$1.3 billion Indo-US satellite saw Nepal disaster coming but no one saw it

MSN | Pallava Bagla

The $1.3 billion NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) satellite detected accelerating mountain movements weeks before Nepal’s catastrophic Rasuwa flash flood on 26 August 2026, yet no early warning was issued to downriver communities. The 99 million cubic metre rock-and-ice collapse from Langtang Lirung plunged 2,170 vertical metres, killing 1,451 people and leaving 5,745 missing.

Institutional coordination gaps between space agencies and disaster response authorities left critical earth-observation data unmonitored across processing pipelines like ISRO’s Bhoonidhi portal. L-band radar data recorded cumulative horizontal displacements exceeding five metres between 20 June and 19 August 2026. Data sat unanalyzed in real time. Unmonitored satellite telemetry highlights a severe command deficit, where sensor deployment outpaces joint operational analysis and actionable dissemination infrastructure. Sustained heatwaves reaching 8 to 9 degrees Celsius destabilised high-altitude permafrost, aggravating regional hazard risks across 25,000 Himalayan glaciers without real-time operational decision authority or oversight.

No tailwinds for India: US and China are squeezing India’s rise

MSN | Sreemoy Talukdar

India’s rise faces five structural headwinds that China’s ascent did not, Sreemoy Talukdar contends, with Washington and Beijing posing the most immediate tests on the road to 2047. Crude prices are touching $117 a barrel, he writes, while the RBI works to keep the rupee afloat. Tariff walls and automation, he says, now deny India the path China took.

He cites 2025 tariffs of 50 per cent on Indian goods, a temporary six-month waiver for Chabahar and Trump’s warmer ties with Pakistan. The trade deal is still in limbo. Beijing is the biggest challenge, he argues: it announced export controls on tunnel-boring machines on October 19 and proposed controls on 12 advanced solar photovoltaic manufacturing technologies. On October 22, the ITBP chief said face-offs continued in Arunachal Pradesh. India is widening its network of partners while keeping channels open to Beijing and Moscow, a trapeze act he calls difficult.

Taliban Claims Cross-Border Strikes on ISKP in Pakistan

The Jamestown Foundation | Barakwal Myakhel

The Taliban regime’s Defense Ministry claimed on June 19 that its forces “targeted and struck hard” at Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) centres in Pakistan’s Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. If confirmed, it would be the first publicly claimed Taliban cross-border strike against ISKP targets in Pakistan since the May ceasefire, though Pakistan dismissed it as propaganda.

Mutual accusations had already fuelled military escalation, with Pakistan conducting airstrikes inside Afghanistan since at least October 2025. The Taliban offered no evidence. Pakistan’s Ministry of Information and Broadcasting called the claim “fake and nefarious” and said ISKP and more than “two dozen” other militant groups operate from Afghanistan. Pakistani strikes on June 28 killed at least 28 civilians and injured 49, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Barakwal Myakhel judges that without credible intelligence sharing and border de-escalation, tensions are likely to persist and ISKP may exploit ungoverned spaces.

Is Washington misreading Beijing? Decline in US visits to China sparks concern

South China Morning Post | Caroline Lin

Congressional delegations to China fell sharply between 2010 and 2026, and fewer Americans now study there, two think-tank studies show. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that only 32 per cent of the 535 sitting US lawmakers, or 172, have travelled to mainland China, Hong Kong or Taiwan.

Bilateral tensions deepened in Donald Trump’s first term, and CSIS linked the drop in Taiwan travel to fallout from Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit. The report estimates fewer than 2,000 Americans now study in China, against a 2019 peak of about 11,000. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) analysis, by Rush Doshi, notes the suspension in China of the Fulbright programme and the Critical Language Scholarship. Isabella McCallum, a CSIS co-author, said Congress would rely more on second-hand information. Sun Chenghao of Tsinghua University warned of miscalculation. Xi Jinping has invited 100,000 young Americans to China over five years. Whether that rebuilds expertise remains open.

How Saudi Arabia’s mBridge Exit Exposes the Limits of China’s Financial Warfare Strategy

Small Wars Journal | Hugh Harsono

Saudi Arabia’s Central Bank publicly disclosed on 19 September 2026 that it had exited the China-led mBridge central bank digital currency project over a year prior. The departure demonstrates that technical participation in alternative clearing platforms does not guarantee long-term geopolitical or institutional alignment with Beijing’s financial warfare goals.

China developed mBridge alongside the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System to reduce global reliance on the U.S. dollar and bypass Western sanctions. Meanwhile, parallel adoption continues elsewhere, as Rwanda’s Bank of Kigali connected to CIPS on 24 September 2026. Conversely, Japan is advancing alternative wholesale digital currency structures through Project Agora and regulated yen-backed stablecoins like JPYC. Financial interoperability is becoming a core strategic capacity. Consequently, emerging international payment architectures will feature overlapping settlement rails rather than a single dollar replacement, complicating Western sanctions enforcement while granting participant states greater operational flexibility in cross-border commerce.

How Do Americans View Foreign Policy Ahead of the Midterms?

Cfr | Rebecca Lissner

Wisconsin voters across Milwaukee and Kenosha counties voice deep economic anxiety regarding trade tariffs and restrictive immigration policies. Tariffs on Canada and other trade partners raised average household costs by $1,500, destroyed 6,100 manufacturing jobs, and shrank economic output by $2 billion in 2025. Citizens express growing frustration with overextension abroad, questioning military support for Iran, Ukraine, and Israel while domestic needs go unmet.

Traditional alliances with countries like Canada receive strong public backing, contrasting sharply with widespread apprehension regarding alignment with authoritarian states. Meanwhile, manufacturing and labor sectors maintain an optimistic yet cautious outlook on the domestic AI infrastructure buildout. China is viewed primarily as an economic rival rather than an immediate security threat, with local industries confronting competitive pressures directly on the factory floor. These sentiments mirror broader voter disillusionment across key electoral swing states regarding Washington's international commitments.

The Donald Trump-Vladimir Putin-Xi Jinping Summit: A New Yalta?

National Interest | Tsiporah Fried

US President Donald Trump has signaled openness to a proposed trilateral summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping during the November 2026 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Shenzhen. The gathering, initially proposed by Moscow, aims to focus on nuclear disarmament rather than the ongoing war in Ukraine.

This initiative follows Washington's suspension of key tariffs under the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 on 16 October. New START expired in February 2026. This left the United States and Russia, who control 86 percent of global nuclear weapons, without a binding strategic arms control treaty alongside China's expanding arsenal. While direct great-power transactionality aims to bypass institutional inertia, practical execution risks eroding transatlantic alliance credibility and intelligence-sharing mechanisms. European partners fear their security architecture could become a bargaining variable in broad trilateral negotiations conducted without Ukrainian or allied participation.

Russia’s Drone Surge Depends on Chinese Supplies

The Jamestown Foundation | Simone Chiusa

Chinese state-owned enterprise Jilin Chemical Fiber Group delivered 46 metric tons of polyacrylonitrile precursor to Rosatom subsidiary Alabuga-Volokno to sustain Russia’s expanding kamikaze drone manufacturing line in Tatarstan. Russian state procurement for Shahed-type loitering munitions grew from 12,000 units in 2024 to more than 100,000 in 2026. This massive output increase exposes Moscow’s overwhelming dependence on Beijing for critical components, ranging from carbon fiber materials to Xiamen Limbach engines.

Domestic import substitution efforts have repeatedly failed. Between March 2022 and January 2025, Alabuga-Volokno imported approximately 3,000 tons of Chinese synthetic yarn worth $21.4 million. Russia now pays up to a 300 percent premium for Chinese defense-critical technology while allocating 89 percent of its carbon fiber output to military enterprises by 2030. Meanwhile, Ukrainian long-range strike campaigns targeting domestic Russian facilities, including the Saransk optical fiber plant, further compel Moscow to rely on Beijing's industrial supply lines to sustain theater operations.

US-China strategic competition to keep escalating as world watches on, Rudd says

South China Morning Post | Lucy Quaggin

Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd warned at Harvard University on Friday that strategic competition between the United States and China is expanding across military, economic, technological, and ideological domains. His assessment followed a September summit in Washington between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump.

Rivalry remains intense despite personal diplomatic overtures. To manage trade tensions, Chinese Vice-Premier He Lifeng and US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent negotiated an extension of the Busan trade truce from November 10, 2026, to January 10, 2027. Alongside targeted tariff reductions, both nations pledged government-to-government dialogue on artificial intelligence and crisis communication mechanisms to avoid Graham Allison’s Thucydides Trap. Beijing favors presidential diplomacy to prevent disruption prior to the ruling Communist Party’s 21st Party Congress. The two leaders are scheduled to meet twice more at the Shenzhen APEC summit and the Miami G20 gathering, marking four face-to-face encounters in a single year.

Lula Defies Latin America’s Pro-Trump Wave

Foreign Policy | Catherine Osborn

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva secured reelection on 25 October 2026, defeating right-wing candidate Flávio Bolsonaro with 51.8 percent of the vote against 48.2 percent. The victory marks a historic fourth presidential term and resists a wider regional political shift towards United States President Donald Trump.

A surge in grassroots digital campaigning, including a WhatsApp channel with 10 million members, proved decisive in reversing first-round momentum. Lula overcame initial deficits to achieve the narrow margin of over 3.5 percentage points. However, domestic governance challenges remain severe. Flávio’s Liberal Party expanded its parliamentary presence in Congress, creating significant legislative friction for the incoming administration. Rising national debt further restricts economic manoeuvrability while election judicial disputes continue. Meanwhile, neighbouring right-wing leaders in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru acknowledged the result prior to Washington’s official reaction, underscoring evolving diplomatic dynamics across Latin America.

The U.S. Army’s Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV)

Congressional Research Service | Andrew Feickert

The U.S. Army’s Infantry Squad Vehicle, built by GM Defense from a Chevrolet Colorado ZR2 baseline, is a lightweight, unarmoured transport for nine soldiers. In February 2026, the Army raised its procurement objective to 11,582 ISVs, an “exponential” increase from the original 2,065-vehicle requirement, citing soldier feedback and Transformation in Contact experimentation.

The FY2026 budget requests $308.620 million for 1,275 ISVs and associated equipment. The Army also issued a Commercial Solutions Opening on 30 March 2026 for up to 606 heavier ISV-H vehicles with exportable power for mobile command and control. DOT&E found the ISV effective as a troop carrier in permissive environments, though initial testing raised reliability, training and survivability concerns; later testing showed improved reliability. The trade-off is protection. Congress faces questions over fleet size, logistics and the ISV’s effect on the wider light tactical vehicle fleet.

AI, Robotics, and Marines

Real Clear Defense | Gary Anderson

The United States Marine Corps faces critical operational vulnerabilities due to its Force Design divestments of tanks, heavy engineer bridging assets, and conventional artillery in favour of short-range Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NEMSIS) platforms. This structural shift was intended to secure positions across the First Island Chain against potential Chinese aggression.

However, NEMSIS anti-ship missiles offer a limited range of just over 100 nautical miles, rendering them rapidly obsolete against longer-range US Army hypersonic systems and advanced peer capabilities. Rebuilding legacy armor would take a decade. Integrating human-robot hybrid infantry formations offers a cost-effective alternative by augmenting small units with robotic skirmishers, loitering munitions, and autonomous ground vehicles. Recent Ukrainian robotic operations demonstrate that teaming infantry with uncrewed platforms restores frontline combat mass and tactical lethality without ballooning defense budgets. Adopting uncrewed ground architecture before 2030 provides a financially viable model to mitigate severe amphibious capability gaps.

AI Adoption: Are Air Force and Space Force Ready and Willing?

Air & Space Forces Magazine | Todd South

The U.S. Air Force and Space Force are accelerating artificial intelligence adoption, with Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink announcing more than 300 AI tools for military personnel. Senior leaders want these systems to streamline administrative work, combine data and improve decision-making. Yet rapid adoption is raising concerns about oversight, security and workforce readiness.

The Department of the Air Force tracks AI applications through a central inventory called CLARA, while mission owners retain responsibility for development, authorisation and delivery. Its AI Action Team, established by Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force David Wolfe, has examined more than 50 projects. The department also uses the Pentagon’s GenAI.mil platform for unclassified and sensitive administrative tasks. However, unapproved tools can create shadow AI, exposing data and networks while generating costs that escape central oversight. The Army’s Sage AI experience offers a warning: its annual allocation of 100 million tokens had been exhausted by mid-June after access expanded. Officials are examining usage, computing requirements and budgets, while acknowledging that training and unit-level support remain essential to effective adoption.

Lessons Learned From Russia’s War Against Ukraine

RealClearDefense | Hlib Parfonov

Russian ground forces in Ukraine have replaced traditional armoured breakthroughs with continuous small-group infantry assaults supported by first-person view (FPV) drones and electronic warfare. Frontline Ukrainian formations counter these tactics by deploying dense electronic warfare networks—including Bukovel-AD, Anklav, and Nota jamming systems alongside Plastun-RP SIGINT units—blocking UAV command channels to a depth of 20 kilometres behind Russian lines.

This dense electromagnetic barrier forces Russian operators to adopt fibre-optic guided drones and machine-vision target acquisition algorithms, bypassing conventional radio-frequency countermeasures entirely. Electromagnetic dominance remains fleeting. Russian assault groups of four to eight personnel functionally act as disposable reconnaissance by fire to draw defender fire and expose positions before follow-on waves attack. Baltic defense planners face a limited strategic depth of 200 to 300 kilometres and require rapid integration of national FPV drone production, layered low-altitude radar detection, and organic counter-UAV platoons into company and battalion echelons to delay offensive momentum during initial operational phases.

Why is Ukraine so reliant on Starlink and can Europe plug the gap?

BBC News | Tiffany Wertheimer

Ukrainian forces experienced critical command-and-control disruptions following recent performance throttling across SpaceX's Starlink satellite network, exposing severe operational vulnerabilities in tactical drone operations. High-speed satellite communications provide the real-time connectivity required to transmit targeting data and execute precision strikes against Russian positions. Line-of-sight command latency directly affects battlefield survival.

European alternatives currently lack the orbital density and hardware specs needed to replace Starlink's 10,000-satellite constellation. France's Eutelsat operates approximately 600 OneWeb satellites, but its larger terminals cannot equip small tactical strike drones. While the European Union aims to integrate Kyiv into its Govsatcom sharing network, regulatory constraints prohibit using the system for offensive combat missions. Furthermore, Europe's dedicated Iris² military-grade satellite constellation will not achieve operational capability until 2029 with 348 planned satellites. Consequently, Ukrainian commanders remain tethered to commercial satcom providers, leaving front-line intelligence distribution and uncrewed strike kill chains subject to foreign corporate policy and geopolitical uncertainty.

What if No One Wins the Israeli Election?

Foreign Policy | David E. Rosenberg

Israeli voters face a pivotal legislative election on Oct. 27, 2026, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition risks falling short of a parliamentary majority. Recent polling allocates Netanyahu’s bloc a maximum of 49 seats and opposition parties 54, leaving both short of the 61-seat threshold required to govern.

The political gridlock stems directly from the aftermath of the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attacks, which permanently fractured Israel's electoral landscape. With Arab-led parties holding the balance, opposition figure Gadi Eisenkot eyes forming a fragile minority government backed by an external parliamentary safety net. Such an administration would pursue a 100-day program to reverse judicial overhauls, enforce military conscription, and legally bar indicted politicians from executive office. Political friction will remain severe. Resistance from West Bank settlers and Haredi factions threatens domestic stability, while Netanyahu retains leverage to contest vote validity or trigger regional military escalation.

Possible Peace Gesture in Ukraine

Geopolitical Futures | George Friedman

Ukraine and Russia agreed on 23 October to halt combat operations in the Russian-occupied town of Oleshky within the Kherson region, establishing a humanitarian ceasefire scheduled to take effect on 26 October. Negotiated directly by Ukrainian and Russian civilian officials, the localized agreement allows residents to evacuate and enables the delivery of food and essential supplies.

This diplomatic arrangement reportedly followed an intervention by Melania Trump, who maintained direct contact with Russian authorities alongside U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff's talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Localised truces remain operational exceptions. Both Kyiv and Moscow are attempting to influence U.S. President Donald Trump, who faces pressure ahead of American midterm elections while managing an ongoing conflict with Iran. Kyiv seeks to secure continuous U.S. satellite intelligence, whereas Moscow offers minor concessions such as diesel shipments to Washington. Neither combatant can conclude the war without justifying its immense strategic costs.

The Arms Race is Measured in Gigawatts

FIRST BREAKFAST | KATHERINE LAMBERT

Iranian Shahed drones struck two Amazon Web Services data centres in the United Arab Emirates and damaged a third facility in Bahrain on March 1, 2026, knocking two of three UAE availability zones offline and disrupting services used by financial institutions, Snowflake and Careem. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed responsibility and described AWS infrastructure as a military target because of alleged links to U.S. military AI.

The piece presents this event as evidence that electricity has become the enabling layer for military power in an era shaped by AI and cloud computing. It links Pentagon cloud contracts, Maven Smart System and military logistics modernisation to growing dependence on civilian power networks. The constraint is institutional. U.S. data-centre demand rose to 64.4 GW in late 2025 and S&P Global projects 183.2 GW by 2030, while grid interconnection delays and fragmented governance slow new capacity. Drawing on examples ranging from Churchill’s oil transition to Germany’s synthetic fuel vulnerability, the author contends that future military effectiveness will hinge on the ability to secure and deliver large-scale electrical power.

Brazil after the vote: strategic and geopolitical implications

International Institute for Strategic Studies

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won re-election in Brazil’s presidential run-off on 25 October with 51.79% of the vote, narrowly defeating far-right candidate Flávio Bolsonaro. The electoral outcome secures Workers' Party leadership over Latin America’s largest economy amid a broader regional shift toward right-wing governments. This political continuity directly shapes global climate diplomacy, critical-mineral supply chains, and multi-aligned foreign policy across the Global South.

Brazil holds 60% of the Amazon rainforest and vast rare-earth reserves critical to the global energy transition. Lula's administration faces persistent domestic challenges including public insecurity, economic volatility, and transnational organized crime. The victory will test Brazil's strategic balance. Abroad, Brasilia will maintain its active footprint within the BRICS grouping while deepening environmental protocols under the Palermo Convention. Ultimately, the election anchors South America's primary economic engine within a non-aligned diplomatic framework while managing heightened internal political fragmentation and external trade dependencies.

PHP crisis: What you need to do as the world panics about AI cyber attacks

The Independent | Andrew Griffin

A critical vulnerability identified in the PHP programming language—which powers roughly 70 per cent of all websites—has triggered global security alarms and emergency patching efforts across businesses and government networks. The flaw exposes vast swathes of internet infrastructure to rapid exploitation, heightened by accessible large language models that automate zero-day discovery.

Software security maintainers now face an operational asymmetry where artificial intelligence weaponises long-hidden code bugs faster than organisations can deploy fixes. Cybersecurity experts from Censys, Trail of Bits, Granitt, and the Surrey Centre for Cyber Security urge institutions to automate system updates and verify defensive configurations. Individual users remain structurally reliant on service-side remediation despite adopting multi-factor authentication or unique passwords. Attackers currently hold the tactical advantage. Meanwhile, financial institutions like the American Bankers Association report robust defensive preparation against automated threats, though consumer risk persists on secondary retail platforms.

ETH Zurich research finds 407 cyber incidents targeting the space sector in 2025

Space and Defense

ETH Zurich’s Center for Security Studies recorded 407 cyber incidents targeting 183 space-related organisations worldwide in 2025, revealing critical vulnerabilities across ground stations, supply chains, and IT infrastructure. Authored by Clémence Poirier, the September 2026 report demonstrates that hacktivists and state-aligned groups increasingly target commercial space infrastructure during conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.

No orbital assets were directly targeted. However, the absence of onboard cybersecurity monitoring leaves spacecraft intrusions largely undetectable, creating a severe intelligence blind spot for military commanders. Modern defense forces rely heavily on dual-use commercial satellites for communications, navigation, and space domain awareness. This integration creates complex command and coordination vulnerabilities, as military decision authority does not extend to private digital supply chains or overseas ground networks. The 2022 cyberattack on Viasat’s KA-SAT network proved how commercial ground disruptions instantly compromise operational command links, necessitating transparent, intelligence-led defense coordination across public and private space sectors.

Funding, force-structure issues could hinder Hegseth’s new autonomous command

Defense One | Meghann Myers

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth faces significant financial and structural hurdles in launching the U.S. Autonomous Warfare Command, known as AUTOWARCOM. The initiative relies on a $54 billion funding request tied to an uncertain reconciliation bill rather than the standard defense budget. Analysts warn that bypassing conventional force-structure models to create an acquisitions-focused combatant command risks operational disconnection from operating forces.

While the Army has rebranded its Futures and Autonomy Command to serve as a component, other military branches have deferred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. With lawmakers facing potential shifts in congressional power ahead of midterm elections, experts note that funding must materialize by Christmas or stall the command's implementation.

A New Era of War: A Nine-Ton U.S. Helicopter Versus a Drone

The New York Times | Michael Schwirtz

The U.S. Army is testing whether its Apache attack helicopters can help counter drones, as the 2-159th Attack Battalion flew against Outlaw targets during Exercise Skyfall 2 in Germany this month. The trials reflect a battlefield shift: drones threaten aircraft and armoured vehicles, while the targets traditionally hunted by Apaches have become harder to find.

The Outlaws have wingspans of about 11 feet, broadly comparable to Russian and Iranian Shahed drones. Crews used 30-millimetre training rounds, missiles and rockets; one crew downed all four drones launched during a flight. The Army views the Apache as one element of a wider defence, with cannon ammunition offering a cheaper option against large numbers of threats. Yet faster jet-powered Geran-4 drones may outrun helicopters, and a Shahed reportedly brought down an Apache over the Strait of Hormuz in June. The pilots survived and were rescued by a remotely piloted Navy sea drone. The helicopter’s future role may therefore be narrower and more selective.

Beast in the Machine

Air & Space Forces Magazine | Col. George Dougherty

Precision-guided munitions are undergoing a fundamental transformation as artificial intelligence and autonomous targeting migrate capabilities from costly cruise missiles into cheap, ubiquitous tactical weapons. This shift enables $300 unmanned aircraft to destroy $200 million C-17 transports, radically destabilising traditional capital platform economics. Universal precision permanently alters battlefield survival.

Military historian Trevor N. Dupuy demonstrated in 1964 that exponential leaps in weapon lethality force military formations to disperse. Modern surgical precision—achieved when circular error probable shrinks below target dimensions—allows light munitions to strike specific vulnerabilities, such as an F-35 fighter or a ship's radar. Small explosive payloads now achieve effects previously requiring massive salvoes. Consequently, heavy mass and concentration become critical operational liabilities against low-cost, asymmetric precision strikes. As demonstrated by Ukrainian drone attacks against Russian armor and bombers, single-shot surgical lethality invalidates traditional force structures relying on heavy protection alone. Battlefield survival requires immediate adaptation.

U.S. Military Operations Against Iran’s Missile and Nuclear Programs

Congressional Research Service | Daniel M. Gettinger and Paul K. Kerr

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched military operations against Iran’s missile and nuclear programmes. The White House later said the campaign struck more than 450 ballistic missile targets and approximately 800 attack drone targets, while President Donald Trump described the objective as preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and destroying its missile industry.

The Congressional Research Service reports that Iran retains thousands of missiles and one-way attack UAVs despite degradation, while reports suggest it may be rebuilding infrastructure and resuming production from stockpiled components. The IAEA has not inspected attacked nuclear facilities since June 2025, and its March assessment found no damage to facilities containing nuclear material. US assessments differ: the 2025 National Security Strategy said the June 2025 strikes significantly degraded Iran’s nuclear programme, while the 2026 National Defense Strategy said they obliterated it. The uncertainty remains material.

The 2026 US-India Subnational Innovation Competitiveness Index

ITIF | Amit Kapoor, Stephen Ezell, Trelysa Long and Sheen Zutshi

The United States holds the top 51 places in the 2026 US-India Subnational Innovation Competitiveness Index, which ranks 87 regions on 12 indicators. The District of Columbia, Massachusetts and California lead. Chandigarh, Maharashtra and Delhi top India but rank below every US state, according to ITIF and the Institute for Competitiveness, India.

Three groups of indicators carry the scoring: knowledge economy at 44.3 percent, globalisation at 11.3 percent and innovation capacity at 44.4 percent. India ranked 38th among 138 economies in the Global Innovation Index 2025, against 3rd for the United States, having risen from 81st in 2015. Manufacturing made up 14.7 percent of India’s total gross value added in 2022–2023, the lowest since 1968–1969. Chandigarh has surpassed Mississippi’s and Hawaii’s knowledge scores. Maharashtra has surpassed 10 US states on innovation capacity, and Delhi has surpassed Alaska. The US score range is about 37 points; India’s is about 23.

India and Europe: Bridging Continents Through IMEC

CSEP | Constantino Xavier and Abhishek Agarwal

India and Europe should build the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) as a resilient economic network and not a mere transport route, a CSEP report edited by Constantino Xavier and Abhishek Agarwal concludes. Announced in 2023, IMEC now serves as a wider resilience project amid the Ukraine war, Gaza conflict, Red Sea disruptions and Strait of Hormuz crisis.

Modelling in the volume suggests a 40% reduction in transit time between India and Europe could add approximately US$3.535 billion to India’s Gross Domestic Product. The report sets out four dividends: economic, security, energy and climate, and political. Governance is the missing layer. Implementation remains fragmented because the corridor lacks a common framework for governments, financiers, regulators and private actors. Proposed fixes include national Sherpas, GTLPRA-type planning frameworks and Track 1.5 structures. Differences between India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act and Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation also complicate data sharing. A six-point action agenda follows.

Pakistan’s Afghan Crisis

The American Conservative | Giorgio Cafiero

Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban have fought sustained hostilities for a year over a border dispute and militant sanctuaries, and have been in an “open war” since February. Giorgio Cafiero writes that Islamabad’s hopes for a cooperative “Taliban 2.0” after August 2021 have become a nightmare, with militant attacks on Pakistan rising since 2024.

Kabul denies sheltering Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and calls Pakistan’s terrorism crisis an internal problem stemming from Islamabad’s failures. Qatari, Turkish and Chinese mediation has so far failed. Russia is so far the only state to recognise the Taliban government formally, though China, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and the Central Asian republics keep de facto ties driven largely by commercial, trade and security interests. Kabul is increasingly engaging New Delhi. Cafiero expects limited outside help for Islamabad and warns that the war risks becoming protracted.

Pakistan Steps Into A Wider Role As Mecca Pact Officials Meet In Tehran

Eurasia Review | Saad Hafiz

Senior officials from Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, the three Makkah Joint Defence Agreement members, met Iranian counterparts in Tehran on 26 October for their first joint high-level meeting since Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia intensified. Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Field Marshal Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin represented the pact.

Pakistan’s mediation, which began after U.S. and Israeli strikes opened the war on 28 February 2026, produced the 14-point Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding. Presidents Donald Trump and Masoud Pezeshkian signed it remotely in mid-June, but it had largely fallen apart by early July. The blockade has run well beyond 100 days. Analyst Saad Hafiz maintains that the meeting widens discussion of collective defence but cannot force Washington or Tehran to compromise on nuclear constraints, sanctions or the blockade. He sees the meeting as keeping open a chance to manage the next phase of a conflict now past eight months.

The Zangezur Corridor (TRIPP): From Regional Geopolitics to Global Geoeconomics

Eurasia Review | Dr. Matin Mammadli

Azerbaijan’s proposed Zangezur Corridor, renamed the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), is advancing through a US–Armenia framework intended to reconnect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan. The August 2025 Washington Joint Declaration gave the initiative political backing, while agreements in 2026 outlined a development company and a possible construction timetable beginning in spring 2027. The project now has a proposed institutional framework.

Under the framework, the planned company would have 74 percent US ownership and 26 percent Armenian ownership, with development and operating rights for 49 years. Beyond roads and railways, the route could accommodate energy transmission and fibre-optic infrastructure. Its geography connects Azerbaijan’s Caspian transport network towards Türkiye and wider European markets, potentially adding capacity to the Middle Corridor. The project also intersects with Armenia–Azerbaijan normalisation, European supply-chain diversification and Central Asian access to international markets. Its commercial significance will depend on implementation and the practical operation of the proposed connections.