5 July 2025

A Lesson On Nuclear Weapons For Iran, From Its Neighbor, Pakistan – Analysis

James Durso

The U.S. and Israel attacked Iran to destroy the country’s nuclear program and perhaps force regime change. Yet just next door to Iran sits Pakistan, a nuclear weapons state, an opponent of Israel and a frenemy of the U.S. How did Pakistan succeed in getting the bomb, whereas Iran’s regime is now in a fight for its life?

First, the Americans wanted revenge for the humiliation of 1979, when 52 Americans were held for 444 days by the revolutionary government. Iran may have decided the 1980 election, handing the White House to Ronald Reagan — ensuring future presidents would do anything to avoid Jimmy Carter’s fate. America’s internal propagandizing has ensured that few citizens know the cause of Iran’s enmity is the 1953 coup, sponsored by Washington and London, against the freely elected government in Tehran after Iran’s parliament voted to nationalize the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

Second, Pakistan made itself useful to the U.S. in the insurgency against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the U.S. punitive expedition in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021.

In the 1980s, Pakistan distributed U.S. weapons and money to the anti-Soviet mujahideen; America obliged by overlooking Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons, though the U.S. stopped its “willful gullibility” in 1990 when President George H.W. Bush was no longer able to certify that Pakistan no longer possessed a nuclear weapon. Many in Pakistan believe America no longer needed them in Afghanistan and so betrayed its long-standing ally, but the real reason may have been the Kashmir crisis that caused Pakistan to raise the enrichment of its uranium to weapons grade, which “removed the last fig leaf.”

Thailand And Cambodia’s Bizarre Border Conflict – OpEd

Murray Hunter

Over the last month Thai and Cambodian military forces have been stepping up their positions along the 803 km (499 miles) mutual land border. This all begin back on May 28 when a border clash occurred after Cambodian nationalist visited the Prasad Ta Moan temple on land not fully demarcated between the two countries. This escalated when Thai authorities began closing the land borders on June 7 and ordered a full alert of troops along the border. Cambodia reciprocated.

This is all going on while the Thai prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra is hanging on for her political life, after the withdraw of the Bhumjaithai Party from the coalition. Paetongtarn has a majority of two seats in a 500 seat parliament. Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra is under threat of returning to prison after allegations of faking his medical ailments while in prison in 2023/24, In addition, Thaksin is in an all-out feud with his friend for 30 years, former Cambodian prime minister and now president of the Senate Hun Sen. Hun Sen disclosed that Thaksin had faked his sickness, only putting on a neck brace for the photo they took together.

There have been mass demonstrations over the last couple of days demanding the resignation of Paetongtarn Shinawatra as prime minister. On June 15, Hun Sen released a recording of a telephone conversation between Paetongtarn and himself, where Paetongtarn, where she was heard to criticise the leader of the 2nd Army Lieutenant General Boonsin Padklang. Meanwhile, the deputy prime minister and defence minister Phumtham Wechayachai guarantees that a coup is not being contemplated by the military leadership.

Xi–Lee Reset Extends Beijing’s Regional Project—and Tests Seoul’s Commitments

Matthew Johnson

A PRC “fish farm support facility” in the Yellow Sea’s Provisional Measures Zone. Beijing’s expanding naval footprint will force Seoul to weigh economic engagement against rising security risks in its strategic calculus. (Source: Chosun)

Executive Summary:

The Xi Jinping–Lee Jae Myung phone call on June 10 signals a tactical thaw after years of strain under Yoon Suk Yeol, reviving “good-neighborly friendship” language and soft power channels Beijing had suspended when Yoon restarted work on deploying the U.S. missile defense system THAAD.

Korea’s trade and financial ties with the People’s Republic of China remain deep and are expanding incrementally through upgraded free trade agreement, digital governance frameworks, and modest renminbi (RMB) usage. This interdependence is pragmatic, however, and not an endorsement of Beijing’s regional order.

Beneath the thaw, persistent maritime incursions, gray-zone coercion, and tech friction reveal that Beijing’s leverage and pressure tools remain fully active, capping how far trust can deepen.

Seoul’s alliance with Washington, dollar-based trade flows, and strategic diversification in semiconductors anchor its core orientation firmly in the U.S.-led order—the hedge that balances Beijing’s gravity.

Worldview Weekly: China’s Stake & Say in the Israel-Iran Conflict

Anushka Saxena 

Since conflict broke out between Israel and Iran, countries around the world are calculating their options in the face of drastic spillovers. China, a party that considers itself a vital regional stakeholder and a peacemaker in the Middle East, is pursuing its own strategy – one which is primarily centered on preserving Chinese interests in the region. Even as China has expressed support for Iran’s right to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, while condemning Israel and the US for attacking its nuclear facilities in blatant disregard for international law, Beijing’s main concerns revolve around two aspects.

The first, is narrative control surrounding American and Israeli bugles of victory vis-à-vis Iran, and expressing explicit support for the latter. Iran is seen as an ally and counterbalancer of Western influence, and so for China, aiding its position and reputation becomes essential. At the same time, Beijing hopes to achieve this without disrupting the possibility of peace and stability. The second, is the uncertainty around its own interests. There is a threat of trade disruptions following Iran’s claim that it will consider closing down the vital chokepoint that is the Strait of Hormuz. There is also the impact that continued missile strikes would have on Chinese citizens in Iran. Hence, Beijing must find ways to secure its position through diplomatic means, in the face of volatility.

Maintaining Support, Controlling Narratives, Playing Safe

As we speak, Iranian Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh has arrived in Qingdao, China, for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Defence Ministers’ Meeting. But regular diplomatic tête-à-tête between China and Iran has been underway for the past few weeks. A day after Israel launched its air attacks on Iran, on June 14, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had a phone call with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi. This was followed up with another phone call between Wang and Araghchi on the ten-day mark, on June 24. A day before that, on June 23, China’s Assistant FM Liu Bin met with Iranian Ambassador Ibrahim Fazli. That same courtesy was not extended to Israeli Ambassador to China Ibrahim Bey, even though both Bey and Fazli were presented their diplomatic credentials on the same day and at the same location.

China Spares No Expense For Latin America and Caribbean Ties

Matthew Fulco

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has cultivated close ties with Brazil, which it sees as a prime candidate to co-lead the Global South in an emerging multipolar world.

Beijing is now the top trading partner for the South American continent, including with individual countries like Brazil, Chile, and Peru, and has persuaded 24 of the 33 members of CELAC—the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States—to join the One Belt One Road initiative.

The PRC has also been successful in poaching Taiwan’s dwindling allies in the region and is currently targeting Paraguay and Guatemala with economic incentives.

In May, People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping announced an RMB 66 billion ($9.2 billion) credit line to partners in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Unveiled at the opening ceremony of the annual at the China-CELAC Forum in Beijing, this was the latest example of a determination to leverage the PRC’s vast financial and economic resources to expand influence in the region. Xi also vowed to increase imports from the region and encourage PRC firms to invest there (Xinhua, May 13).

China will unveil the People’s Liberation Army’s new Information Support, Aerospace, and Cyberspace Forces during Victory Day celebrations


On September 3, as part of the 80th anniversary of the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the fight against fascism, China will hold a large military parade in Tiananmen Square, where the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) new Information Support, Aerospace, and Cyberspace Forces will officially debut.

The announcement was confirmed by China’s State Council Information Office during a press conference on Tuesday, where it was stated that the event will carry strong symbolic and strategic significance. According to Wu Zeke, a senior official from the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the parade will feature foot formations, armored columns, and aerial squadrons, as well as troops who have participated in UN peacekeeping missions.

Debut of the New Technological Forces

Military expert Zhang Junshe emphasized that this parade will mark the first public appearance of new units created after the PLA’s major structural reforms—specifically, the Information Support, Aerospace, and Cyberspace Forces, which now fall under the new command structure directly controlled by the CMC.

What Happens in the Middle East Doesn’t Stay in the Middle East: Strategic Signaling in a Multipolar Age

Peter Mitchell

Recent developments culminating in kinetic US military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and Iran’s retaliatory strike on Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar have radically altered America’s posture since the beginning of the year. Israeli and American air operations against Iranian targets have been extremely effective, and demonstrate impressive capabilities, but these successes should not obscure the reality that every commitment signals adversaries about opportunities and constraints. Beijing is undoubtedly keeping a weather eye on American disposition, industrial capacity, and will as the US strikes deepened American involvement in the region’s unstable security landscape.

The question is not whether Chinese aggression against Taiwan is imminent—such predictions are inherently speculative and counterproductive. Rather, the United States must soberly assess what signals its strategic choices are sending and ensure that decision-makers in Beijing understand that American capability and resolve in the Pacific remain undiminished despite its intervention in the war between Iran and Israel.

Is Chinese President Xi Jinping on his way out?

Gregory W. Slayton

Over the past few months, unprecedented developments point to the potential, and potentially imminent, fall of China’s “Chairman of Everything” Xi Jinping. Chinese Communist Party elders — including Hu Jintao, Xi’s immediate predecessor, whom Xi humiliated at the 20th Party Congress in 2022 — are now running things behind the scenes.

Xi is in poor health and likely to retire at the CCP Plenary Session this August or take a purely ceremonial position.

Xi’s downfall has been rumored before. But never have we seen the recent purges (and mysterious deaths) of dozens of People’s Liberation Army generals loyal to Xi; all replaced by non-Xi loyalists.

Nearly one in 10 ‘Tier 1’ subcontractors to defense primes are Chinese firms: Report

Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

WASHINGTON — Despite a bipartisan push to disentangle the US economy from China, the military-industrial base still relies heavily on Chinese suppliers, a new study from analysis software firm Govini warns. And, the company’s leader says, that’s not the only weak link.

“Defense supply chains today are incredibly brittle. They’re not resilient. They’re very, very intricately tied to foreign suppliers,” Govini CEO Tara Murphy Dougherty told reporters Thursday. “We try to quantify that.”

Bottom line up front, Western defense firms have struggled just to meet the intense surge of demand from years of large-scale combat in Ukraine. A war with China would be much worse — and Murphy Dougherty doesn’t think that US defense production, stockpiles and supply chains are up to the task.

“The data is unequivocal: The United States is not prepared for the war that we may have to enter if China said, ‘today is the day,’” she said. “It’s not that I think we would automatically lose — by no means do I think that’s the case — but I do not believe that the industrial base is prepared to support the material demands of the Department of Defense.”

Drawing on its proprietary database of Defense Department spending and using its flagship analytics toolkit, Ark, Govini recently published its annual “National Security Scorecard.” The study looks at the previous year’s data on not only DoD’s prime contractors — which, Murphy Dougherty notes, remain a small and exclusive group despite ambitious startups like Anduril and Palantir knocking on the door — but also on their principal subcontractors, known as “Tier 1 suppliers.”

Disturbing Post-Iran Attack Questions


Arguably the most cogent analysis of the US-Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear sites to have been made public is one written by Nicole Grajewski, a Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The analysis, published on June 26 by Carnegie, supports both US hawks and doves, both confirming that centrifuges and o…

Offline and in danger: the humanitarian consequences of connectivity disruptions


As people around the world become increasingly reliant on digital and telecommunications networks to access essential services, contact loved ones, and seek help, the rising number of connectivity disruptions in armed conflicts is a growing source of concern for their safety and dignity.

In this post, ICRC Protection Specialist Cléa Thouin reflects on the humanitarian consequences of such disruptions – situations in which digital or telecommunications become partially or completely lost – and on the need to address their causes and mitigate their impact, especially in contexts where connectivity can mean the difference between life and death.

How much of your life depends on connectivity? As societies become increasingly digitalized, connectivity, and particularly access to the internet, now plays an increasingly important role in many people’s daily lives – from the mundane aspects like the platforms providing us with entertainment to more essential tasks such as staying in touch with loved ones, communicating at work, making medical appointments and carrying out financial transactions. So, when connectivity is disrupted during times of conflict or crisis, the stakes can be very high. In these moments, connectivity is no longer just a matter of convenience. It can save lives.

Without connectivity, when military operations start, it may be near impossible to get accurate and life-saving information on safe evacuation routes, or about areas affected by hostilities. Individuals trying to cross international borders to seek protection may not be able to request or access essential documents stored online. People in areas affected by disruptions may be left without financial resources to purchase essential goods when mobile cash stops functioning, and families may be left without news about the fate of loved ones.

Moscow Ponders Reconfigured Middle East, Finding Few Openings

Pavel K. Baev

The Kremlin miscalculated the United States’s readiness to support Israel’s air campaign and underestimated the speed of the ceasefire with Iran, underscoring Russia’s diminishing leverage in Middle Eastern conflicts.

Russia cannot offer Iran tangible aid despite vocal support, pushing Tehran away from Russia for military assistance. This erodes Moscow’s credibility among allies and weakens its strategic presence.

Moscow, sidelined by its limited military and economic tools, is watching its influence recede across Syria, Iran, and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Plus (OPEC+) structures.

The cessation of hostilities in the Gulf on June 25 was as surprising for Moscow as was Israel’s strike on Iran on June 13. Russia’s attempts to assess the consequences of the surge of the air war have to take into account apparent analytical miscalculations. The most serious errors of judgment pertained to U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to join the Israeli air campaign and the follow-up decision to stop it. Russian experts and officials tended to believe that the U.S. administration had been committed to talks with Iran in the weeks preceding Israel’s shocking first strike, and then tended to emphasize his reluctance to join the war, and presently they prefer to exaggerate the fragility of the ceasefire (Parlamentskaya gazeta; Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 24). This stream of commentary cannot quite hide or deny the crumbling of Russia’s positions in the wider Middle East and the lack of feasible options for regaining influence.

One key proposition in Russian assessments of the new geopolitical configuration in the Middle East is the unshakable stability of the Islamic regime in Iran, which Russian analysts apparently presume to be able to withstand all Israeli and U.S. designs for “regime change” underpinned by the extermination of a score of top commanders of the Revolutionary Guard Corps (RIA Novosti; RBC, June 28). Only a few Russian experts-in-exile—duly labelled as “foreign agents”—argue that the grip on power by the 86-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has weakened and the depth of discontent in Iran has deepened (Vot-Tak.tv, June 24; The Moscow Times, June 27).

Sino-Russian Convergence in Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference: A Global Threat to the US and Its Allies

Tamás Matura

The use of AI-driven propaganda and deepfake technologies has significantly escalated the scale and sophistication of disinformation, posing unprecedented challenges from Russia and China for Western intelligence and democratic institutions.

Executive Summary While Russian and Chinese foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations may appear to affect only the soft power of the US and its allies, these actions have a fundamental impact on hard power and national security as well. Moscow and Beijing use different tools and pursue different goals, but both seek to undermine the domestic cohesion of Western societies. This, in turn, weakens the Western alliance system, ultimately diminishing US power and its ability to act globally.

China and Russia, while differing in style and intent, increasingly align in their FIMI efforts, aiming to weaken Western democracies, erode public trust, and promote multipolarity through shared anti-Western narratives and media amplification.

Both countries employ state-controlled media, cyber intrusions, content generated by artificial intelligence (AI), and social media influence campaigns — often reinforcing each other’s messages without formal coordination. This is done to manipulate public perception globally, particularly during crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic or the war in Ukraine.

Case studies reveal their growing presence and influence in regions such as Africa, Latin America, and the Asia Pacific. While evidence of direct coordination remains limited, their activities in discrediting democratic processes, especially around Taiwan and US elections, show alarming parallels. The use of local influencers amplifies their outreach and enhances their credibility with local audiences.

Western openness and media freedom are being exploited, as FIMI actors thrive on creating polarization, undermining NATO and European Union (EU) cohesion, and exploiting societal fault lines.


The Return of Spheres of Influence

Monica Duffy Toft

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine was never simply a regional conflict. His illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 was the proof of concept for a broader Russian test of the so-called rules-based international order, probing how far the West would go to defend that order. The ensuing war forced Europe to consider its dependence on the United States and required U.S. leaders to reassess their appetite for foreign commitments. It ushered China into a new role as Russia’s backer and made countries thousands of miles away grapple with essential questions about their futures: How should they

US Army Responds to Losses of M1 Abrams Tanks in Ukraine

Kyiv Post 

The US sent 31 refurbished M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks to Ukraine for its war against Russia in September 2023, with the first of them reportedly deployed in February 2024. Although claimed to be one of the best tanks in the world, their performance in the field has not lived up to that billing.

Not only had the tanks been provided without some of the latest upgraded depleted uranium armor and fire control systems, it was soon evident that they were vulnerable to the warfighting innovations that have arisen on Ukraine’s battlefields. As with most, if not all, currently fielded main battle tanks, they were designed to fight “tank-on-tank” battles and so were given extensive frontal protection.

However, the war in Ukraine has changed the nature of the threat. The ubiquitous first-person view (FPV) attack drones, modern anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW) and guided artillery have all highlighted the Abrams’ vulnerability to strikes from above. All but one of the tanks lost in Ukraine resulted from drone or other strikes from above and to the rear. The sole exception was hit by the main armament from a Russian T-72B3 tank.

Might Unmakes Right The Catastrophic Collapse of Norms Against the Use of Force

Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro

In his first months back in office, U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened to use military force to seize Greenland and the Panama Canal, suggested that the United States could take ownership of Gaza after the expulsion of two million Palestinians, and demanded that Ukraine give up territory to Russia in exchange for a cease-fire. These acts and statements might appear to be just a handful of examples of Trump’s typical wide-ranging and hyperbolic bluster. But in fact, they all form part of a cohesive assault on a long-standing principle of international law: that states are prohibited from

Preventing Tunnel Construction: Technological, Architectural, and Policy Solutions in Conflict Zones

Chandler Zolan 

Tunnel construction in conflict zones presents a critical security challenge, particularly in regions where underground passageways are exploited for smuggling, terrorism, and circumventing border controls. These tunnels undermine national security, threaten infrastructure stability, and complicate urban planning efforts, making their detection and prevention a priority for both military and civilian authorities. Nowhere is this issue more pronounced than in Israel, where subterranean networks along the Gaza and Lebanese borders have been used for arms smuggling, surprise attacks, and the holding and slaughtering of hostages.

Case Study: Israel’s Anti-Tunnel Strategies

The Gaza Strip hosts an extensive and complex network of tunnels developed primarily by Hamas and other Palestinian factions. This subterranean infrastructure serves multiple strategic purposes, including military operations, smuggling, and concealment. The earliest tunnels were primarily smuggling tunnels connecting Gaza to Egypt in the early 1980s. These were hand-dug and used for moving consumer goods, fuel, and small arms. Tunnels soon became primarily for the transport of weapons and launching attacks. In 2006, Hamas used tunnels to infiltrate Israel and capture Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier, as well as killing two others, which significantly raised Israeli concerns about underground threats. Gilad Shalit was kept as a hostage for more than five years as a result, used as leverage to free over 1,000 people convicted of terror offenses and murder, including the most senior Hamas leadership.

This success led Palestinians to recognize the potential of tunnelling, and they developed extensive military tunnels, some stretching beyond Gaza into Israel and others into Egypt. They also had a significant network within Gaza itself, allowing terrorists to move underground, shielded by the civilian populations above them. This system became known as the Gaza Metro. During 2014’s Operation Protective Edge , the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) discovered over 100 kilometers of tunnels, with about one-third extending into Israeli territory. These tunnels featured multiple entry and exit points, were reinforced with concrete, and equipped with electricity, ventilation systems and communication lines. The IDF deployed troops into the tunnels to clear them of people, then had engineers inspect and map the tunnels for destruction, either by flooding or high precision strike. Egypt was also concerned during the Sinai insurgency, when ISIS-affiliated groups like Ansar Beit al-Maqdis declared a caliphate in the Sinai Peninsula, smuggling weapons, fighters, and supplies through tunnels from Gaza.

Trump’s European Revolution – Analysis

Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard

“We are in the process of a second American revolution.” So claimed Kevin Roberts, president of the Heritage Foundation. The Trumpian think-tank’s policy ideas—on everything from education and migration to healthcare and human rights—have helped to shape the seismic change that has upended American politics. But Trump’s revolution, like previous ones before it, is not simply about changing policies and institutions, but about the identity of the country itself. In just six months, the US has shifted from championing liberal democracy to promoting illiberalism and economic protectionism.

This revolutionary transformation reaches far beyond the nation’s borders. In that sense, it is not just an American revolution. It is reshaping Europe, too. Such is the main finding of a major international opinion poll commissioned by ECFR and conducted in May 2025 in 12 European countries, with an overall sample of 16,440 respondents (full methodology below). This paper reports the results of the study, and buttresses them with the political observations and analysis of its authors.

In short: revolutionary change in America signals the collapse of assumptions that have undergirded European security for decades. Reliance on American guarantees, NATO as an alliance of liberal democracies, the promotion of free trade and a taboo against aggressive nationalism—it is all falling away. The new reality is a crisis of the alliance itself, the growing threat of a global trade war and the looming prospect of American troop withdrawal from Europe. And, as ECFR’s polling shows, this in turn is transforming Europe’s political and geopolitical identity.

War and Law in a Digital World

Aurel Sari

The Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program is a leading source of independent policy research, writing, and outreach on global democracy, conflict, and governance. It analyzes and seeks to improve international efforts to reduce democratic backsliding, mitigate conflict and violence, overcome political polarization, promote gender equality, and advance pro-democratic uses of new technologies.Learn More

This is part of a series on “The Digital in War: From Innovation to Participation,” co-produced by Carnegie’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program and Swedish Defense University.

Technological advances over the past century have enabled modern armed forces to project power at a scale and speed never seen before. In parallel, the information revolution has dramatically expanded the capacity of ordinary citizens to actively participate in war by producing, relaying, and consuming information. Mediating war has thus become one aspect of fighting it.1

These developments call into question whether traditional theories of war are still adequate for understanding contemporary forms of warfare. Some commentators have argued that the information revolution has radically transformed the nature of war by erasing the distinctions between bystander, victim, and perpetrator to create a new hierarchy of war where everyone is now a participant.2 If so, the implications are profound, not least from a legal point of view.

The modern law of armed conflict is built on the principle of distinction—the idea that to avoid unconstrained warfare, lawful targets must be distinguished from civilian persons and objects.3 If the information revolution really has turned civilians into participants in warfare, this may render them lawful targets liable to attack. Should this affect a large number of civilians or even the civilian population as a whole, it could compromise the principle of distinction as the pillar on which much of the law of armed conflict rests. In turn, this could open the door to unlimited warfare.

Microsoft Aided an Adversary’s AI Ambitions

Lars Erik Schönander, and Luke Hogg

In January, when a little-known Chinese AI startup called DeepSeek stunned the tech industry by developing a cutting-edge large language model, one revelation stood out: several of its top engineers had honed their skills at Microsoft’s artificial intelligence lab in China. This was no coincidence and exemplifies a larger trend: Microsoft’s longstanding presence and partnerships in China helped the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) advance its techno-authoritarian ambitions.

In pursuit of market access and talent, Microsoft spent decades building research centers and forging collaborations in China. In the process, they trained a generation of Chinese AI experts, transferred knowledge and tools that bolstered China’s military and surveillance state, and complied with the CCP’s censorship demands. As the race for AI supremacy intensifies, it’s time to confront how one of America’s largest tech giants empowered an authoritarian rival’s agenda.

Microsoft first opened its research lab in Beijing in 1998 as part of its larger subsidiary, Microsoft Research Asia. The goal of this lab was to use Chinese researchers to produce groundbreaking research on areas such as computer vision and speech recognition. In the process, Microsoft Research Asia also ended up training thousands of Chinese scientists and engineers, becoming something of a finishing school for China’s tech elite. The founders and top executives of major Chinese tech firms have passed through Microsoft’s labs, including Zhang Yiming of TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, Tang Xiao’ou of AI giant SenseTime, and leading technologists from Alibaba and Baidu.

Claude AI can now replicate your exact writing style, even in the free version

Aishwarya Faraswal

How many times have you found yourself tweaking the same AI prompt over and over, just to get the tone right? You try to make it sound more like you, casual, professional or something in between, but the output still misses the mark.

You might ask the tool to avoid certain words, cut down on punctuation, or stick to a specific voice, but it rarely gets everything right in one go. So, is there a way to make AI write like you without going through a dozen prompt revisions?

Claude AI has heard you! Its new feature lets you teach the tool your unique writing style, quickly and effortlessly. All it takes is a few minutes and some simple settings to get Claude writing just like you.

Here are the steps you need to follow to make AI write exactly like you without buying a paid plan.

Step 1: Sign up and log in to Claude

To get started with custom writing styles, the first thing you need is a Claude account. If you haven’t already signed up, head to the Claude website and create one. It’s quick, free, and gives you access to all the basic features, including the ability to create and use personalised styles.

Step 2: Choose or explore a style

After logging in, head to the Claude home screen and click on the settings icon. Here, you’ll see two main options, one for toggling web search capabilities and the other for managing writing styles.

Second-order impacts of civil artificial intelligence regulation on defense: Why the national security community must engage

Deborah Cheverton

Civil regulation of artificial intelligence (AI) is hugely complex and evolving quickly, with even otherwise well-aligned countries taking significantly different approaches. At first glance, little in the content of these regulations is directly applicable to the defense and national security community. The most wide-ranging and robust regulatory frameworks have specific carve-outs that exclude military and related use cases. And while governments are not blind to the need for regulations on AI used in national security and defense, these are largely detached from the wider civil AI regulation debate. However, when potential second-order or unintended consequences on defense from civil AI regulation are considered, it becomes clear that the defense and security community cannot afford to think itself special. Carve-out boundaries can, at best, be porous when the technology is inherently dual use in nature. This paper identifies three broad areas in which this porosity might have a negative impact, including market-shaping civil regulation that could affect the tools available to the defense and national security community; judicial interpretation of civil regulations that could impact the defense and national security community’s license to operate; and regulations that could add additional cost or risk to developing and deploying AI systems for defense and national security.

This paper employs these areas as lenses through which to assess civil regulatory frameworks for AI to identify which initiatives should concern the defense and national security community. These areas are grouped by the level of resources and attention that should be applied while the civil regulatory landscape continues to develop. Private-sector AI firms with dual-use products, industry groups, government offices with national security responsibility for AI, and legislative staff should use this paper as a roadmap to understand the impact of civil AI regulation on their equities and plan to inject their perspectives into the debate.

The Hidden Cyber War: Europe’s Emerging Cyber Armies and Proxy Threats

Denis Postiniuc

As the digital domain becomes a decisive arena for geopolitical competition, Europe finds itself during an escalating cyber conflict largely hidden from public view. The rise of proxy actors, criminal-for-hire groups, and state-sponsored cyber operations poses a significant threat to the continent’s security and sovereignty.

The digital battlefield is now central to European security. The cyber domain, often described as the “fifth domain of warfare,” has become a critical front in Europe’s struggle for strategic autonomy and defence resilience. Unlike traditional conflicts, cyber warfare unfolds in the shadows, with attribution often obscured by layers of deception, making it an ideal space for proxy operations and hybrid threats.

Europe’s cyber vulnerabilities have grown more visible in recent years, especially in light of the Russian war against Ukraine, the increasing assertiveness of China in cyberspace, and the rapid development of artificial intelligence as a tool of attack. While European nations have made significant strides in building cyber capabilities, the race against sophisticated adversaries remains uneven and full of blind spots.

Europe’s Cyber Defence Build-up

Competence and Coordination

Artificial Intelligence: A Tool That Is Reshaping Geopolitics – Analysis

Matija Šerić

In recent years, following the end of the COVID-19 crisis, the term artificial intelligence (AI) has become omnipresent in public discourse. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, artificial intelligence is “the capability of computer systems or algorithms to imitate intelligent human behavior.” This emerging phenomenon is receiving great attention. In truth, it is neither a new concept nor a new occurrence, as AI began gradually developing in 1956 with a scientific conference in Dartmouth. Since then, AI has experienced both advances and setbacks, having been most utilized in fields such as the military, medicine, robotics, and education.

Over time, artificial intelligence has significantly advanced. Today, ordinary people around the world can use basic smart computer models, but there is little doubt that the centers of global power—national governments, intelligence agencies, and various organizations—possess models that are ten or more years ahead of what is publicly available.
An Indispensable Tool of Our Time

Many analysts warn that artificial intelligence will replace and subordinate human beings. This is a highly debatable claim, as AI is not some superior “divine” entity, but rather a technology created by flesh-and-blood humans with all their imperfections. Similarly, when the Industrial Revolution emerged in the 18th century, many feared machines would replace humans. That did not happen. It is unlikely AI will do so either. However, it is evident that individuals who do not use AI tools will be unable to keep up with those who do. The same applies to the international political arena.

Unsecured Fronts: How Hybrid Warfare Influences Strategic Competition – Analysis

Nicholas A. Weber

Modern warfare has undergone a profound transformation. Modern adversaries, whether capable of traditional methods of warfare or not, now readily engage in hybrid activities that fuse political, economic, military, and informational disciplines into extremely effective, rapid, and low-cost operations with strategic effects. These new warfare strategies, if unaddressed, will usher in an age of national security uncertainty in which US dominance (established by innovation, wealth, expertise, and geography) will be perpetually threatened.

Until comprehensive legal, technical, and defense countermeasures are developed, the United States remains exposed across both its military and civilian sectors. The battlefield has expanded. Participating in strategic competition has never been easier due to low “buy-in” cost. No longer confined to traditional theaters of war, it now includes farmland, shipping containers, substations, and telecom relays—any space where adversaries can operate under the radar, they will.

At the heart of this trend lies the principle that physical proximity to sensitive infrastructure enables an adversary the opportunity to conduct operations with disproportionate strategic gains. Land near military installations can host surveillance equipment, signal intercept platforms, or serve as launch sites for expendable, one-way munitions. Civilian infrastructure—transformers, cables, or utility networks—can be Trojan horses for sabotage, pre-installed to degrade national resilience at a place and time of the adversary’s choosing.

These tactics reflect the logic of hybrid warfare: blending conventional and unconventional tools to achieve political and military objectives before and after the threshold of war. What was once considered benign—real estate transactions, transformer sales, commercial shipping—now carries the potential to become a vector for organized crisis and strategic leverage.

Chinese Trojan Horse Infrastructure


4 July 2025

Hidden Tides: IUU Fishing and Regional Security Dynamics for India

Ajay Kumar and Charukeshi Bhatt

India’s evolving role in regional and global security is shaped by complex dynamics. Experts in the Security Studies Program examine India’s position in this world order through informed analyses of its foreign and security policies, focusing on the relationship with China, the securitization of borders, and the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.

This program studies contemporary developments in India’s political economy, with a view towards understanding and informing India’s developmental choices. Scholars in the program analyze economic and regulatory policies, design and working of public institutions, interfaces between politics and the economy, and performance of key sectors of the economy such as finance and land.

The world’s oceans are witnessing a continuous growth in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Chinese fishing fleets, in particular, are emerging as a significant threat contributing to this global challenge. While India recognizes the gravity of this global issue, IUU fishing has yet to receive the level of priority it arguably deserves within the country’s economic and security strategy.1 A comprehensive study on the scale and implications of IUU fishing for India is therefore essential to spotlight this pressing challenge.

This article examines the scale and impact of Chinese IUU fishing operations globally and identifies the nature of the challenge posed by IUU fishing in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It also investigates why existing maritime law and international frameworks have struggled to address this growing threat. By highlighting the gaps in current legal frameworks and regional cooperation mechanisms, this article uncovers why IUU fishing persists despite international efforts to combat it. This article also offers suggestions for India to prepare to combat this challenge in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and across the IOR.

Are India’s Civilian and Military Authorities Aligned?

Sumit Ganguly

Newly recruited Indian Army soldiers from the Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry (JAKLI) take part in a parade at the JAKLI Army headquarters in Srinagar, Indian-administered Kashmir, on June 5.Newly recruited Indian Army soldiers from the Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry (JAKLI) take part in a parade at the JAKLI Army headquarters in Srinagar, Indian-administered Kashmir, on June 5. Tauseef Mustafa/AFP via Getty Images

At the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, India’s chief of defense staff, Anil Chauhan, made comments that have drawn rebuke within segments of the Indian media. Much of the criticism against Chauhan focused on his admission that India lost some aircraft in its military clash with Pakistan last month, keeping the exact number vague. Some commentators argued that he should not have made this admission on foreign soil.

But few, if any, critics have highlighted a potentially more troubling issue: Why did Chauhan have to make this admission when Indian civilian authorities, especially Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, have not commented on the efficacy (or lack thereof) of India’s military operations?

Rising Islamist and Anti-Hindu Sentiment in Bangladesh in Wake of Pahalgam Attack

Animesh Roul

Following the ousting of longtime Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Islamist factions have filled the power vacuum in Bangladesh, leading to a surge in anti-Hindu violence. These groups have capitalized on growing anti-India sentiment—especially after the Pahalgam terror attack—to justify attacks against the Hindu minority and push a radical Islamic agenda.

Jihadist propaganda and pro-Pakistan Islamist movements have resurged, framing India as an existential threat to Islamic identity in Bangladesh. The interim government’s inaction has emboldened extremists, deepening sectarian tensions and heightening the risk of regional destabilization.

Bangladesh’s political and religious landscape has witnessed a sharp sectarian turn since the ouster of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her flight to India in August 2024. What began as protests over job quota reforms soon escalated into a broader civil uprising. Exploiting the ensuing power vacuum, factions that include Islamist groups have expanded their influence, propagating anti-Hindu sentiment nationwide.

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This situation has grown more pronounced following the April 22 terror attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, where 26 Hindu tourists were killed by Islamist militants who reportedly targeted victims based on their religion (OpIndia, April 22). Though the attackers were linked to Pakistan-based terror groups, the incident and India’s retaliatory attacks against Pakistan reverberated in Bangladesh, and concerns over relations between the two states are at a new high.

Militant Monks Fuel Government Terror in Myanmar

Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan

An ultranationalist subset of Myanmar’s community of Buddhist monks have become active supporters of the military junta, offering the regime legitimacy and support in the ongoing civil war.

This alliance reflects a broader pattern of authoritarian regimes weaponizing religious authorities to suppress dissent and target minorities. Myanmar’s case highlights the need to include non-Muslim religious extremism within global counterterrorism frameworks.

Myanmar’s ongoing sectarian conflict has seen a dangerous convergence between the military junta and ultranationalist Buddhist monks. Myanmar’s current military government, frequently referred to as the Sit-Tat (referred to by its supporters as the Tatmadaw), led by Min Aung Hlaing, is aligned with the country’s community of monks (called the Sangha) in important ways. While the Sangha is divided politically—and has an apolitical mandate—portions have decided to collaborate with the regime as a result of shared interests. Pro-junta monks, exemplified by the MaBaTha (Committee for the Protection of Nationality and Religion) organization, serve as a powerful actor in the service of the current regime, engaging in both civil and military activity against anti-junta forces (The Irrawaddy, September 9, 2021).

A number of developments underscore how the Sit-Tat has co-opted segments of the Sangha into a political instrument, weaponizing religion to suppress internal resistance, court international allies, and incite violence against ethno-religious enemies of the state. The alliance of MaBaTha and the Sit-tat have affected Myanmar’s international posture. Following Myanmar’s magnitude 7.7 earthquake on March 28, Sri Lanka extended support, specifically citing that it and Myanmar are “two Buddhist states,” a gesture underpinned by ties between Sri Lanka’s Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) and Myanmar’s MaBaTha (Tamil Guardian, April 2). A few months earlier, the arrest of Saffron Revolution veteran and dual U.S.–Myanmar citizen Venerable Pinnya Jawta on terrorism charges highlighted the regime’s crackdown on dissenting monks (Radio Free Asia, December 6, 2024). Jawta was an activist opposed to military rule, and his arrest showcases the Sit-tat’s disdain for monks who fail to hold the party line.

Losing the Long Game: China Advances As U.S. Refocuses on the Middle East

Anthony Quitugua

For more than a decade, American defense and foreign policy leaders have declared China the top long-term competitor — what the Pentagon refers to as the “pacing threat” — and the Indo-Pacific the priority theater. From the Obama-era “Pivot to Asia” to the Trump and Biden administrations’ strategic guidance, the message has been consistent: the future of U.S. power projection, deterrence, and economic competition hinges on our presence in the Pacific. But each time the Middle East ignites, that focus slips — and China quietly gains ground.

I spent time at Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), the Marine Corps’ service component to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, during the height of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), when the U.S. was recalibrating its posture across the Indo-Pacific. The effort aimed to build a more distributed and survivable presence — in places like Guam, northern Australia, and the Philippines. But even then, it was evident: whenever the Middle East flared, CENTCOM drew the bulk of attention, airlift, and decision-making energy. The Indo-Pacific, despite its declared importance, was routinely sidelined in practice.

The current Israel–Iran confrontation is no different. Once again, the situation threatens to pull U.S. strategic focus back toward the Middle East. Intelligence assets, air defense deployments, and senior-level attention are already shifting in that direction. While Indo-Pacific Command continues to face the most consequential long-term challenges, CENTCOM risks becoming the gravitational center — as it so often has when the region flares.

China’s threat to Tibet’s future should be a global conce

Brahma Chellaney

Three decades ago, China abducted the Panchen Lama — then a six-year-old boy — shortly after his recognition by the Dalai Lama, and installed a regime-picked imposter in his place. That abduction, one of the most audacious acts of spiritual and cultural repression in modern history, still haunts the Tibetan people.

Yet Chinese President Xi Jinping’s meeting with the false Panchen Lama this month has served only to remind the world of the genuine Panchen Lama’s continued disappearance. That makes the Panchen Lama — the second-highest spiritual leader in Tibetan Buddhism — arguably the longest-held political prisoner anywhere.

Now, Xi is preparing to repeat that sinister act on a much grander scale. He is waiting for the Dalai Lama, who turns 90 on July 6, to pass away so that Beijing can impose its own puppet as the next spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism. This would be akin to the Italian government installing a state-appointed pope to lead the Catholic Church, a brazen affront to religious freedom and cultural sovereignty.

China’s ambitions go far beyond symbolism. With Xi’s regime intensifying efforts to erase Tibetan culture, language and identity, the looming succession of the Dalai Lama marks a pivotal and dangerous turning point. Although the Dalai Lama has yet to clarify the exact process for selecting his successor, Beijing is zealously laying the groundwork to seize control of Tibetan Buddhism from within.

Strategies of Prioritization

Jennifer Lind and Daryl G.

Less than six months into U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term, his administration’s foreign policy has generated widespread dismay and confusion at home and abroad. The use of tariffs against allies and adversaries; the threats to annex Canada, Greenland, and Panama; and the unusually blunt criticism of Washington’s closest partners appear both arbitrary and destructive, especially to policymakers who have spent their professional lives managing the U.S.-led international order. They believe that creating order in a world full of complex transnational challenges requires alliances, credibility, and soft power—precisely what the Trump administration seems bent on destroying.

Aspects of its policies may be difficult to understand, but there is a logic at the core of the administration’s national security strategy. The Trump administration sees the previous U.S. strategy—which aimed to build and maintain a global order led by the United States—as a misguided effort that has sapped U.S. power. It views Washington’s moves to cultivate soft power as leading to meddling and overstretch, and it perceives highly credible American security guarantees as encouraging most of the United States’ allies to reduce their defense efforts and rely on its protection.

Instead of trying to create global order, the Trump administration now appears to be pursuing a more focused strategy: prioritization. Its reasoning is simple. The United States has limited resources and China is its greatest geopolitical threat, so Washington must energize recalcitrant allies around the world to manage their own regions, freeing the United States to concentrate on Asia.

China purges senior military official Miao Hua from top ruling body


BEIJING: China's top legislature has voted to remove senior military official Miao Hua from the Central Military Commission, its highest-level military command body, according to a statement published on Friday (Jun 27) by state news agency Xinhua.

The Xinhua statement did not contain any other details, but the move marks another stage in President Xi Jinping's ongoing anti-corruption purge of China's military, in which over a dozen PLA generals and a handful of defence industry executives have been implicated.

Miao's photo had been removed from the senior leadership page of the Chinese defence ministry's website in recent weeks. He was also removed from China's national legislature for "serious violations of discipline and law", according to a communique released by the legislature last month.

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"The Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission held a military representative conference on Mar 14 this year and decided to remove Miao Hua from his position as a representative of the 14th National People's Congress," the statement said.

Miao was stationed in the coastal province of Fujian when Xi worked there as a local official, according to his official biography. Xi personally elevated Miao to the Central Military Commission.

China Unleashes Hackers Against Its Friend Russia, Seeking War Secrets

Megha Rajagopalan

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, groups linked to the Chinese government have repeatedly hacked Russian companies and government agencies in an apparent search for military secrets, according to cyberanalysts.

The intrusions started accelerating in May 2022, just months after Moscow’s full-scale invasion. And they have continued steadily, with Chinese groups worming into Russian systems even as President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and President Xi Jinping of China publicly professed a momentous era of collaboration and friendship.

The hacking campaign shows that, despite this partnership and years of promises not to hack each other, China sees Russia as a vulnerable target. In 2023, one group, known as Sanyo, impersonated the email addresses of a major Russian engineering firm in the hunt for information on nuclear submarines, according to TeamT5, a Taiwan-based cybersecurity research firm that discovered the attack last year and linked it to the Chinese government.

China is far wealthier than Russia and has plenty of homegrown scientific and military expertise, but Chinese military experts often lament that Chinese troops lack battlefield experience. Experts say that China sees the war in Ukraine as a chance to collect information about modern warfare tactics, Western weaponry and what works against them.

“China likely seeks to gather intelligence on Russia’s activities, including on its military operation in Ukraine, defense developments and other geopolitical maneuvers,” said Che Chang, a researcher with TeamT5.

It is unclear how successful these attempts have been, partly because Russian officials have never publicly acknowledged these intrusions. But a classified counterintelligence document from Russia’s domestic security agency, known as the F.S.B., makes clear that intelligence officials are concerned. The document, obtained by The New York Times, says that China is seeking Russian defense expertise and technology and is trying to learn from Russia’s military experience in Ukraine. The document refers to China as an “enemy.”

Drills and Experts Suggest Beijing Favors Blockade on Longer Timeline

Daniel Fu

The People’s Liberation Army increasingly emphasizes blockade scenarios in its exercises and drills, signaling a strategic shift in Beijing’s approach to a military contingency in the Taiwan Strait.

Policy elites and current and former military officials corroborate this shift but largely project any military action as unlikely before 2027, citing economic challenges and geopolitical risks.

Going forward, Beijing will act to normalize blockade tactics around Taiwan and bolster salami-slicing tactics, thus advancing coercive capabilities on a longer timeline.

Recent military exercises and drills conducted by the People’s Liberation Army around Taiwan have emphasized blockade scenarios, indicating a growing preference for a military blockade over direct invasion (Observer, April 3). Commentary and writings by Chinese academics, think-tank scholars, and current and former military officials reflect this shift. Where these writers discuss potential a timeline for such actions, they appear to extend far beyond 2027, often citing the PRC’s current economic woes and potential blowback from retaliatory sanctions as reasons to prolong any Taiwan timeline.

Drills and Commentary Focus on Blockade Scenario