran’s ‘forward defence’ became a strategic boomerang

Dr Sanam Vakil

The war between the United States and Israel and their enemy Iran marks the most consequential turning point in the 47-year history of the Islamic Republic. For decades tensions between Washington, Tel Aviv and Tehran played out across the Middle East through proxy conflicts, indirect confrontation and competing security strategies.

Today, thanks to the US–Israel strikes that started on 28 February and Iran’s retaliation, that long-running rivalry has exploded into open war, embroiled Arab states and placed the Islamic Republic in greater danger than ever before. Washington aims to degrade Iran’s nuclear programme, weaken its missile and military capabilities and roll back the network of armed groups Tehran cultivated across the region. Israel’s leadership has voiced broader ambitions, and some officials openly argue that sustained military pressure could weaken the Iranian regime itself. Yet the consequences of this war extend far beyond these immediate objectives.

Who Owns the Drones? Why Modernization of Army Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Should Be a Maneuver Responsibility

John Dudas

At first glance, placing Army modernization of small unmanned aircraft systems—sUAS—under the leadership of the aviation branch seems reasonable. After all, sUAS fly and share battlefield airspace with crewed aircraft, so it is logical for the Army to charge the Aviation Center of Excellence to manage the modernization of all sUAS platforms (including Groups 1 and 2).

But beyond the fact that sUAS, like the crewed aircraft that belong to the aviation branch, fly, there is good reason for the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) to assume responsibility for the management of modernizing and integrating sUAS, which are inextricably linked to ground maneuver forces’ missions. These systems are fielded and employed almost exclusively at maneuver battalion formations and below, in both conventional and special operations units.

Subscribe to: Comments (Atom)