On oil, the US keeps India guessing

The Indian Express | Shifali Goyal

The United States temporarily waived specified duties and sanctions under the Lindsey O Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act on October 16, easing immediate tariff pressure on India without removing the underlying threat. President Trump’s decision followed his October 9 statement that Russia would supply several million tons of diesel to US and global markets. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the administration would take around 60 days to assess the waiver’s implications. The relief remains reversible.

The Act authorises duties of up to 500 per cent on direct US imports from Russia and up to 100 per cent on goods from the five largest buyers of Russian crude and gas in the previous year if they make new purchases from October 18. The 100 per cent tariff is discretionary, making the legislation a potential bargaining instrument. India’s combined US duties reached 50 per cent in August 2025, including an extra 25 per cent linked to Russian oil, while a February 2026 interim agreement remains unsigned. The article connects this uncertainty with wider US tariff negotiations and the disruption to Gulf oil supplies following the US-Israel campaign against Iran, which began in February 2026. Rubio’s reference to Venezuelan crude offers another possible option for India’s oil mix, but neither the trade deal nor future sourcing arrangements has been settled.

Grounding A Giant: Inside HAL’s Disqualification From The AMCA Stealth Project

Eurasia Review | Girish Linganna

India’s Ministry of Defence excluded state-owned manufacturer Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) from the ₹15,000 crore contract to construct prototypes for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), a fifth-generation radar-evading fighter jet. Three private industry contenders—Tata Advanced Systems Limited, a Larsen & Toubro-led consortium, and a Bharat Forge-led team—will now compete to build five flying prototypes and one structural test aircraft alongside the Aeronautical Development Agency.

This unprecedented disqualification stems from a routine technical non-compliance during evaluation rather than HAL's substantial eight-times turnover order backlog. A prototype serves as the initial flying aircraft validating aerodynamic design, while a structural test airframe undergoes ground stress testing to establish physical limits. HAL failed mandatory criteria despite partnering with Vem Technologies and JK Enterprises. India seeks a dual production base. The policy explicitly aims to establish a second domestic combat aircraft manufacturing line, diversifying India's defense supply chain while allowing HAL to re-compete for future full-scale production contracts.

US Army long-range fires make a splash on the frontline with China

Military Times | Christopher Woody

U.S. Army soldiers have intensified training with long-range weapons along the first island chain, from Balabac in the southern Philippines to Hokkaido in northern Japan, in larger and more complex exercises with allies. The effort responds to China’s growing missile arsenal, which U.S. planners fear could deny access to the Western Pacific.

HIMARS has conducted land-attack and maritime-strike missions with ranges of a few dozen to a few hundred miles. It first operated in Japan in 2021 and reached an island 150 miles east of Taiwan during Keen Sword. In the Philippines it has moved to Palawan, northern Luzon, Itbayat only 100 miles from Taiwan, and Balabac for live-fire. Typhon, able to fire SM-6 missiles a few hundred miles and Tomahawk missiles up to 1,000 miles, has remained in the Philippines since 2024, was test-fired nearly 400 miles in May 2026, and has returned to Japan. Gen. Ronald Clark called the rapid movement of launchers and munitions a joint success that gives adversaries pause. Maj. Gen. Bernard Harrington noted more than 30 consecutive months of forward presence and the need to master sustainment and sensor-to-shooter links. Chinese assessments stress the difficulty of mobility, concealment and resupply on small islands near Taiwan. Harrington pointed to lower-cost drones and unmanned vessels to preserve larger systems.

‘Jensen’s nightmare’: Huawei, DeepSeek narrow AI chip ecosystem gap with Nvidia: report

South China Morning Post | Ann Cao

Huawei Technologies is narrowing the gap with Nvidia’s chip hardware and software ecosystem through closer work with AI start-up DeepSeek, a SemiAnalysis report published on Thursday said. The firm wrote that software results and testing on the Ascend 950PR show the ecosystem gap is closer, and that Jensen Huang’s “nightmare is starting to come true”.

DeepSeek released six software modules for the Ascend ecosystem that mirror ones it built for Nvidia chips, including an Ascend version of TileLang, a programming language for kernels, the code that operates chip hardware. SemiAnalysis expects DeepSeek to rely “primarily” on Huawei’s stack by 2027 or 2028. Gaps remain. The Ascend 950PR, unveiled in March, lags Nvidia’s H100, which began shipping in 2022, though Huawei’s best kernels reach 99.7 per cent of their theoretical ceiling. Optimisations have centred on large supernodes, leaving problems for developers using x86 host processors. Beijing has made tech self-reliance a national priority. Shared fixes could compound gains.

The CCP ‘Saturates’ Religion with Socialist Values\

The Jamestown Foundation | Jonah Reisboard

China’s Communist Party is intensifying efforts to embed socialist values and Chinese cultural identity within religious life through a policy described as “saturation”. The approach seeks to weaken the organisational and spiritual independence of religious communities. It combines ideological education, state-aligned religious messaging and surveillance. Local implementation has continued for years.

The policy forms part of a four-part framework for sinicising religion: guidance, harmonisation, saturation and transformation. Local authorities distribute Party-aligned books, display national flags, organise patriotic education and encourage sermons consistent with official ideology. Inspections and digital systems monitor religious sites, leaders and activities, including through cameras, mobile applications and data analysis. The article cites 534 surveillance cameras across 178 religious sites in Nantong and an AI-assisted management system offered by Baotou Pasis Network Technology. The Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress Law may encourage renewed efforts, although local authorities have pursued these policies without a comprehensive national statute. The central question is how far administrative and technological controls can reshape religious identity while reducing space for independent belief and organisation.

The Fog of Tech

Foreign Affairs | Mara Karlin

Artificial intelligence, autonomous systems and drone swarms are now shaping conflicts in Gaza, Iran, Lebanon and Ukraine, with combatants deploying them in the air, on land and at sea, sometimes in massive numbers. Mara Karlin warns that the United States risks a “technology trap”: treating new capabilities as guarantees of victory while neglecting war’s enduring political and human fundamentals.

She contrasts the apparent technological triumph of the 1990–91 Gulf War with later insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Ukraine, cheap drones, balloons and fishermen’s nets operate alongside precision glide bombs and ballistic missiles. Karlin argues that planners must define political ends, identify an adversary’s centre of gravity, sustain coalitions and learn systematically. The nature of war has not changed. Otherwise, technological confidence may hollow out deterrence, reduce civilian protection and widen the gap between the military and the society it serves.

The Pentagon is quietly building an elite new tech sabotage agency

Politico | John Sakellariadis, Jack Detsch and Paul McLeary

The Pentagon has spent months building a Technology Support Office, or TSO, to covertly disrupt and sabotage foreign technology programmes seen as threats to American military superiority. Deputy Defense Secretary Steve Feinberg signed the memo establishing it on April 14, yet neither Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth nor any other senior official has mentioned it publicly.

It grew largely from two classified intelligence programmes that have run smaller sabotage efforts since 2023. TSO lacks legal authority to run clandestine operations itself. Its engineers, special operators and intelligence officers build hacking tools and plan deception operations with senior military and intelligence officers. One former senior intelligence official estimated its classified contract budget at north of $1.5 billion. Special Operations Command and U.S. Cyber Command objected, fearing cuts to their budgets. Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Jacob Bliss said the reporting rests on untrue information. Critics fear secrecy will limit oversight as the Pentagon signals an intent to expand covert activity abroad.

U.S. and Israel are planning for a possible attack on Iran, source tells NPR

NPR | Daniel Estrin, Hadeel Al-Shalchi, Ruth Sherlock

The U.S. and Israel are preparing plans for a possible attack on Iran in early November, after the U.S. midterm elections on 3 November, a person briefed on the war planning told NPR. Israel had initially planned a mid-October strike before its own elections on 27 October, but President Trump objected. The U.S. is amassing forces in the region.

Preparations could also pressure Iran toward a diplomatic deal. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Tehran is ready for diplomacy or war. An Iranian security source warned of retaliation against U.S. interests and assets of participating countries if officials or civilian infrastructure are hit. The conflict began on 28 February with U.S. and Israeli strikes that killed Iran’s supreme leader and senior officials. Iran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz and targeted vessels; the U.S. has blockaded Iranian ports and oil shipments. U.S. strikes have reduced Iran’s air force, air defences and navy, yet Tehran still threatens Gulf states and has struck U.S. bases. The Revolutionary Guard has threatened data centres and underwater internet cables under the Strait. On Thursday it targeted seven oil tankers there, with four catching fire and three hitting naval mines. The IMF reports contractions of around 16 percent for Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar this year, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE also in recession, and projects oil at $130 a barrel in 2027 if disruptions continue.

Will AI Concerns Become a New Source of Terrorism?

CSIS | Daniel Byman and Riley McCabe

Only two attacks, both in April 2026, count as terrorism motivated by opposition to artificial intelligence. On April 6, someone fired 13 rounds into the Indianapolis home of Councilor Ron Gibson, who backed a $500 million data center, and four days later Daniel Moreno-Gama, 20, attacked OpenAI chief executive Sam Altman’s San Francisco residence and the company’s headquarters.

Neither attack killed anyone, and no organisation has been tied to either. Vandalism, including more than 240 destroyed Flock Safety licence-plate cameras by early September 2026, falls outside the CSIS definition, which requires intent to kill. Motives run from fear of human extinction to local grievances over water and power, and white supremacist groups have borrowed the cause. The record is thin. Executives and local officials may prove easier targets than guarded facilities. The risk would grow if attackers copy one another, extremist communities reward violence, or opponents conclude that elections and protest cannot slow AI.

Iran in ‘Advanced Stages’ of Planning Attacks Against Americans, Officials Say

The New York Times | Edward Wong, Jonathan Swan and Julian E. Barnes

The U.S. government has placed employees on heightened alert across the Middle East and begun reducing personnel at embassies and consulates after intelligence showed Iran is in the advanced stages of planning attacks against Americans. A Friday memo from Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton to Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that lethal plotting had reached advanced stages in the Middle East and certain other countries.

Agencies assess the threat at its highest level since the war began in February. The State Department ordered nonessential employees and families to leave Saudi Arabia and has quietly adjusted staffing at other missions already under restricted operating status. Travel advisories for 13 regional countries remain at level three or four. Officials note that some intelligence points to possible Iranian operatives in the United States and potential targets in Europe, though one official cautioned that Iran’s overseas capabilities remain limited relative to its ambitions. The warnings follow the U.S.-Israel strikes of 28 February that killed Iran’s supreme leader and other senior figures, subsequent Iranian drone and missile attacks, the ongoing U.S. blockade of Iranian ports, and the earlier withdrawal of B-1 bombers from R.A.F. Fairford after specific threats. Plans for further strikes after the midterms remain undecided.

Iran is not bowing pressure

The Washington Post | Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh

Iran is locked in a war of attrition with the United States and pursues clear objectives that President Donald Trump’s recent decision to send another aircraft carrier to the region and threaten the resumption of a significant bombing campaign after the midterms will not alter. The ruling clerics and the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remain fixed on those aims.

They seek to create a new tributary order. That order would impose tolls on ships traversing the Strait of Hormuz and sever security ties between the United States and the Arab Gulf states. The added carrier and the post-midterms bombing threat are presented as insufficient to shift Tehran’s course. The clerical and IRGC leadership continues to prioritise control of the waterway and reduced American influence among Gulf partners over any adjustment forced by the latest US deployments.

Hegseth’s Afghanistan remarks spark backlash from US veterans, allies\

Stars and Stripes | Jennifer H. Svan

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has drawn criticism from US veterans and European leaders after suggesting that only “one or two” NATO-led coalition allies remained actively involved in combat in Afghanistan towards the conflict’s end. Speaking to ROTC cadets at the University of Tennessee on October 17, 2026, he also mocked the abbreviation on the International Security Assistance Force patch. The remarks have reopened questions about allied contributions.

Retired General Ben Hodges called the comments shameful, while former Marine pilot Amy McGrath warned that diminishing allied sacrifice damages trust. NATO and partner nations deployed troops through the ISAF mission after the 2001 terrorist attacks, initially securing Kabul before the mission expanded nationwide by the second half of 2006. At its peak, more than 130,000 personnel served. The source cites 2,465 US service members killed and more than 1,100 from NATO and partner countries. British and Polish officials also defended their forces’ sacrifices, with Poland’s Radoslaw Sikorski citing deaths in Ghazni. The dispute centres on how coalition participation and combat contributions are understood, as Hegseth distinguishes the presence of national flags from what he considers meaningful military capability.

Deadly shooting near Paris is a 'racist terrorist attack', Macron says

BBC | Paul Kirby and Jacob Phillips

French President Emmanuel Macron has labelled a gun attack in a Parisian suburb that killed one person and injured five others a racist terrorist attack. He described it as a turning point, the first random racial killing of this kind in the Republic. The attacker opened fire from a car over some 15 minutes in Trappes and then La Verrière.

People of migrant origin appeared to be targeted. Three of the injured, including a 12-year-old girl, remain in a serious condition. The girl suffered eight gunshot wounds; her mother said she had been wearing a headscarf. The National Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor’s Office is treating the case as murder in connection with a terrorist enterprise and is examining possible conspiracy with a terrorist group. The suspect, named in media as Kevin T, is 39, had four previous convictions that were automatically expunged, was known to police but not to intelligence services, and was not on the list of individuals considered a serious security threat. He used an older-style semi-automatic weapon reported as dating back to the Second World War and classed as a Category A weapon. A member of his immediate family circle was also taken into custody. The mayor of Trappes said the gunman fired randomly with the intent of causing as many casualties as possible.

Russia’s Attritional Theory of Victory in Ukraine

Parameters | Tewfik Hamel

Russia no longer requires the total military defeat of Ukraine to claim a politically usable success. Moscow can treat a negotiated freeze, forced neutrality, durable limits on Ukrainian military sovereignty or weakened transatlantic cohesion as victory if the outcome confirms its strategic depth and veto rights over Europe’s security architecture.

The initial special military operation sought rapid political effects through multi-axis thrusts and a decapitation effort against Kyiv. That approach failed. The war then shifted to slower, industrial attrition tied to Russian state endurance and the durability of Western support. Russian strategic culture supplies the frame of great-power identity and buffer zones. The updated theory of victory relies on coercive attrition, force preservation, long-range strikes and exploitation of Western political variation. Putin’s 14 June 2024 statement conditioned a ceasefire on Ukrainian withdrawal from the four claimed regions and renunciation of NATO membership. By 2025 Russian forces advanced only tens of meters per day while sustaining nearly 1.2 million casualties since February 2022, yet still converted persistent pressure into cumulative political advantage. Operational performance has often been poor relative to resources consumed; the strategic adaptation has not abandoned the original political aims.

Why a Russia Gas Deal Can’t Buy Peace in Ukraine

The National Interest | Andreas Umland

President Donald Trump’s envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have urged Kyiv and European capitals to consider resuming Russian gas flows through Ukraine’s pipeline network as part of a peace settlement. The suggestion followed a US announcement of a deal to buy 2.25 million barrels of Russian diesel and reports of discussion around the surviving Nord Stream 2 string.

Ukraine would likely accept transit under a ceasefire. It permitted Russian gas to continue flowing after the February 2022 invasion until 1 January 2025, moving 15–16 billion cubic metres in 2024 and booking over $1 billion under the prior contract. Russia’s oil and gas revenues fell 23.8 percent in 2025 to 8.48 trillion rubles, with a further 17.2 percent year-on-year drop in the first nine months of 2026, and the end of Ukrainian transit cost Gazprom up to $4.5 billion annually. Yet Moscow earlier cut Nord Stream supplies for political leverage and has not moderated its territorial aims. An EU regulation now phases out Russian pipeline gas from autumn 2027. Economic cooperation offered before a verified ceasefire would reward aggression without securing behavioural change.

Ukraine: With or Without Trump

Comment is Freed | Lawrence Freedman

Ukraine remains dependent on selected United States intelligence and military capabilities despite becoming less reliant on Washington since January 2025. Lawrence Freedman describes growing friction between Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Donald Trump over sanctions, military support and responsibility for the war. The immediate stakes include Ukraine’s access to warning information and the credibility of American diplomacy.

The author links the dispute to reported US decisions involving Russian diesel exports, sanctions under the Graham Act and alleged restrictions affecting military Starlink use. Trump also announced an energy ceasefire that, Freedman reports, neither Moscow nor Kyiv had agreed to beforehand. Zelenskyy accepted the announcement, while Vladimir Putin deflected. Meanwhile, US envoy Steve Witkoff’s visit to Moscow produced no breakthrough, although Russia indicated readiness to re-engage in trilateral talks. Freedman portrays Trump’s public statements as unreliable and his treatment of Ukraine as increasingly sympathetic to Moscow. The extract ends before completing its promised assessment of Trump’s objectives, the peace negotiations and their implications for Ukraine.

The New Energy Stalemate in Ukraine

Foreign Affairs | Tatiana Mitrova and Sergey Vakulenko

The Trump administration has demanded that Ukraine suspend attacks on Russian refineries, one of Kyiv’s most effective means of pressuring Moscow, as the fifth winter of war approaches. It has also struck a deal with Moscow that temporarily waives US sanctions on Russian diesel exports, and its envoys have proposed that Europe buy more Russian gas, Mitrova and Vakulenko write.

Ukraine has adapted with batteries and distributed generation, yet 2,500 to 3,000 of Kyiv’s 12,000 apartment buildings could enter winter without alternative heat. Ukrainian drones have cut Russian refinery throughput by roughly 30 percent since mid-2025, leaving a gasoline shortfall of about ten percent. Moscow has room to manoeuvre, having loosened fuel standards and subsidised imported gasoline. Neither side has a decisive edge. The authors judge that energy strikes alone are unlikely to force either side to accept the other’s terms, and only a true cease-fire can break the cycle.

Trump Asked Musk to Reverse Limits on Ukraine’s Military Internet Use

The New York Times | Michael Crowley, Maggie Haberman and Siobhán O’Grady

President Trump called Elon Musk last week and asked him to restore Ukraine’s full access to the Starshield satellite communications network after Ukrainian officials reported new limits on military drones essential to the war against Russia. The limits raised alarms that the restrictions might have been imposed at Trump’s direction.

Ukrainian drones flying faster than 100 miles per hour began losing their Starshield connection in mid-October, with some falling from the sky. Longer-range operations and interception of faster Russian jet-powered drones were disrupted. Starshield is the military-grade version of Starlink, offering higher encryption and security; the US government has spent billions on it and granted Kyiv access. Control remains disputed. Musk states that limits are decided by the US military and ultimately the president. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the United States cannot direct a private company and that no one in the system requested changes. Trump declined to confirm the call but said Musk “put it back.” Full restoration remained unclear to some Ukrainian officials. The disruption has not altered the broader stalemate, yet it has heightened concerns about the direction of US support.

It’s terrifying: Ukraine and Europe on edge as Trump sides with Putin

Euronews | Jorge Liboreiro, Sasha Vakulina & Shona Murray

Donald Trump’s apparent alignment with Vladimir Putin has intensified Ukrainian and European fears that Washington could pressure Kyiv into accepting a settlement favourable to Moscow. Reported restrictions on Starlink, delays in American weapons deliveries and interruptions to intelligence-sharing have raised concerns about Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. European leaders are trying to restore momentum in peace negotiations.

The dispute extends beyond diplomatic rhetoric to the military support on which Ukraine depends. A November 2025 US-backed 28-point proposal reportedly called for territorial concessions, limits on Ukraine’s armed forces and permanent renunciation of NATO membership. Kyiv has also sought permission to manufacture Patriot interceptors domestically, but no final licensing agreement had been confirmed. Washington denies imposing restrictions for political reasons. European governments are pursuing simultaneous support for Ukraine, pressure on Russia and engagement with the United States. Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Finnish President Alexander Stubb organised talks in Oslo as tensions rose. The central uncertainty remains whether negotiations can progress without weakening Ukraine’s defences or diminishing Europe’s influence over the terms of a settlement.

The Myth of Inevitable Russian Victory over Ukraine

Institute for the Study of War | Frederick W. Kagan, Kateryna Shymkiv, Nikolai Sundstrom

Russian forces have made effectively zero net gains in 2026 at the cost of over 40,000 casualties per month since July, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assesses. It judges a Russian military victory extraordinarily unlikely unless Western support for Ukraine collapses, and says Ukraine has held the initiative in key sectors.

Operation Vivaldi liberated around 277 square kilometres and 16 settlements near Lyman. Putin’s claims of gains are fictional, ISW says, and it is unclear whether he is lying or being lied to. Over 1.5 million Russian personnel have been killed or seriously wounded since the start of the full-scale invasion, and recruitment lags losses. At the 2026 rate of approximately 0.25 square kilometres per day, Russia would need 60 years to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast. Russia could still win. ISW sees a collapse of Western support as the likelier route.

How Laser Communications Could Simplify Modern Warfare

The National Interest | Jean-Francois Morizur

Ukraine’s military reported that some drones lost satellite internet connectivity when flying too fast, following restrictions affecting Starshield, SpaceX’s military satellite service. One unit experienced interruptions lasting 10 to 20 seconds, disrupting sensitive missions. In operations where drones may have only moments to identify and engage targets, even brief communications failures can make intelligence unusable.

The article explains that intelligence loses value at different rates, depending on whether it identifies a fixed installation or a moving target. A June operation cited by the Center for Strategic and International Studies delivered commercial satellite information to Ukrainian operators roughly 15 minutes after collection. Optical communications use narrowly directed laser beams to transmit more information during brief satellite contact with ground stations. They are difficult to jam or spoof, but weather disruption and precise alignment remain limitations. The proposed approach combines optical links, radio communications, sufficient ground stations and alternative connections. Its central concern is ensuring that intelligence reaches decision-makers before circumstances change, rather than concentrating solely on image quality or collection speed.

Why African Oil Cannot Solve the Global Fuel Crisis

The National Interest | Yagiz Sullu

Nigeria, Angola, Libya and Algeria have long supplied crude to world markets and offer shipping routes that avoid the Strait of Hormuz. Amid ongoing Middle East conflict, buyers seek these alternatives to reduce exposure. Yet established producers cannot rapidly raise output to ease the global fuel crisis.

Most lack spare capacity. Production in Nigeria, Angola and Algeria has declined for years as fields mature and exploration lags. Nigeria’s Bonga Complex and Agbami face natural depletion, compounded by pipeline vandalism and theft. Fifteen of Angola’s twenty largest fields have reached at least 70 percent maturity. Algeria’s Hassi Messaoud requires fresh investment under heavy state control. Africa’s refining base remains thin; many producers still import products. Nigeria’s Dangote refinery has reached 700,000 barrels per day, but new capacity will take years. Domestic gasoline and diesel demand is projected to rise to 2050, pressuring governments to favour local markets. Diversifying suppliers can cut route risk but cannot offset shortages or price spikes when oil trades globally. Spare production capacity remains the decisive missing element.

No Front Lines: A Decision Guide for Companies Caught in Conflict

CSIS | Emily Harding, Julia Dickson and Aosheng Pusztaszeri

Iran threatened data centres across the Gulf in March and April 2026, extending the risks of conflict beyond military bases to commercial infrastructure. The CSIS report, No Front Lines: A Decision Guide for Companies Caught in Conflict, examines how businesses face exposure when their services become entangled in warfare. The immediate concern is corporate involvement in conflicts where civilian and military interests intersect.

The report places these risks within an interconnected economy shaped by just-in-time operations and companies' supporting roles in war. It presents a decision guide for executives and boards, using questions to identify knowledge gaps before evaluating risks and mitigation options. It also examines the protections governments can provide when commercial organisations become exposed to conflict. The framework addresses corporate decisions about assisting a party to a conflict and the consequences of those choices. Its final section offers recommendations for the US president on how the White House can assess and reduce risks facing affected companies. The report received project support from the International Committee of the Red Cross, alongside general support.

From Jihad to Instagram: The Taliban’s New Playbook

SOF News | Jessica L. Walton

The Taliban is using foreign visitors, social media and carefully managed public messaging to improve its international image while maintaining restrictions on Afghan citizens. In 2025, American visitor Whitney Wright shared images from Afghanistan, including a visit to Band-e Amir National Park, where Afghan women had been prohibited from visiting since 2023. The contrast exposes competing portrayals of life under Taliban rule.

The movement’s messaging has shifted from insurgent resistance towards claims of security, development and effective governance. Strategic communications adviser Majeed Qarar describes its approach through deception, delusion and direction, targeting domestic audiences, international observers and its own supporters differently. Social platforms, sympathetic content creators and religious education help circulate these messages, while censorship limits independent reporting. A September 2026 ODI Global report cited in the source raises concerns about ideological instruction in religious schools. The Taliban also seeks diplomatic recognition and economic engagement amid continuing sanctions. The article warns that favourable international perceptions could obscure the presence of al-Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISIS-K in Afghanistan, complicating assessments of the movement’s intentions and the potential security consequences beyond its borders.

When AI Holds the Red Button, Deterrence Could Put Humanity at Risk

The National Interest | Boaz Golany

Boaz Golany contends that handing nuclear retaliation to artificial intelligence would strengthen deterrence on paper while removing the human judgement that has averted catastrophe before. North Korea's law of September 8, 2022, which calls for an automatic and immediate strike if its nuclear command system is endangered, prompts him to ask whether Kim Jong-un might delegate that role to AI.

An AI system could monitor warning data, judge whether an attack had occurred and trigger retaliation if no leader could respond. The Soviet Union's Perimeter system, known in the West as the Dead Hand, offered a Cold War precedent. Golany says such autonomy removes any chance of intervention when stakes peak. He cites Stanislav Petrov, who in 1983 judged satellite warnings of incoming US missiles false. Rule-bound software could fail without malfunctioning. Rivals might also speed up their own decisions and lean on automated warning systems. He would keep AI in support roles under meaningful human control.

India Needs A Littoral Manoeuvre Warfare Concept

Eurasia Review | Siddharth Anil Nair

The Indian Armed Forces currently lack a dedicated littoral manoeuvre warfare doctrine, leaving coastal and island defences reliant on static, unidirectional sea-to-land operations. Modern conflicts in the Black Sea and Red Sea demonstrate how dispersed, land-based precision strike systems and autonomous unmanned platforms can contest maritime domains effectively.

Establishing a formal land-to-sea manoeuvre framework is essential for India to secure critical maritime chokepoints. While amphibious doctrine established in historical operations like Operation Beaver in 1971 emphasised concentrated force projection, contemporary multi-domain warfare requires distributed expeditionary sensor-shooter networks. India already possesses relevant capabilities, exemplified by its export of the BrahMos missile system to the Philippines for archipelagic defence. Current operations remain siloed. Developing a unified joint doctrine through the Integrated Defence Staff will enable emerging theatre commands to transform the Andaman and Laccadive Seas into dynamic sea-denial zones against eastern maritime adversaries.

Is It Going To Be A Rebirth Of The Quad?

Eurasia Review | Dr. Rajaram Panda

United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that the Quad will convene a leaders' summit alongside ASEAN meetings in Manila from 16 to 18 November 2026. This initiative seeks to revive top-level engagement after India's planned 2025 summit was repeatedly delayed by bilateral friction over United States tariffs, oil sanctions, and visa restrictions.

Foreign ministers maintained the operational continuity of the grouping through four ministerial meetings, most recently issuing a joint statement in Manila in July 2026 targeting South China Sea maritime security without explicitly naming China. Quad diplomats sustain working-level collaboration. However, strategic alignment is strained by President Donald Trump's skepticism toward multilateral forums and his proposed nuclear trilateral meeting with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin during the 18–19 November APEC summit. Consequently, Japan, Australia, and India are rapidly expanding bilateral defense and security cooperation to hedge against potential shifts in American regional commitments.

How much aid does the UK spend in Pakistan, and why?

House of Commons Library | Philip Brien, Philip Loft and Jonathan Hingston

Pakistan received £113 million in UK bilateral aid in 2025, recovering from £57.8 million in 2022 despite a longer-term decline in British assistance. The United Kingdom has ended direct aid disbursements through Pakistan’s government, shifting delivery towards implementing organisations, multilateral institutions and development finance. The change reflects a stated move from traditional aid towards a partnership linking development objectives with British national interests.

Pakistan was the largest recipient of UK country-specific bilateral aid in every year from 2015 to 2019. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office plans £51.4 million annually for bilateral assistance from 2026/27 to 2028/29, alongside potential multilateral support. Priorities include disaster response, governance, education, women’s rights, climate resilience, irregular migration and counter-terrorism. British International Investment held a US$358 million portfolio across 38 Pakistani companies in 2025. Security funding also supports programmes addressing terrorism, cyber threats and organised crime. The Commons International Development Committee criticised earlier reductions for their effects on marginalised groups and weaknesses in coordination. The briefing examines the effectiveness of assistance as the UK reduces its aid budget and places greater emphasis on investment, expertise and local leadership.

Censorship in Pakistan Goes From ‘Pleasant’ to ‘Unpleasant’

The Diplomat | Asif Ullah Khan

The Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority issued a directive on October 13 restricting satellite television channels from broadcasting live coverage of explosions, shootings, and terrorist attacks. Under the new regulations, broadcasters must rely exclusively on verified information provided by law enforcement agencies while employing automated time-delay mechanisms and establishing independent editorial boards.

This policy expands existing media suppressions that previously prohibited news outlets from airing the name or likeness of former Prime Minister Imran Khan following his arrest in May 2023. State control has deepened. Beyond broadcast television, Pakistani cyber authorities are enforcing vague digital speech regulations that penalise online comments deemed harmful to public peace or government institutions. These compounding regulatory mandates effectively force news organisations, journalists, and private citizens to self-censor crucial security incidents, political trial developments, and core policy debates to avoid regulatory penalties, legal prosecution, or state retaliation.

US Central Asia Policy Has an Afghanistan Problem

The National Interest | Zalmai Nishat and Chris Blackburn

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Samarkand on 18 October within the C5+1 framework, accompanied by a substantial American business delegation. Zalmai Nishat and Chris Blackburn contend that Washington’s push on trade, investment and security cannot succeed while Afghanistan’s political and security crisis remains unresolved.

Washington’s calculations centre on critical minerals, energy resources, transport corridors and industrial development. Rubio called it a beginning. He acknowledged the United States had paid the region insufficient attention. Russia became the first country to recognise the Taliban in July 2025, opening the way for a military-technical cooperation agreement in May 2026 whose terms have not been publicly disclosed. Pakistan has spent much of the past year confronting the Taliban along its western frontier. The World Bank says CASA-1000 cannot operate unless the Afghanistan section of the line is completed. Nishat and Blackburn propose a regional dialogue running alongside an Afghanistan-led national one.