20 March 2025

Cooperation, Coexistence, and Contestation in India’s and China’s Overlapping Strategic Spaces

Tanvi Madan

By dint of their geographies, partnerships, development imperatives, and broader objectives, China and India have had overlapping strategic spaces since India became independent in 1947 and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) came into being in 1949. As their interests and capabilities—and thus reach—have grown, the theater of their strategic interaction has expanded to encompass a wider geography and multiple domains. It has evolved from primarily the bilateral space and a focus on their borderlands to include regional and global spaces, as well as the diplomatic, geopolitical, economic, technological, and ideological spheres.

There has been some Sino-Indian cooperation in these spaces, but more often there has been competition—and it has become more intense over time. The phases of cooperation and contestation have been sequential, with both elements present but one dominant. This essay outlines these periods of early competition and collaboration, of coexistence and cooperation, and then a return to contestation.

President Trump 2.0, China, And Southeast Asia: Security Challenges And Strategic Dilemmas – OpEd

Simon Hutagalung

In the evolving landscape of global politics, the emergence of a leadership style reminiscent of President Donald Trump—now often referred to as President Trump 2.0—has created a seismic shift in international security strategies, particularly within Southeast Asia.

As 2025 unfolds, the intertwined relationship between a reassertive United States under a nationalist banner, an increasingly assertive China, and the multifaceted security facing challenges in Southeast Asia forms a complex web of geopolitical contestation. This essay examines critically these emerging issues, arguing that President TRUMP 2.0’s recalibrated policies, China’s aggressive regional posturing, and Southeast Asia’s adaptive responses collectively represent both significant a challenge and a pivotal moment in redefining regional dynamics security.

The reemergence of a Trump-inspired approach in American leadership signals a renewed emphasis on nationalist policies, the recalibration multilateral of alliances, and an unpredictable foreign policy that frequently prioritizes economic protectionism over traditional diplomatic engagement. Recent data from early 2025 indicates that U.S. defense spending has risen by approximately 3% compared to the previous year, reflecting a deliberate shift toward bolstering military capabilities to counterbalance China’s burgeoning influence. This strategic pivot is particularly significant in Southeast Asia, where nations balance their lucrative economic ties with China against the need for security guarantees traditionally provided by Washington. The dynamic illustrates a broader recalibration in which security considerations are increasingly interwoven with economic imperatives.

Strategic Reorientation on A.I. Competition with China


The view from London

The first roundtable explored the UK and China’s competitiveness on AI, examining what the drive behind competition reveals about the UK’s geopolitical aspirations and positioning, while also addressing its domestic policy priorities.

Held three months after the UK general election, the event welcomed a diverse group of opinion-shapers and experts from: policy and government; security, intelligence, and defence; research and academia; civil society and advocacy; and the private sector. The convening was held under the Chatham House Rule.

With welcoming remarks, two plenary sessions, and issue-focused breakout sessions (on the technology, trade, and talent “drivers” of competitiveness), Rethinking UK-China Competitiveness on AI aimed to establish a shared understanding of what makes the UK—and other diverse democracies—competitive. The following event summary captures areas of agreement and divergence in the characterization of the UK’s net competitiveness vis-à-vis China, in addition to platforming several takeaways specific to the UK.

How China Is Weaponizing Education to Erase Tibetan Identity

Tsering Dolka Gurung

For the past two years, reports have laid bare the systematic erasure of Tibetan identity, and Tibetans across the world have been staging protests, demanding accountability from China. Most recently, on February 18, Tibetan activist Namkyi shared her testimony at the Geneva Summit. At the age of 15, she staged a peaceful protest alongside her sister – an act that led to years of relentless surveillance, intimidation, and repression. She told the summit that Chinese authorities followed her every move until she escaped Tibet for good in 2023.

The weight of China’s rule has been growing for decades in Tibet, but incidents over the past few years have revealed an intensifying effort to wipe out Tibetan culture through a strategy of forced assimilation, particularly targeting children. Under the guise of promoting “national unity” and “economic progress,” the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has embarked on a systematic campaign to integrate Tibetans into the dominant Han Chinese culture, diminishing their language, religion, and traditions. What Beijing calls “unity” is a methodical erasure of Tibetan identity – a slow-motion cultural genocide taking place in one of the world’s most isolated regions.

Ten books to understand the world we're now in

Sam Freedman

Trump’s second term is on track to be more damaging than his first. He has a more loyal central team, unwilling to push back against his madder ideas, and, critically, a co-President in Elon Musk charging around breaking things. Meanwhile those Republicans in Congress who aren’t fully signed-up to the cult, are cowering in fear and, as yet, unprepared to make even the smallest gesture of defiance.

The consequences for the global economy are only just starting to be felt. In Europe there has been a much more dramatic switch to thinking about military and economic independence than almost anyone expected a few months ago.

This is all pretty alarming, especially when combined with some of the wider global trends that contributed to Trump’s victory. Russia’s journey back into full blown totalitarianism happened a while ago, but in more recent years we’ve seen the rise of Putin-backed politicians in Eastern European countries that had transitioned to democracy. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán was the first – in the EU at least – but now Robert Fico is the Slovakian Prime Minister, and the Romanians have had to use the courts to block Călin Georgescu. In the upcoming Polish Presidential elections the spectacularly unpleasant Sławomir Mentzen may make the run-off.

CFR President Michael Froman on Trump, Global ‘Polyamory’ and AI

Edward Felsenthal

What’s the role of America’s most influential foreign-policy institution at a moment when the rules of U.S. engagement in the world are being completely rewritten? When I saw Michael Froman, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, in the first few days of the Trump Administration, he was already describing the current geopolitical moment as the most complex in 80 years. Since then, as he noted in an appearance at Princeton earlier this month, “the last five or six weeks may well have been the most important five or six weeks in American history in 80 years.” Questions that had long seemed resolved—about the nature of the global economy and America’s role in the world—are suddenly getting new answers.

That obviously complicates the task of leading an organization like the Council, which was founded after World War I to underscore the importance of U.S. engagement in the world. Over the years, its mission has evolved more toward informing than underscoring, but it has long had deep connections to the foreign policy establishment that Donald Trump came to power promising to upend. Steering it through this period, Froman notes in our interview, “puts a premium” on CFR’s nonpartisanship and independence.

A veteran of the Clinton and Obama Administrations as well as the private sector at Citigroup and Mastercard, Froman took the helm of the Council two years ago, at a time of deepening global instability and growing distrust in institutions. In our conversation, edited for length and clarity, he discusses why the world is becoming more “polyamorous,” what Trump is right about, and why America’s economic and technological strength remains its greatest geopolitical asset.

An Open Letter to His Excellency Volodymyr Zelenskyy - Opinion

Yurij Holowinsky & Keith D. Dickson 

By early 1940, it was clear that the aggressor forces would keep what they currently held and continue a relentless war of attrition, whatever the cost. The defense of the Finns was epic, and still remembered to this day with awe and great respect. The Finns had done the impossible and were in a position militarily and strategically to save Finland from destruction.

It was a bitter and temporary peace. The Russians gained all of their original demands plus some additional concessions. The losses of population, economic resources, and defensible terrain in the Karelian Isthmus-Viipuri area were especially serious. Yet, it gave the Finns the means to survive, and in another year, conduct offensive operations against the enemy. Mannerheim had saved his country, built alliances and set the stage for a long-term peace treaty in 1948, allowing Finland incrementally to move closer to the West, and by 2023, become a member of NATO.

As Commander-in-Chief, you have the same military-strategic opportunity as Mannerheim did in 1940. You, like Mannerheim, have demonstrated inspiring leadership, the courage and skill of your soldiers and the resolute response of your citizens has won the world’s admiration and respect. Mannerheim chose to preserve his country’s long-term survival in the face of unrelenting attacks. Finland had to fight again and had to accommodate its aggressor neighbor, but that opened the path to eventual integration with Europe and peace along a shared border with a former aggressor. After 1948, it took 45 years for Finland to join the European Union and 75 years for Finland to realize its strategic position as a member of NATO. Without that initial peace of 1940, none of these outcomes could have been possible.

'Bloody Saturday' at Voice of America and other U.S.-funded networks

David Folkenflik

Journalists showed up at the Voice of America today to broadcast their programs only to be told they had been locked out: Federal officials had embarked on indefinite mass suspensions.

All full-time staffers at the Voice of America and the Office for Cuba Broadcasting, which runs Radio and Television Martí, were affected — more than 1,000 employees. The move followed a late Friday night edict from President Trump that its parent agency, called the U.S. Agency for Global Media, must eliminate all activities that are not required by law.

In addition, under the leadership of Trump appointees, the agency has severed all contracts for the privately incorporated international broadcasters it funds, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks.

The termination notices for grants for the funded networks, two of which were reviewed by NPR, carried the signature of Trump's senior adviser Kari Lake, whom he placed at USAGM, not the agency's acting chief executive. Lake does not appear in her current job to have the statutory authority to carry out that termination.

Voice of America channels fall silent as Trump administration guts agency and cancels contracts

Brian Stelter

The Voice of America may not live up to its ambitious name for much longer.

Michael Abramowitz, the director of VOA, said in a Facebook post on Saturday that he was placed on leave, along with “virtually the entire staff” of 1,300. The announcement comes one day after President Trump signed an executive order to gut VOA’s parent agency.

Some of VOA’s local-language radio stations have stopped broadcasting news reports and switched over to music to fill the airtime, according to listeners.

Even top editors at VOA have been ordered to stop working, so employees expect the broadcaster’s worldwide news coverage to grind to a halt, according to half a dozen sources who spoke with CNN on the condition of anonymity.

“The Voice of America has been silenced, at least for now,” a veteran correspondent said.

Voice of America is part of the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which also runs networks like Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia, and Middle East Broadcasting Networks. Those networks are also on Trump’s chopping block, as networks’ contracts with the operators have been terminated.

Hegseth shuts Pentagon 'think tank' analyzing future conflicts

KEN MORIYASU

U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has instructed the closure of a specialized unit often referred to as the Pentagon's "internal think tank," a group that focuses on evaluating the future of American military capabilities relative to potential rivals like China.

Hegseth has directed the "disestablishment" of the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) and ordered the development of a plan to rebuild the office in alignment with the department's strategic priorities, chief Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell said in a statement Thursday night.

All ONA personnel will be reassigned to "mission-critical" roles within the department, the statement said.

The Pentagon remains committed to conducting "rigorous, forward-looking strategic assessments that directly inform defense planning and decision-making," Parnell said.

The ONA has had only two directors since its establishment in 1973. For four decades, the office was led by legendary strategist Andrew Marshall, who served eight presidents from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama. Since 2015, the office has been led by James Baker, a retired Air Force colonel who holds four graduate degrees.

Overcoming the Six Unspoken Barriers That Impede Defense Innovation

Matthew Schlueter, Marc Giesener, Lauren Mayer, Laura Key, and Mishaal Hassan

Ministries of defense (MoDs) are not meeting their innovation goals. In 2022, the Munich Security Conference Innovation Board (MSC) and Boston Consulting Group (BCG) first identified the defense innovation readiness gap—the gap between ministries’ aspirations for innovation and their ability to generate results. Since then, the gap has widened. External factors such as heightened geopolitical tensions play a role, as do supply chain disruptions and the complexity of emerging technology. Yet many aspects of the forces responsible for expanding the gap lie within MoDs’ control.

As in prior years, we surveyed leaders at 59 ministries of defense, the European Union, and NATO. We benchmarked the results relative to results from the prior three years, as well as to the innovation capabilities of private-sector counterparts, across 11 key dimensions of innovation. We supplemented our quantitative findings with interviews of key public and private national security leaders worldwide.

The results show that the innovation readiness gap continues to widen. On average, MoDs scored 59 against a threshold score of 80—a 5% decline from the 2022 average. Across most innovation dimensions—including ambition, talent and culture, and project management—MoDs’ scores fell below last year’s average and below top-quartile commercial innovators. (See Exhibit 1.) During the same time period, public defense funding increased by up to 12% annually across the G-7 and China.

Achieving “peace through strength” in the 2020s

Michael E. O’Hanlon

Introduction

How should President Donald Trump, with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at the helm of the Department of Defense, shape American defense strategy and budgets in his second term? The good news is that Trump himself, with Secretaries of Defense Jim Mattis and Mark Esper, did much to set the American armed forces on a sound and sensible post-war-on-terror path that President Joe Biden and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin then largely sustained. The foundations of U.S. defense strategy, policy, and budgets are in reasonably good shape as the nation aspires to a period of what Ronald Reagan called “peace through strength”—a goal that Trump has wisely endorsed. But in light of the newfound coordination and cooperation within the “axis of autocracies”—Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—as well as challenges to the U.S. defense industrial base revealed by the COVID-19 pandemic and then the Russian war against Ukraine, some changes will be needed. Specifically, I advocate five ways of strengthening American defenses in the years ahead.

The sum total of these changes would cost up to $60 billion a year, only partially offset by a total of $10 billion in annual savings from the reforms and efficiencies discussed below. In broad brush, I calculate that these changes together would increase the real-dollar U.S. national defense budget from its current level of just under $900 billion to roughly $950 billion next year—and likely to $1 trillion by decade’s end since many defense costs rise faster than inflation (expressed in constant 2025 dollars). These numbers include funds for the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration as well as the $100 billion annual intelligence budget but do not account for the Veterans Affairs or Homeland Security budgets).

US must prioritize cybersecurity training for the military’s engineers

Alison King, Annie Fixler &RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery

The Trump administration begins under the shadow of a series of consequential Chinese cyber hacks targeting U.S. critical infrastructure. While incoming officials grapple with long-standing failures to deter China and other adversaries from launching cyberattacks on the U.S. homeland, the Department of Defense (DOD) faces a startling capability gap: The civilian and military professionals responsible for protecting the same type of assets that China compromised receive inadequate training in recognizing, defending against, and recovering from malicious state-sponsored cyber activity. There is no institutional home for this vital training.

The U.S. military maintains an extensive global footprint, with 800 installations spanning more than 70 countries and territories. Public and private utilities own and operate the power lines, water pipes, and fiber optic cables that supply these bases. Yet once those systems cross the fence line onto military facilities, the U.S. military is responsible for ensuring their safe and reliable operation and restoration during an attack.

The problem is many of the professionals tasked with maintaining these critical systems might not recognize a cyberattack for what it is because they’ve received no specified training. They often see an operational disruption, assume it is just a system malfunction, and move quickly to restore systems, potentially wiping out the forensics data that cyber professionals need to discern how an attacker got in and disrupted the system.



Europe’s Economic Decoupling From America Is Underway

Anchal Vohra

After the Trump administration imposed tariffs on Mexico, Canada, and China, the European Union was expected to be the next in line. Washington did, in fact, impose 25 percent tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from the EU this week, as well as on a range of other commodities including cars and agricultural products by early April.

The Europeans have tried to win over U.S. President Donald Trump with flattery and alluded they could buy more U.S. gas and weapons in exchange for a reduction in threatened tariffs. But at the same time, Europeans are brainstorming about what decoupling from the United States in trade and defense could mean for them. They are also wondering if they have any realistic options left, other than appeasing Trump.


The Cost of Ignoring Geopolitics

Jo Inge Bekkevold

Europe finds itself in the greatest peril since the 1940s. As Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine enters its fourth year, the Trump administration’s policy shifts mean that Europe suddenly faces the possibility of war with Russia without the United States’ full backing. Washington is now negotiating a possible peace directly with Moscow and Kyiv, without the participation of other Europeans. It also seems willing to reach a deal largely on Russia’s terms.

In addition, the Trump administration demands that any security guarantees to Ukraine be provided by European countries without U.S. backing, and it has signaled uncertainty about its willingness to adhere to NATO’s Article 5 commitments to help defend Europe in case of attack. This is a state of affairs that Europe’s armed forces are ill-prepared to handle.

What military members need to hear from their leaders now

PAULA THORNHILL

The four-star firings, anti-DEI campaign, and flurry of directives and counter-directives from the Pentagon have sown confusion within the ranks—and among their leaders, many of whom are grappling with how, when, and even if they should discuss these actions and their implications with their subordinate units.

Some leaders have chosen to do no more than pass along these sweeping, hastily issued, and, in some cases, poorly explained orders. Their reasons for remaining quiet range from uncertainty over what to say to their people, to being misunderstood if they speak, to fearing retribution for having spoken incorrectly. At a minimum, this approach confuses the force, invites speculation, and potentially leads to discontent.

Now more than ever, leaders at all levels must communicate clearly and routinely with those they lead. This means providing detailed guidance for implementing new policies. But it also means reaffirming timeless messages that transcend presidential administrations and partisan politics.

Why the U.S. and Europe Are No Longer Friends

Pavlo Kuliuk

The new world order being built by Donald Trump excludes major military conflicts and confrontations between military blocs. In this world order, identical ideology becomes a disadvantage rather than an advantage. In this context, Europe, which is trying to strengthen itself through a war with Russia and has an identical ideology to the United States, is turning into an opponent rather than an ally of America.

Europe's influence on the U.S. has become too great

By 2025, European politicians have achieved such great influence in the United States that this gives them the opportunity to carry out coordinated actions in order to influence the decisions of the American authorities. These actions are expressed both in political statements by American politicians and in public protests in which U.S. citizens participate. American politicians and citizens condemn the decisions of the legally elected U.S. president but support the interests of European politicians. These actions inside the United States are supported from outside by European politicians. This situation can be assessed in different ways. It can be assessed as a manifestation of American democracy or a violation of the unity of the American nation in the interests of a foreign state. Judging by the actions of Donald Trump, the American president is inclined to the second version of events. There are many reasons for this.

For example. Even representatives of the U.S. Republican Party publicly disagree with Donald Trump’s actions regarding Ukraine. “I am sick to my stomach as the administration appears to be walking away from our allies and embracing Putin, a threat to democracy and U.S. values ​​around the world,” said Sen. Lisa Murkowski (1) after the scandalous scene in the Oval Office of the White House on February 28, 2025.(2)

In Show of Force, Ukraine Blasts Russia With Drone Onslaught

Stavros Atlamazoglou

Ukraine’s Drone Strikes Inside Russia

Last week, the Russian military launched dozens of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as suicide drones against Ukraine. In response, the Ukrainian military launched hundreds of suicide drones against Russia on Tuesday morning.

“The strikes targeted several Russian regions including Moscow and locations in the vicinity,” the British Ministry of Defence assessed in a recent intelligence estimate on the war. “Fires have been reported in Moscow as well as a temporary halt in operations at all four Moscow airports, and the suspension of the railway connection between Moscow and Domodedovo.”

The Russian military claimed to have shot down more than 330 Ukrainian suicide drones, but the Kremlin acknowledged that at least 20 people were killed or wounded by the attack.

“The Ukrainian strikes are the latest in a pattern of increased regularity of Ukrainian UAS strikes deep into Russian territory, emphasising the challenge confronting Russia to protect its infrastructure and strategic assets balanced against protecting its operations at the front line,” the British Ministry of Defence added.

Technology, Globalisation and Civilisational Decline

John West

Robert Kaplan’s book Waste Land: A World in Permanent Crisis paints a portrait of civilisation in flux. Drawing insights from history, literature and art, he examines the effect of modern technology, globalisation and urbanisation on the decline of great powers and increasing domestic polarisation.

The title of Waste Land is inspired by T S Eliot’s famous poem of 1922, ‘The Waste Land’. According to Kaplan, this captures very well the situation of the world today—the end of the old world and a new world not quite coming into being, and a sense of alienation, disjointedness and fragmentation. Kaplan’s book reads like an essay, despite its length of 224 pages, and is triggered by his feeling that we are always in a crisis of some sort.

The first of the book’s three sections argues that Germany’s Weimar Republic, from 1919 until the ascension of Hitler in 1933, is a metaphor for the world today. Weimar was an attempt at forming a stable democracy that would prevent the rise of an autocrat. But it was a sprawling and badly managed system that was always in crisis.

The United States of Elon Musk Inc

BRIAN BARRETT

Where do Elon Musk’s business interests end and Donald Trump’s political interests begin? Trick question—they’re one and the same.

How else do you explain the jarring sight of the President of the United States hawking Teslas on the White House South Lawn? Trump has always been a salesman, lending his name to real estate, casinos, restaurants, steaks, vitamins, a fragrance for men, watches, water, a bicycle race, office chairs, sneakers, vodka, coins, another fragrance, NFTs. You could, at this very moment, buy a Trump pickleball paddle from the Trump Store online, or a Trump sea mist & sage candle.

But Trump is most famously a pitchman for himself. (And Pizza Hut, if the price is right.) To spend this much political capital on Musk? The world’s richest man? Over a few protests at Tesla dealerships and a tanking stock price? Come on.

Trump is no altruist. Musk did, though, spend nearly $300 million on the 2024 US election cycle, with the vast majority of that directly in support of Trump’s presidential campaign. His transformation of Twitter into X has created an online MAGAtopia barely rivaled by Trump’s own Truth Social platform. And his work with the so-called Department of Government Efficiency has let Trump outsource the tedious mechanics of actual governance.

Fragmented frontiers: three approaches to understanding irregular warfare

Christian Tripodi

Introduction

Michael Koffman’s observation, made in the early months of the Ukraine war, was important in two respects. Firstly, it provided much needed logic to what appeared otherwise to be an inexplicable series of decisions by Vladimir Putin and his senior civilian and military advisors where Russian military strategy was concerned. What Koffman was arguing was that the evident failings at that point in Russia’s conventional military capabilities were real but were never really meant to matter.Footnote2 This was because the employment of those conventional capabilities was always intended take place in the context of an adversary that had already been fatally paralysed by multiple forms of irregular ‘shaping’ actions – espionage, infiltration, cyber-attack, subversion, assassination – prior to the invasion. Russian conventional forces would thus mount their assault with the political and psychological disintegration of the enemy having been largely achieved before a shot had been fired.

Koffman’s observation mattered in another way, however. Namely that Russian methods not only exemplified the use of irregular warfare as a strategic enabler for the effective prosecution of interstate conflict, but simultaneously encompassed a wide range of non-military and indeed non-violent shaping actions, e.g. espionage, cyber-attacks, information operations and organised crime, carried out by non-military actors.Footnote3 Why is this important? Because at the time of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, let alone the fait accompli in Crimea 8 years previously, Western military doctrinal thinking on irregular warfare was notable for its entirely different approach to the subject. This was one in which the focus remained primarily upon counterinsurgency, stabilization and counterterrorism missions in which states and non-state actors (NSAs) violently contested one another in the context of intra-state dysfunction.Footnote4

Pressure grows to hold secret Apple data privacy hearing in public

Tom Singleton

US politicians, civil rights campaigners and the BBC are all calling for a High Court hearing about a data privacy row between Apple and the UK government to be held in public.

The tech giant is taking legal action after the Home Office demanded the right to access customer data protected by its Advanced Data Protection (ADP) programme.

Apple cannot access data stored in this way currently - but the UK government says it needs to be able to see it if there is a national security risk.

The BBC understands the matter will be considered at a closed hearing of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal at the High Court on Friday morning.

In an open letter, five US politicians from across the political divide have urged the Tribunal to remove what they call the "cloak of secrecy" surrounding the row - which they say has major security implications.

The letter has been signed by Senators Ron Wyden and Alex Padilla, and Members of Congress Warren Davidson, Andy Biggs and Zoe Lofgren.

A New Era of Attacks on Encryption Is Starting to Heat Up

Matt Burgess

Over the past decade, encrypted communication has become the norm for billions of people. Every day, Signal, iMessage, and WhatsApp keep billions of messages, photos, videos, and calls private by using end-to-end encryption by default—while Zoom, Discord, and various other services all have options to enable the protection. But despite the technology’s mainstream rise, long-standing threats to weaken encryption keep piling up.

Over the past few months, there has been a surge in government and law enforcement efforts that would effectively undermine encryption, privacy advocates and experts say, with some of the emerging threats being the most “blunt” and aggressive of those in recent memory. Officials in the UK, France, and Sweden have all made moves since the start of 2025 that could undermine or eliminate the protections of end-to-end encryption, adding to a multiyear European Union plan to scan private chats and Indian efforts that could damage encryption.

These latest assaults on encryption come as intelligence agencies and law enforcement officials in the United States have recently backtracked on years of anti-encryption attitudes and now recommend that people use encrypted communication platforms whenever they can. The drastic shift in attitude followed the China-backed Salt Typhoon hacker group’s widespread breach of major US telecoms, and it comes as the second Trump administration ramps up potential surveillance of millions of undocumented migrants living in the US. Simultaneously, the administration has been straining longtime, crucial international intelligence-sharing agreements and partnerships.

Fighting to adapt: a study of the relationship between organizational culture and cognitive flexibility in Swedish army brigades

Mathias Wallin

Prelude to discovery: a journey into cognitive flexibility and culture

Warfare is an inherently unpredictable enterprise. Throughout history, the virtues of cognitive flexibility, in this study defined as the ability of individuals or organizations to adapt their thinking and behavior in response to changing environments and situations (Finkel Citation2011, 98–99), have been extolled as a critical ability to achieve victory. Highly influential theorists such as Sun Tzu (Citation1963, 101) and von Clausewitz (Citation1976, 75) have emphasized the ability to adapt to rapidly changing battlefield conditions. Clausewitz’s concept of military genius as an ability to make effective decisions amidst the “fog and friction” of war aligns closely with cognitive flexibility. This is further echoed in Boyd’s OODA loop theory, suggesting that success in military operations lies in the rapid and fluid decision-making process where a commander’s cognitive ability plays a critical role (Osinga Citation2006, 2–3). While the connection between cognitive flexibility and military success may be challenging to prove, the idea has, through thinkers like Liddell Hart (Citation1943, 246) and Finkel (Citation2011, 2), taken root in the military doctrines of great powers such as the United States (United States Citation2018, IV-5), China (Burke et al. Citation2020, 9), and Russia (Reach et al. Citation2023, 50), middle powers like the United Kingdom (UK Ministry of Defence (Citation2022), 22), and smaller states like Sweden (Försvarsmakten (Citation2020), 32).

The challenges and opportunities for academics in professional military education

Matthew Powell & Dafydd Townley

Militaries have provided academic education, alongside military training, for several centuries. This phenomenon began with the Prussian Staff College as early as 1801. Entrants into this staff college underwent a rigorous university level education with a curriculum focused on military history, mathematics, science and a foreign language (initially either French or Russian). For the Prussian army, graduation from this staff college was an essential requirement to be appointed to the Prussian General Staff. Within the Prussian Staff College, there was a clear emphasis on the purpose of the education provided to attendees, which was to enhance the cognitive abilities of those that would serve under senior general officers. These staff officers were educated in order to provide the “powerful brain of the military body” (Wilkinson 1913). The catalyst for the  creation of such a body within the Prussian army were a series of crushing defeats suffered at the hands of the French under Napoleon Bonaparte (Newland 2005). These reforms led to the Prussian army becoming one of the most formidable in Europe, and resulting in victories over Denmark, Austria and France in the 1860s and 1870s. Other European militaries adopted similar reforms within their own armed forces, and this trend for more highly educated personnel has continued through the twentieth and into the twenty-first century, which has resulted in the creation of formalised professional military education (Libel 2021).


19 March 2025

India’s diplomacy amid changing great-power dynamics

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury

The second administration of President Donald Trump appears determined to restructure US ties with the other great powers. This presents India with new challenges in the implementation of its ‘multi-aligned’ foreign policy, which seeks to ensure the country maintains and continues to develop a diverse range of political and security partnerships short of a military alliance. However, a reset in great-power dynamics could also provide new opportunities for India’s diplomacy, namely in the form of strengthened defence and economic ties with the EU and within the Quad.

Navigating potential challengesIndia remains cautiously optimistic about its relations with the US, its most important strategic partner. This is due to the personal chemistry between India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, and Trump (Modi was the fourth foreign leader to meet him in the Oval Office after his inauguration in January); the intensification of India–US business and defence ties that took place during the first Trump administration (including landmark ‘foundational’ defence agreements); and a convergence of interests in the Indo-Pacific region (the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was the first foreign-group meeting with new Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the day after Trump’s inauguration). After the Modi–Trump meeting in February 2025, the two countries agreed to sign a new ten-year defence framework agreement by the end of the year and committed to doubling bilateral trade to US$500 billion by 2030. Trump is also expected to travel to India when it hosts the next Quad Leaders’ Summit later this year.


Pakistan’s Hostage-Rescue Failures Exposed As BLA Siege Ends In Heavy Casualties – Analysis

Aritra Banerjee

The recent hijacking of Pakistan’s Jaffar Express by militants from the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has ended in tragedy, exposing serious flaws in Pakistan’s military preparedness and counterterrorism capabilities. While Pakistani authorities quickly declared success in ending the siege, conflicting reports from militants and independent sources have cast serious doubts on the official version, indicating higher casualties and continuing insurgent resistance.

On March 11, 2025, militants belonging to the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist insurgent group seeking independence for Pakistan’s Balochistan province, seized control of the Jaffar Express near the Mashkaf region in Balochistan. The attackers blew up railway tracks, derailing the train, which was carrying around 440 passengers from Quetta to Peshawar, and held hundreds hostage, including Pakistani security personnel.

Initially, the BLA issued a demand for a prisoner exchange, threatening to execute hostages if Pakistani authorities failed to comply within 48 hours. In response, the Pakistani military launched a large-scale operation, employing both ground forces and airstrikes. By March 12, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the military’s media wing, declared the operation successfully concluded, stating all 33 insurgents had been killed, 21 passengers and four Pakistani Army personnel had died, and all hostages had been rescued.

Islamic Extremism In Sri Lanka: A Rising Threat To South Asian Security – Analysis

A. Jathindra

Since the onset of Israel’s war on Hamas, the first incident of Israeli tourists facing terrorist threats abroad occurred in Sri Lanka. The war began on October 7 after Hamas attacked Israel, killing 1,200 people and taking some 250 others hostage. In October, Israel’s National Security Council urged Israelis to leave Sri Lanka’s Arugam Bay area and other beaches in the island’s south and west immediately, citing terrorism threats in the eastern part of Sri Lanka. This announcement from the Israeli Defense Ministry followed a warning from the US embassy in Sri Lanka, which stated it had “received credible information warning of an attack targeting popular tourist locations” in eastern Arugam Bay.

Eastern Arugam Bay, a hotspot for surfing around 400 kilometers (250 miles) east of Colombo by road, is a popular destination for Israeli tourists. The Indian Intelligence Agency had given a tip-off on October 7 that foreigners could be targeted, the local media reported, citing the Acting Inspector General of Police.

The Sri Lankan government has now received intelligence reports of attempts to propagate extremist ideologies within the Muslim population in the Eastern Province. Most of such activities have been reported from the Kalmunai area, prompting SIS and military intelligence units to increase monitoring. Public Security Minister Ananda Wijepala has confirmed this, highlighting evidence of a breeding ground for Islamic extremism in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake informed Parliament that six arrests were made following intelligence reports about possible attacks on tourists in the Arugam Bay area.

Mapping China’s Strategic Port Development in Africa

Paul Nantulya

Chinese state-owned firms are active stakeholders in an estimated 78 ports across 32 African countries as builders, financiers, or operators. Chinese port developments are concentrated in West Africa, with 35 compared to 17 in East Africa, 15 in Southern Africa, and 11 in North Africa.

With a total of 231 commercial ports in Africa, Chinese firms are present in over a quarter of Africa’s maritime trade hubs. This is a significantly greater presence than anywhere else in the world. By comparison, Latin America and the Caribbean host 10 Chinese-built or operated ports, while Asian countries host 24.

In some sites, Chinese firms dominate the entire port development enterprise from finance to construction, operations, and share ownership. Large conglomerates like China Communications Construction Corporation (CCCC) will win work as prime contractors and hand out sub-contracts to subsidiaries like the China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC). This is the case in one of West Africa’s busiest ports, Nigeria’s Lekki Deep Sea Port. CHEC did the construction and engineering, secured loan financing from the China Development Bank (CDB), and took a 54-percent financial stake in the port which it operates on a 16-year lease.

Key Takeaways from China’s Two Sessions in 2025

Neil Thomas

This year’s Two Sessions broadly met the expectations outlined in a preview article I co-authored with my colleague Jing Qian in late February. Li Qiang announced an unchanged economic growth target of “around 5%,” a record-high fiscal deficit target of 4% of GDP, a reduced consumer price inflation target of 2%, and stable targets for creating over 12 million new urban jobs and keeping urban unemployment at around 5.5%. Given falling property prices, weak consumer sentiment, strained local finances, and rising geopolitical volatility, these targets are relatively ambitious.

Despite the pro-growth messaging, we overestimated promises of stimulus. Beyond an extra 1.6 trillion yuan in deficit spending, Beijing will issue 4.4 trillion yuan in local government special-purpose bonds for investment in infrastructure, purchases of idle land and unsold housing, and payments of arrears to government contractors. A 1.3-trillion-yuan issuance of ultralong special treasury bonds will fund projects that advance national security and other interests. Beijing will also issue 500 billion yuan in special sovereign bonds to recapitalize state-owned banks.

All the same, these unprecedented stimulus measures and bond issuances are unlikely to achieve 5% growth, especially given Beijing’s reliance on exports and the potential for further U.S. tariffs, sanctions, and export controls (in addition to the 20% tariff increase since January). Xi Jinping seems open to a deal with U.S. President Donald Trump but is keeping his powder dry in case of further U.S. escalation. The more intense the trade war, the more aggressively Beijing will add stimulus. Nonetheless, debt concerns will likely deter a stimulus “bazooka,” and direct consumer stimulus remains unlikely due to ideological opposition and implementation hurdles.

Harnessing AI to Understand China’s Grand Strategy

Umar Ahmed Badami

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long concealed its strategic vision behind a great information wall. Western views of Chinese strategy often blend Sun Tzu’s antiquated platitudes with designs for revenge following the Century of Humiliation. Although these ideas are relevant to the philosophy informing the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), they are not sources of military doctrine. The paucity of accessible Chinese-origin doctrinal materials sustains far fewer Chinese experts today relative to the plethora of information available to Russia hands available during the Cold War.

Today’s China analysts must formulate their own frameworks of PRC grand strategy. These are largely based on research reports and policy positions promoting a looming “China threat” from the perspective of the Westphalian world order and Western conceptions of realpolitik. These frameworks may identify patterns across CCP-linked global events, but they cannot adequately explain the rationale behind those events as they lack a Chinese perspective.

Competing with China and countering misinformation are major policy goals in America’s national security strategy. Sun Tzu reminds us that knowing and understanding one’s adversaries is critical to effectively competing. In the absence of widespread China expertise, artificial intelligence provides an opportunity to better approach this problem.

The Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria

Jeremy Hodge

Introduction

In the six weeks between the December 8, 2024, overthrow of former Syrian President Assad and the inauguration of President Trump, the United States (US) quietly widened the territorial scope of its counter-terrorism footprint in Syria more than three-fold, an unprecedented expansion not seen even at the height of the U.S. anti-ISIS campaign from 2014-2017.

The purpose of this growth has been to fill the void left by outgoing Russian troops. Prior to Assad’s ouster, Russian forces were responsible for anti-ISIS operations in the regime-controlled area south of the Euphrates River, per a de-confliction agreement reached between Washington and Moscow in 2015.

Starting in 2024, ISIS activity in Syria increased significantly, with the group’s attacks tripling compared to 2023. This growth pushed the US to breach the deconfliction agreement for the first time in SeptemberOctober 2024, launching airstrikes targeting ISIS cells south of the Euphrates River that killed more than 100 of the group’s fighters and leaders.

The DRC Conflict Enters a Dangerous New Phase


The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has entered a new and more destabilizing stage. A call for a pause in the fighting by leaders from the 8 member states of the East African Community (EAC) and 16 member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was dismissed by Rwandan-backed M23 rebel forces, who have continued their offensive to seize more territory in the eastern DRC.

Following their taking of Goma (population of 2 million) and Bukavu (population 1.3 million), the respective capitals of North and South Kivu Provinces, the M23 has pressed farther south, capturing Kamanyola on its way to Uvira (population of 650,000), the third largest city in the Kivus. Another prong moved north of Goma toward Butembo (population of 280,000).

With the prospect of the M23 controlling the entirety of the 124,000 km2 of the mineral-rich Kivus, Rwanda would effectively be gaining a territory nearly five times its size.

Nor would this necessarily be the culmination of Rwanda’s territorial ambitions. Tensions have already started surfacing in Kisangani (in north central DRC) and Lubumbashi (in the south of the country) following the M23’s threats to push all the way to Kinshasa.

Militant Islamist Groups in Africa Sustain High Pace of Lethality


Highlights
  • There were an estimated 18,900 fatalities linked to militant Islamist violence in Africa in 2024.
  • A sharp decline in deaths involving al Shabaab in Somalia brought the continental total below the record high levels of 2023 (23,000 fatalities). Nonetheless, the average annual total number of fatalities for the past 3 years was still more than a third higher than the period from 2019-2021.
  • The Sahel remained the most lethal theater on the continent for the fourth year in a row. There were an estimated 10,400 deaths linked to militant Islamist violence in the Sahel in 2024. This comprises 55 percent of all related fatalities for the continent.
  • The Sahel also accounts for the most prevalence of violence against civilians—a metric of direct targeting of civilians by militant Islamist groups. The region accounts for 67 percent (1,840) of these civilian fatalities for the continent. The Lake Chad Basin region was second, comprising 24 percent (670) of such fatalities.
  • Three theaters accounted for 98 percent of the reported fatalities linked to militant Islamist violence on the continent: the Sahel (55 percent), Somalia (24 percent), and the Lake Chad Basin (19 percent).
  • Both Mozambique and North Africa saw increases in violent activity and reported fatalities following steady declines in previous years. Nonetheless, the two theaters account for just 2 percent of related fatalities.

Getting Specific on DOGE Efficiencies: Opportunities for Defense

Elaine McCusker, John G. Ferrari, Todd Harrison

The Department of Defense (DOD) is about to undergo a welcome and overdue fundamental shift in its operations. This shift is enabled by four intersecting yet simultaneous forces acting upon it. First, the potential for needed real increases in resources from Congress.[i] Second, clear, global American foreign policy objectives. Third, active participation in defense weapons innovation and production from large and small non-traditional defense contractors. And fourth, a change in the risk profile for reform driven by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) from one in which the fear of failure is replaced with the fearlessness of creativity.[ii]

Describing and providing recommendations for all four of these at once is beyond the scope of this paper, which is focused on opportunities for efficiencies and reprioritization of defense resources. To fully understand the opportunities presented, and particularly the positive pressure DOGE can bring, one should keep in mind the other three forces – money, global leadership, and more players on the field supporting defense technology advancement. All of these elements feed into the changing risk profile that DOGE brings to the table – fearless, innovative, and rapid improvements.