5 April 2026

Iran-Israel-US War’s Quiet Shock on India’s Fertilizer Imports

Deepanshu Mohan

For all the attention oil has received in this latest round of geopolitical stress, it was not the only market that moved with urgency. As tensions between Iran and the United States intensified and risks around the Strait of Hormuz escalated, fertilizer benchmarks began adjusting with unusual speed and clarity.

Within days, urea prices at major import hubs rose from roughly $516 to over $680 per tonne. Ammonia climbed from about $495 to $600, while phosphate prices crossed $700. These are not routine fluctuations. They signal a supply disruption that markets believe will persist, not dissipate.

The reason lies in geography. The Strait of Hormuz carries close to a quarter to a third of global fertilizer trade, alongside roughly 20 percent of global LNG flows that underpin nitrogen production. The Gulf region itself accounts for nearly 45 percent of global urea supply. Disruptions at this chokepoint have already constrained an estimated 22 million tonnes of annual urea exports, with ammonia and phosphate markets facing parallel dislocations. Nearly a million tonnes of cargo remain stranded, caught between contract and delivery.

For India, this poses an immediate constraint: more than 60 percent of its urea imports and close to 80 percent of ammonia and sulfur imports are sourced from the Gulf. India remains among the largest global importers of diammonium phosphate and urea, with imports of both rising sharply in recent months as domestic demand strengthens. When supply through this corridor tightens, substitution is limited and adjustment costs rise quickly.

Worse, the disruption has coincided with a narrow global application window, when farmers across major producing regions apply nitrogen to sustain crop cycles. When input prices rise sharply at this stage, usage adjusts. Application rates are reduced or cropping patterns shift toward less input-intensive alternatives. These decisions are not reversed easily, and their consequences appear with a lag in the form of lower yields.

India’s goal of isolating Pakistan is facing a setback Opinion

Amitabh Dubey

Only two years ago, Iran and Pakistan were firing drones and missiles at each other. Pakistan signed a mutual defence treaty with Iran’s archrival Saudi Arabia last year. And yet Pakistan, along with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, is at the centre of talks over a ceasefire between the US and Iran. There is no guarantee that the talks will succeed, but Pakistan, for now, appears to have a seat at the “global high table”.

However, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar ended up looking like sour grapes when he labelled Pakistan a “dalal” nation for attempting to mediate between the US and Iran. It wasn’t so long ago that Jaishankar himself had presented India as a potential go-between in the Russia-Ukraine war. Given how urgently India needs the Middle East war to end to contain serious harm to the economy, silence may have served the national interest better.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s poorly timed tilt to Israel on the eve of the war had already damaged Iranian trust in India. The Modi government subsequently course-corrected to protect Indian energy security. However, 18 Indian vessels carrying crude oil and LPG remain stuck in the Persian Gulf (as of 30 March) while Iran has reportedly given blanket permission for 20 Pakistan-flagged vessels to gradually transit the Strait of Hormuz.

How Pakistan won over Trump to become an unlikely mediator in the Iran war

Caroline Davies

The head of its armed forces, Field Marshal Asim Munir, is in US President Donald Trump's favour. The US leader frequently refers to him as his "favourite" Field Marshal and has previously spoken about how Munir knows Iran "better than most".

Iran is not only a neighbour of Pakistan, with whom it shares a 900km (559 miles) or so border, but by its own messages also has a "brotherly" relationship with deep cultural and religious ties.

It also has no US air bases.

And unlike many of the usual intermediaries in the Gulf it has not yet been pulled into the conflict.

Crucially, it is willing to wade in - peace between the US and Iran by many accounts would be in its interest.

Still, there have been questions about how a country embroiled in conflict with two of its neighbours - Afghanistan and India - has positioned itself as a bringer of peace.

The country is currently bombing Afghanistan and tensions with India led to a fear of nuclear escalation only last year.

Pakistan has so far walked the tightrope between Iran and the US, passing messages between the two sides, hosting foreign ministers from other concerned Muslim nations and hitting the diplomatic telephones.

But the balancing act is not risk-free.

Much to lose

New Governments in Bangladesh and Nepal Open Window for India to Recast Ties with Neighbors

Elizabeth Roche

The winds of political change sweeping through South Asia, with the installation of new governments in Nepal and Bangladesh, offer New Delhi a chance to rework ties with two key neighbors.

In Nepal, 35-year-old rapper-turned-politician Balendra Shah took the oath as prime minister on March 27 after a landslide victory in general elections, held in the aftermath of the 2025 Gen Z protests. Shah’s swearing in as prime minister marks an important milestone in Nepal’s history—he is the youngest to hold this post.

To India’s east, in Bangladesh, a government headed by Tarique Rehman of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) took office on February 17. This followed the ouster of the long-entrenched Sheikh Hasina government in 2024, in student-led protests in July-August of that year.

Taken together, the new governments in India’s neighborhood represent significant breaks from the past and open the door for new possibilities.

Within days of the BNP government taking charge in Bangladesh, India hosted a senior Bangladeshi military intelligence official, Major General Kaiser Rashid Chowdhury. More visits to India are expected in the coming days, including that of Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Khalilur Rehman. And in a display of goodwill, India sent 5,000 metric tons of diesel to Bangladesh amid the energy crisis triggered by the Iran war.

On March 26, at an event to mark Bangladesh’s National Day, Bangladeshi High Commissioner to India Riaz Hamidullah drew attention to the “high importance” that Prime Minister Rahman accords to “its relationship with India, a partnership shaped by [a shared] history, culture, and geography.” As the new government in Dhaka “embarks on a robust mandate, we look forward to advancing our ties and engagements with India, premised on dignity, equality, mutual trust and respect, and shared benefits,” he said. Hamidullah also pointed to the immense potential that remains to be tapped in bilateral trade. “Our ties go far beyond the $12 billion in bilateral goods trade. Conservative estimates point to comprehensive economic transactions in the order of $28 to $30 billion, minimum,” he said.

The Shocking Speed of China’s Scientific Rise

Ross Andersen

If China finally eclipses the United States as the world’s preeminent scientific superpower, there won’t be an official announcement. Neither will there necessarily be a dramatic Promethean demonstration, a bomb flash in the desert, a satellite beeping overhead, a moon landing. It will be a quiet moment, observed by a small, specialized subset of scientists who have forsaken the study of the stars, animals, and plants in favor of a more navel-gazing subject: the practice of science itself.

This moment may now be at hand. American science has been the envy of the planet since the Second World War at least, but it has recently gone into decline. After President Trump took office last year, his administration started vandalizing the country’s scientific institutions, suspending research grants in bulk and putting entire lines of cutting-edge research on ice. In August, Trump’s Department of Health and Human Services canceled $500 million in mRNA-vaccine research, less than two years after Americans won a Nobel Prize for pioneering that technology. More than 10,000 science Ph.D.s have left the federal workforce, according to one group’s estimate, and the White House has been withholding money from frontline researchers in computer science, biomedicine, and hundreds of other fields that will define the human future. As one historian of science put it to me in July, “This is an unparalleled destruction from within.”

While all of this has been unfolding, metascientists have been following a very different story overseas. They’ve watched in wonder as China has built out a gigantic research apparatus at world-record speed, stocking institutions, universities, and laboratories with talent and some of the best equipment and facilities money can buy. In 1991, China spent $13 billion on research and development. Today, its annual spending is more than $800 billion, second only to the U.S. The Chinese government just unveiled a plan to grow the country’s science budget by 7 percent each year for the next five years. According to a new forecast from Nature, China’s public spending on research is likely to overtake the United States’ by 2029.

Former KC-135 Wing Commander On What It Will Take To Fuel A Fight Against China

Howard Altman

As Epic Fury grinds into a second month, the Air Force continues to rely heavily on its fleet of aerial refueling tankers, the majority of which are over 60 years old, to gas up aircraft attacking Iran and those still pouring into the Middle East. The strain on the force has been exacerbated by the loss of a KC-135 Stratotanker and damage to another after a collision over Iraq and several more tankers being destroyed and damaged on the ground by Iranian long-range weapons. Meanwhile, given this large commitment of aircraft and personnel, there are questions about how the U.S. tanker fleet can respond to a fight in the Pacific should one break out tonight. To get a better sense of that, we spoke to retired Air Force Col. Troy Pananon, who flew tankers and commanded a tanker wing.

In the second installment of our two-hour, wide-ranging exclusive interview – the first centering on Epic Fury’s strain on the force – Pananon offers insights into whether there are enough tankers and crews to sustain combat in two theaters more than 4,000 miles apart, the challenges of flying long distance over contested airspace and what, if any, countermeasures tankers should be given to survive.

Some of the questions and answers have been lightly edited for clarity. 

Q: Given the heavy use of aerial refueling for Epic Fury, how concerned are you about the ability to fuel a fight in the Pacific, if one should break out tonight or in the near term?

A: There is a high demand on the tanker community. We retired the KC-10s, so that is a void that can’t be filled as quickly as we would like. But the tanker force is robust, and even though we have a contingency of aircraft in the Middle East region and parts of Europe, we still have tankers that are all over the world, to include the Pacific. Kadena has its own wing of tankers there. And so the ability for our tanker fleet to pivot or to surge and scale to another region – there is not another military out there that can do it – but it puts that demand on the total force.

I think that we could do it, sure, but it would put a significant strain if we were trying to operate in two different parts of the globe, especially if it was involving major combat operations. And not to mention, there’s an element of protecting the homeland as well. Tankers are required to do that too. So you can’t just say, ‘Oh well, we’ll deplete the entire force and focus abroad.’ There’s an element required to support homeland operations as well.

ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: in ever more technologies, China is moving towards monopoly

Jenny Wong-Leung

China is no longer merely leading the research in major technology fields. It’s also moving towards a monopolistic position in most of them, the latest update of ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker shows.

As wars in Ukraine and especially Iran remind us of the decisive effect of technology in combat, many of the areas in which China is strengthening its hand are directly or indirectly military. Others promise economic dominance for China – and technological dependence on it for the rest of the world.

The tech tracker continues to show the United States losing leading places in research to China in one technology after another. Comparison with the previous, 2025 update shows that European countries, too, are losing ground, though India is making remarkable advances.

The window for Western countries to reverse this trajectory is narrowing. This data shows exactly where the ground is being lost and how fast.

ASPI’s Critical Tech Tracker measures not a country’s current level in any particular technology but the intensity of its research efforts in the field, as shown by a rolling five-year count of high-impact papers the country produces. This data points to its future technological level. Papers with high impact are the 10 percent most highly cited.

In 2021 to 2025, China published the greatest number of such papers in 69 of 74 technologies covered by the tracker – in other words, in almost all the technologies. This compared with 66 fields in which it was ahead in 2020 to 2024. The three technologies in which Chinese research gained leadership had formerly been led narrowly by the US: natural language processing, genetic engineering and nuclear medicine and radiotherapy.

Monopoly risk

How to assess China’s real chance of winning AI race against US

Ke Meng

In January, a top Chinese AI researcher told an industry summit in Beijing there was less than a 20 per cent chance of any Chinese company surpassing a leading US artificial intelligence firm in the next three to five years.

The remark by Lin Junyang, until recently a technical leader working on Qwen, one of China’s most capable open-source AI models under Alibaba (which owns the South China Morning Post), made headlines. But much of the commentary missed a more important question Lin posed: “Does innovation happen in the hands of the rich or the poor?”

The United States held an estimated 74 per cent of global AI computing power in mid-2025, compared with China’s 14 per cent. Lin described the gap as “one to two orders of magnitude”. Because US labs command far more aggregate compute, they can allocate substantial capacity to next-generation research as well as product deployment. Chinese labs, he admitted, are “stretched”: just delivering products consumes most of their compute. The luxury of exploration is one they simply cannot afford.

Lin’s 20 per cent remark provoked two broad reactions. Optimists dismissed it: benchmark gaps have shrunk to near parity, Chinese models last year claimed nine of the top 10 open-weight positions on a major leaderboard and export controls have plainly failed to stop progress.
Pessimists, however, thought a 20 per cent chance was generous: Huawei Technologies’ chip output is projected at 2-5 per cent of Nvidia’s aggregate AI computing power through to 2027, and DeepSeek founder Liang Wenfeng has admitted “money has never been the problem” while “bans on shipments of advanced chips are”, acknowledging a fourfold compute disadvantage. It is only a matter of time, this camp suggests, before the deficit becomes insurmountable.

Both reactions miss the point. They treat the AI race as a contest with one finish line. In reality, compute scarcity and compute abundance have produced two structurally different innovation models – each with distinct strengths, blind spots and implications for governance. Understanding this divergence is key to knowing what Lin’s 20 per cent really means.

Quieter, stealthier, further: new hybrid unit to power China’s small battle drones

Meredith Chen

A hybrid propulsion system designed to make small battlefield drones stealthier and go further has passed its flight tests, according to Chinese state media.

The system’s motor is driven by fuel-powered electricity, combining two systems to make the best of both, according to a report on Friday on CCTV-7, China’s military television channel.

Drone propulsion has largely followed two distinct paths. Fuel-powered systems are typically used in bigger uncrewed aircraft, offering strong performance and long endurance but generating a lot of noise.

Smaller drones are usually powered by electric batteries, making them quieter and less visible on the infrared spectrum but reducing their time in the air.

The 60-kilowatt system, tested in December, seeks to integrate the advantages.

By combining fuel and electric power, the system can generate electricity from fuel during flight and switch to quiet electric mode when needed, enabling small drones to fly longer distances while maintaining low noise and reducing thermal signatures.

The development was reported in Stealth Vanguard, an episode in a CCTV documentary series called UAV Competition.

“[The tests mean the] the hybrid ‘heart’ of small drones is steadily moving towards maturity,” it said.

Will Conflict in the Middle East Boost China’s Renewable Energy Sector?

Dmytro Spilka

Amid the Iran-Israel-U.S. war, the price of Brent crude oil has already spiked to its highest levels since Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The resulting energy shock has sent many global indices falling over the first quarter of 2026.

China hasn’t been immune to the conflict in Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, with the Hang Seng Index set to close the quarter 5 percent lower. However, the Asian powerhouse is well-positioned to weather the storm. Estimates suggest that the conflict in the Middle East will have a limited impact on China’s economic growth over the foreseeable future, thanks to its large strategic crude reserves, along with the nation’s focus on renewable energy.

Along with the rapid expansion of its renewable energy sector, China has made efforts to maintain a high level of coal production while diversifying its oil imports in a way that can protect against supply disruptions.

Iran has also reportedly shipped 11.7 million barrels of crude to China through the Strait of Hormuz since the conflict began on February 28. That, alongside Saudi Arabia’s bid to redirect oil exports to the Red Sea, could help to support a steadier long-term supply to support China’s energy infrastructure.

For many other global economies more directly exposed to disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, recent events in the Middle East are offering a timely reminder of the downside of reliance on fossil fuels. Given that, we could see new opportunities emerge for the renewable energy sector on the back of recent events in Iran – and China is poised to benefit.

China has spent much of the 21st century focused on becoming a world leader in clean energy, with a rollout of wind and solar farms nationwide, as well as a strong emphasis on electric vehicles (EVs). Clean energy industries drove more than 90 percent of China’s investment growth in 2025.

Why Chinese tech companies are racing to set up in Hong Kong

Sylvia Chang

In a hotel lobby on Hong Kong Island, a delivery robot pauses outside one of the lifts as the doors open, and a guest steps out. The robot waits, and then rolls neatly inside.

The move looks simple, but it isn't. To work in the busy hotel, owned by an international chain, the robot must navigate a building that won't slow down for it.

People are often getting in the way, and it must be able to take the lift to the correct floor, and then find the right room.

The company behind the robot, Yunji, is a mainland Chinese tech business that is aiming to use Hong Kong as a springboard for successful overseas expansion.

"We aim to make our product succeed in Hong Kong, and then expand outward," says the firm's vice-president, Xie Yunpeng.

Hong Kong is becoming increasingly important to such mainland Chinese tech companies as a place to raise money, test products with international clients, and build credibility for overseas expansion.

This matters because US and European nations have grown more wary of such Chinese companies. Dubbed "China risk" by some commentators, countries fear state-led espionage and excessive Chinese domination of their tech sectors.

For mainland Chinese tech firms it means they are finding access to capital, customers and trust harder to secure in some international markets. So, they are instead looking to Hong Kong in the first instance.

Last year, the number of mainland Chinese firms listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange increased to 76, up from 30 in 2024, an increase of 153%, according to a report by accountancy giant PricewaterhouseCoopers.

Is the Iran War breaking NATO forever?

Anatol Lieven

In the view of General de Gaulle, “Treaties are like young girls and roses; they last while they last.” By that standard, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization seems to be wilting pretty fast. The Israeli-U.S. war on Iran has opened up (or revealed) divisions that may prove fatal.

This week, in the first call of its kind from the European right, Tino Chrupalla, federal spokesman of Germany’s Alternative For Germany (AFD) party, declared, “Let’s begin to put into practice what our party manifesto says: the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Germany.” He said that Germany cannot call itself a truly sovereign country while it hosts foreign bases over which it has no real control.

Chrupalla praised the Spanish government’s action in closing U.S. bases and Spanish airspace to participation in the Iran War: “Ships under the Spanish flag are allowed to pass the Strait [of Hormuz]. Why are the Spaniards allowed to cross? Because Spain has closed its bases for the Iran war. And that is totally right.”

This is an obvious riposte to President Trump’s latest remark that “countries like the United Kingdom”, that refused to get involved in the Iran War” should “Go get your own oil.” Iran has in fact allowed ships with oil destined for neutral countries to pass the Strait of Hormuz.

Understandably however, Tehran does not consider European countries that host bases from which the U.S. is attacking Iran to be truly “neutral.” If the war continues and energy shortages in Europe worsen, calls for other European countries to follow Spain are bound to intensify. The fate of the Gulf Arab states in this war has underlined the risks of hosting foreign military forces that you do not control.

France and Italy are indeed beginning to head in this direction. Italy has denied permission for U.S. planes headed to the war to refuel in Italy. France has closed its airspace to U.S. flights linked to the war. Trump’s response has been predictably furious, posting that “The U.S. will remember” France’s lack of help, and warning Britain and France that, “You’ll have to learn how to fight for yourself, the U.S.A. won’t be there to help you anymore, just like you weren’t there for us.”

The Iran War is the Culmination of Washington’s Foreign Policy Pathologies

Chris McCallion

The Iran war and other recent misadventures by the Trump administration can seem like a radical departure from the U.S. foreign policy consensus. To be sure, the Trump administration has spurned the most sanctimonious aspects of U.S. foreign policy, which arguably reached their crescendo under the Biden administration. The gleeful gangsterism in Latin America and the Caribbean, the territorial threats against Canada and Denmark, the planned luxury condos on the mass graves of Gaza—all are indeed shocks to both the mind and the conscience.

Yet the Iran war is actually the culmination of Washington’s long-standing foreign policy pathologies, not a break with them.

The first example is Washington’s seemingly endless appetite for military interventions without any clear definition of success when the stakes for the U.S. are low to nil. This virtually ensures the war will be, at best, not worth the cost, and at worst, an open-ended disaster. The United States cannot mobilize appropriate means in the absence of achievable ends, nor can it be willing to do so if its core interests are not meaningfully involved. This has been a common thread throughout U.S. foreign policy failures, from Vietnam to Iraq to Libya.

The same is true now. The goals of the Iran operation have been defined schizophrenically: regime change (or not), destruction of Iran’s nuclear program (supposedly obliterated last summer), degradation of Iran’s navy and missiles, elimination of Iran’s proxies, etc. There does not appear to be any obvious alternative to the regime within Iran, nor can its capabilities be permanently suppressed. The means have so far been limited to air and naval power, though the administration is reportedly considering sending ground troops. When the ends are open-ended, the war is likely to be as well.

The best-case scenario is Trump rushing to find an offramp, while worse outcomes range from an even more extreme Iranian regime rushing toward a nuclear deterrent, state collapse or ethnic Balkanization, and the beginning of a generational “forever war.” None of these can be meaningfully defined as “victory.”

U.S. and Iran discussing ceasefire for reopening strait, officials say

Barak Ravid

The U.S. and Iran are discussing a potential deal that would involve a ceasefire in exchange for Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, three U.S. officials tell Axios.

The big picture: The officials did not say whether those discussions had taken place directly or only through mediators, and they cautioned that it was unclear whether a deal could be reached. But the officials said President Trump was discussing the possibility with officials inside and outside the administration.

Trump raised the talks around a possible ceasefire in a call on Wednesday with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, according to two sources with knowledge.
Trump also spoke to UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed.

Behind the scenes: Vice President Vance has been talking to the mediators about the possible ceasefire as recently as Tuesday, according to a source familiar.The source said Vance passed a message to Iran via the mediators that the U.S. is open to a ceasefire if its demands are met, including the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
Vance also reiterated Trump's threats to attack Iranian infrastructure if no deal is reached, the source said.

Driving the news: Trump claimed on Wednesday that Iran had asked the U.S. for a ceasefire, but stressed he would only consider it if the strait was reopened.China and Pakistan presented a peace initiative along those lines on Tuesday.
Iran's Foreign Ministry swiftly denied Trump's claim, and Tehran has consistently denied holding any direct negotiations with Washington.

Between the lines: Trump might have been referring to a statement Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian made on Tuesday during a call with European Council President Antรณnio Costa.Pezeshkian said Iran was willing to end the war but only if the U.S. stopped its attacks and Iran received guarantees that the war would not resume.

What they're saying: "Iran's New Regime President, much less Radicalized and far more intelligent than his predecessors, has just asked the United States of America for a CEASEFIRE! We will consider when Hormuz Strait is open, free, and clear," Trump wrote on Truth Social.

The Third Islamic Republic A War’s Unintended Consequences—for Iran, the Middle East, and the Global Order

Suzanne Maloney

At a February 2026 gathering to commemorate the revolution that ushered in Iran’s Islamic Republic, the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, struck a reflective note. He remarked that it had been “a strange year,” alluding to Israeli and American attacks on Iran’s nuclear program eight months earlier, and offered an extended justification of the unprecedented violence deployed by regime enforcers to suppress mass protests that had erupted in late December. He described the unrest as an attempted coup orchestrated by Israel and the United States and boasted that it had been “crushed under the feet of the Iranian nation.”

Predictably, Khamenei then turned to the United States, the regime’s foremost adversary and a frequent focus of his invective. He dismissed “the crumbling U.S. empire” and President Donald Trump’s threats of military action against Iran, insisting that “the Americans themselves who are constantly threatening that there will be a war . . . know that they don’t have the staying power for such a thing.” He added that “the U.S. President has said that for 47 years, the United States hasn’t been able to eliminate the Islamic Republic . . . . That confession is true. I say, ‘You, too, won’t be able to do such a thing.’”

These would prove to be some of Khamenei’s final public statements. Eleven days later, the United States and Israel launched coordinated airstrikes on Iran that killed him, along with members of his family and several senior military and political leaders. It was the first salvo in a war that would methodically degrade Iran’s navy, air force, and ballistic missile program, as well as its broader security infrastructure and defense industrial base. “When we are finished, take over your government,” Trump told the Iranian people in his address announcing the start of the campaign. “It will be yours to take.”

But as thousands of American and Israeli strikes pummeled the country, Iran’s leaders managed to regroup, installing Khamenei’s even more hard-line son Mojtaba as his successor. And Tehran immediately began retaliating with missile and drone strikes that targeted American military bases and the economic and energy infrastructure of Iran’s neighbors. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth derided Iran’s response as “indiscriminate targeting, flailing recklessly.” But Tehran’s strategy soon became clear: its attacks had effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic waterway through which one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas exports pass.

Assessing the Air Campaign After Three Weeks: Iran War By the Numbers

Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park

As the war with Iran enters its fourth week, there is an opportunity to look at data on the air campaign to understand what has happened and the combatants’ intentions.U.S. Strike Campaign: The U.S. strike campaign has settled into a sustainable pace of bombing between 300 and 500 targets per day. U.S. forces also now predominantly use far less expensive, short-range munitions. This “munitions transition” has vastly lowered the daily war costs.

Iranian Launches: Iran’s drone and missile launches declined rapidly after the first four days. While rebounding slightly since, these launches remain far lower than earlier large salvos. The “lingering launch capacity,” however, continues to inflict damage—particularly, to energy facilities.

Interceptions: Some Gulf states report very high interception rates, ranging from 80 to 90 percent. If true, that aligns with the best rates that Ukraine has achieved.

U.S. Strike Campaign

In the first 24 hours of Operation Epic Fury, U.S. forces struck over 1,000 targets as they worked from the long-standing U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) target list. The Israeli Air Force struck over 750 additional targets during this time. After that, the pace eased. CENTCOM likely was being judicious in using expensive and scarce long-range missiles like the Tomahawk and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)—both around $3.5 million per shot.

The intensity of the U.S. bombing campaign picked up between Days 7 and 10 as the coalition took advantage of its air dominance over large parts of Iran. Operational success in diminishing Iran’s air defense meant U.S. planes could fly with few limitations and use less expensive, more plentiful munitions like Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), which costs less than $100,000 per shot.

Iran Threatens to Start Attacking Major US Tech Firms on April 1


Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned Tuesday that it plans to begin attacking more than a dozen American companies across the Middle East on Wednesday in retaliation for the killing of Iranian citizens in the ongoing war with the US and Israel. The list of companies includes Apple, Google, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Tesla, and Boeing, which the IRGC accused of enabling United States military targeting operations. The IRGC urged employees of the US firms to evacuate and civilians in the region to stay away.

Tuesday's warning, posted to the IRGC's Telegram channel, extends a campaign of threats by Iran against American commercial infrastructure since the US and Israel launched their first attack on Tehran on February 28. Iranian drones struck two Amazon Web Services data centers and damaged another in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain on March 1, in the first publicly confirmed attack on American-owned hyperscale cloud infrastructure. Banking sites, payment processors, and consumer services across the region crashed as redundancies meant to prevent outages were taken offline.

Earlier this month, the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency published a list of 29 regional offices and data centers operated by major firms such as Amazon, Google, IBM, Nvidia, and Palantir, accusing the firms of supporting US military and intelligence activities.

The IRGC said in its post to Telegram that targeted companies “should expect” attacks to begin after 8 pm on April 1 in Tehran.

Most of the companies the IRGC named in Tuesday’s Telegram post did not immediately respond to WIRED’s request for comment. Google, Microsoft, and JP Morgan declined to comment.

Billions of dollars in US technology and infrastructure are tied up in the Gulf, where American tech giants have bet big on the region becoming the next hub for AI development.

Iran’s attacks drone on, with the U.S. at risk of losing the war

Michael J. Armstrong

The United States and Israel have repeatedly boasted about airstrikes in their current war with Iran. In Week 1, they claimed the destruction of 75 per cent of Iran’s missile launchers. By Week 2, they had reduced Iranian missile fire by 90 per cent and said the war was “already won in many ways.”

And yet, Iran keeps damaging refineries and blocking tankers from crossing the Strait of Hormuz.

The country has certainly suffered many tactical losses. But its missiles and drones have been strategically successful.

Iran so far has launched at least 5,400 such projectiles. Surprisingly, less than a tenth of them have targeted Israel, its traditional rival.
Missiles over Israel

Israel faced about 450 Iranian missile attacks during the war’s first four weeks. The rate of fire fell rapidly after the first weekend but has never halted.

Some missiles carry several hundred kilograms of explosives, enough to destroy an entire building. The rest instead dispense dozens of cluster bombs over wide areas. Those are less powerful but still lethal.

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Israel’s long-range Arrow interceptors engage the missiles first. Its mid-range David’s Sling and short-range Iron Dome interceptors provide backup. (The country’s Iron Beam lasers are not being used.) Together, they’ve reportedly intercepted 92 per cent of incoming missiles.

But interceptors sometimes miss. And their supply is limited. Consequently, at least nine large warheads and 150 cluster bombs have hit populated areas.

How the US could try to seize Iran's Kharg Island

Frank Gardner

US President Donald Trump has indicated that he may send troops to seize control of Iran's key oil export terminal at Kharg Island in the northern Gulf. So what's behind this, how would it work and what are the risks?

Kharg Island has long been Iran's chief outlet for its oil exports. The island sits offshore with waters deep enough to load product onto tankers known as Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs), which can hold around two million barrels. Around 90% of Iran's oil exports pass through Kharg.

During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s it was frequently bombed by the Iraqi Air Force and on 13 March this year the US struck what it said were 90 military targets on the island. It however spared the oil infrastructure.

If the US does decide to invade Kharg Island then it would most likely be a temporary measure intended to put pressure on Iran by cutting off its fuel exports until it relinquished its chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz - one of the world's busiest oil shipping lanes - and conceded to Washington's demands.

Given the resilience and defiance of the Iranian regime it is highly questionable whether this would work.

The speaker of Iran's parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, has warned that his country's forces would "rain down fire" on any invading US forces. Iran is believed to have reinforced its defences on the island, including with surface-to-air missile batteries.

Iran has also accused the US of duplicity by proposing peace talks at the same time as dispatching troops to the region. These forces are made up of nearly 5,000 US Marines and around 2,000 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division.

This has prompted widespread speculation that either or both could be used to seize and hold Kharg.

Three Crises, Four Years: Europe Keeps Failing the Same Energy Test

Haley Zaremba

Europe is facing its third energy crisis in four years, this time triggered by the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, exposing the continent’s persistent dependence on fossil fuel imports.
Renewable energy overtook fossil fuels in Europe’s energy mix for the first time in 2025, but experts say deeper investment in wind, solar, and nuclear is the only path to true energy independence.

European leaders are pivoting hard toward next-gen nuclear technologies including small modular reactors — a dramatic reversal from the EU’s previous push to phase nuclear out.

For the third time in four years, Europe is waking up to discover that it has sleepwalked into yet another energy crisis." When Russia illegally invaded Ukraine in February of 2022, Europe was caught in an extremely compromised position, as it was dependent on Russian producers for 40 percent of its natural gas. When energy sanctions were slapped on the Kremlin, the impact on European energy markets was dire, with many families plunging into energy poverty.

In the years since that crisis, European leaders have made efforts to diversify their energy supplies and become more energy independent – but clearly it was not enough. Europe has experienced two crises since that invasion, both involving the closure of critical shipping lanes – first from conflict choking passage of the Red Sea in 2023 and 2024, and now thanks to the extended effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz. This newest crisis throws into sharp relief how dependent Europe remains on fossil fuels, and particularly on fossil fuel imports, rendering the continent highly vulnerable to such disruptions of trade routes.

"We swore we’d learn. We promised things would change but here we are," a ‘highly frustrated European diplomat’ was recently (anonymously) quoted by the BBC.

The age of the aircraft carrier is over

Andrew Cockburn

Ever since World War Two, America’s aircraft carrier fleets have served as imposing instruments of imperial power, roaming the oceans to cow recalcitrant nations into obedience. Favored by the Trump administration for this purpose, current experience indicates their day is done thanks to the proliferation of anti-ship missiles and the increasing ubiquity of drones.

In America’s last Middle Eastern war but two, against the Yemeni Houthis in 2025, the carrier USS Harry S.Truman, complete with its attendant escorts, was driven into retreat, leaving antagonists in control of the Red Sea. On one occasion, the carrier’s desperate maneuver to avoid a Houthi drone caused an $80 million Hornet jet fighter to slide off the deck and topple into the sea.

Chronicling the buildup to the current war, media commentary paid excited attention to the progress of the USS Gerald R. Ford, customarily described as the “world’s largest aircraft carrier,” as it made its way to the war zone. Rarely did the Ford’s status as the most expensive warship ever built get a mention in the commentary, nor that key functions – such as its plane-launching catapult and the elevators that move aircraft to the flight deck – were deficient.

According to a report by Bloomberg defense correspondent Anthony Capaccio, the Navy did not know “how well the Ford – and other ships in its class, which have yet to be delivered – can detect, track or intercept enemy aircraft, anti-ship missiles or small attack aircraft. It’s also unclear how the aircraft carrier’s systems would perform under the wartime strain of continuous takeoffs and landings.” Equally unclear was the “reliability of several key systems, including its jet launch and recovery system, its radar, its ability to keep operating if hit by enemy fire and its elevators for moving weapons and munitions for warplanes from the hold to the flight deck.”

The 850 Tomahawks Launched in Operation Epic Fury Is the Most Fired in a Single Campaign

Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park

The Washington Post reported that Navy ships and submarines have fired more than 850 Tomahawk missiles in the first four weeks of Operation Epic Fury. Replenishing inventory after this campaign will take time, and creates near-term risk for the United States.

Tomahawks are capable long-range missiles that have been widely used for U.S. warfighting since the first Gulf War. They remain a key munition for potential future wars, including one in the Western Pacific. Tomahawks are also expensive, costing $3.6 million per shot according to the latest Navy budget documents.

850 missiles would account for around half of available launchers in the region— assuming two guided missile submarines with Multiple-All-Up-Round Canisters are on station, alongside the destroyers with vertical launching system (VLS) cells. Because VLS cells are also loaded with other types of missiles—for example, those for air defense—this amount could represent most of the Tomahawks on station. These launchers cannot be reloaded at sea. Ships would need to return to port with requisite infrastructure once they are out of missiles.

The Navy is set to receive 110 Tomahawks in FY 2026. Existing stockpiles are estimated to be in the low-3,000s. While sufficient munitions exist to wage this war, high expenditure of Tomahawks and other missiles in Operation Epic Fury creates risks for the United States in other theaters—particularly the Western Pacific.

U.S. Plans Military Expansion in Greenland

Jeffrey Gettleman Maya Tekeli and Eric Schmitt

The American military is intensifying efforts to secure greater access to Greenland, a clear signal that President Trump’s interest in the enormous Arctic island has not waned.

The United States is negotiating with Denmark for access to three additional bases in Greenland — including two previously abandoned by Americans — which would mark the first U.S. expansion there in decades, according to a top Pentagon general, Gen. Gregory M. Guillot.

General Guillot, the head of U.S. Northern Command, told lawmakers in a congressional hearing in mid-March that the military wanted “increased access to different bases across Greenland as we look at the increasing threat and the strategic importance of Greenland.”

“I’m working with our department and others to try to develop more ports, more airfields, which leads to more options for our secretary and for the president, should we need them up in the Arctic,” General Guillot added.

The request places Denmark in a tricky spot. Greenland is a semi-automonous territory that has been part of the Danish kingdom for more than 300 years. President Trump, at the same time, has fixated on acquiring Greenland, and threatened to use force for months before relenting in January.

The Danish government has cited a 1951 Danish-American defense pact to push back against Mr. Trump’s threats, noting that the U.S. already has sweeping military access.

US jibes at Royal Navy are uncomfortable because they have substance

Jamie Grierson

The US defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, had his tongue firmly in his cheek when he singled out the “big, bad Royal Navy” in a recent press update on the US-Israeli war against Iran.

Hegseth’s sarcastic comment was the latest in a long line of jibes against the capabilities and readiness of the British Royal Navy.

However, less political figures have also warned of the perilous state of the UK’s naval warfare force, including the First Sea Lord, the highest-ranking naval officer on active duty.

Donald Trump has dismissed the UK’s aircraft carriers as “toys”, compared with their US equivalents. He reportedly told Keir Starmer to not “bother” sending them to the Gulf.

In perhaps more scathing comments, the US president told the Daily Telegraph: “You don’t even have a navy. You’re too old and had aircraft carriers that didn’t work.”

Hegseth and Trump’s comments should be viewed through the political lens: both are under pressure at home and abroad for launching an offensive against Iran that many say has no clear objective. The British prime minister, like many European counterparts, has refused to be drawn into the conflict, which has clearly angered Trump.

But the uncomfortable truth for Starmer is that many British politicians, military officials and experts suggest that there is some substance to the US barbs.

On 10 March, the House of Commons defence committee expressed grave concerns over whether the navy had the “capacity and resilience” to respond to the crisis in the Middle East. Last month, the former general Richard Barrons, one of three members of Labour’s strategic defence review team, said the lack of military readiness was because of the “armed forces we have ended up with at the end of the post-cold war era – a military right-sized for an era free of threat”.

What was the 1970s oil crisis, and are we heading for something worse?

Rachel Clun

The oil crisis in the 1970s sparked a global economic and financial crisis

The month-long closure of a crucial waterway for the global energy supply has sparked warnings the world is heading for problems worse than those caused by the 1970s oil crisis.

Lars Jensen, a shipping expert and former director at Maersk, told the BBC the impact of the US-Israeli war on Iran could be "substantially larger" than the economic chaos seen in the 1970s.

His comments follow a warning from the director of the International Energy Agency, Fatih Birol, earlier this month that the world is "facing the greatest global energy security threat in history".

"It is much bigger than what we had in the 1970s, the oil price shocks. It is also bigger than the natural gas price shock we have experienced after the Russia's invasion of Ukraine," he told the BBC.

But while the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is disruptive to global supplies, others argue the world today is more resilient.
What happened in the 1970s oil crisis?

The 1970s oil crisis was "fundamentally different" from today's, as the first oil shock back then was "the result of a deliberate policy decision", economist Dr Carol Nakhle, who is also the chief executive of Crystol Energy, told the BBC.

In October 1973, Arab oil producers placed an embargo on a group of countries led by the US over their support for Israel during the Yom Kippur war. That policy came alongside a co-ordinated cut to oil production.

"The result was a near quadrupling of oil prices within a few months," Nakhle said.

This led to fuel rationing in major oil-consuming countries, and Nakhle said it triggered a "global economic and financial crisis" with lasting implications.

4 April 2026

Fuel Shortages Raise Stability Risks in Myanmar

Andrew Nachemson

Last week, a Thai cargo ship ran aground near Iran’s Qeshm Island, two weeks after Iranian forces bombed the vessel as it tried to cross the Strait of Hormuz. Twenty sailors were rescued on the day of the attack as the Mayuree Naree drifted through an active war zone with a damaged engine, but three people remain unaccounted for.

The sailors were among many Southeast Asians caught up—in this case, literally—in the current Middle East conflict as it threatens to destabilize fuel supplies and derail economies. Around 20 percent of the world’s oil and natural gas transits the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has declared that no ships can transit the strait without its approval, aiming to jolt the global economy in retaliation for ongoing U.S. and Israeli attacks.

The end of Trumpism is nigh

Christopher Caldwell

Having Donald Trump as your president probably resembles being a heroin addict: you undergo regular episodes of sweating terror and mortal danger, the end result of which is to get you – at best – back to normal. A year ago, the Liberation Day tariffs nearly caused the American economy to seize up, before China mercifully let the matter drop. Then came the even more reckless decision to join Israel in bombing Iran’s Fordow nuclear installation; Iran agreed to halt hostilities just as it was figuring out how to penetrate Israeli airspace with its missiles.

But now the President has pressed his luck. He has joined Israel in a campaign of aerial assassination and bombardment against Iran – this time of an almost incredible violence – and has wound up trapped. American air power proved sufficient to kill Iran’s 86-year-old leader and dozens of schoolgirls, flatten apartment blocks and blow up much of the country’s navy, but not to neutralise Iran’s missiles, which have been able to rain destruction on America’s bases and Tel Aviv’s neighbourhoods.

Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 per cent of the world’s oil passes. The reversal has not brought out the President’s dignified side. He now boasts about the comprehensiveness of his glorious victory, while imploring America’s hitherto unconsulted allies to join him in a naval campaign to get the strait back open. The message seems to be: ‘Help! Help! We’re kicking ass!’

Trump has escaped other predicaments of his own making, but there is something different about this one. The attack on Iran is so wildly inconsistent with the wishes of his own base, so diametrically opposed to their reading of the national interest, that it is likely to mark the end of Trumpism as a project. Those with a claim to speak for Trumpism – Joe Rogan, Tucker Carlson, Megyn Kelly – have reacted to the invasion with incredulity. Trump may entertain himself with the presidency for the next three years (barring impeachment), but the mutual respect between him and his movement has been ruptured, and his revolution is essentially over.

The Xi Doctrine Zeros in on “High-Quality Development” for China’s Economic Future

Damien Ma

While the Strait of Hormuz crisis roiled the global economy, Chinese President Xi Jinping was putting his imprimatur on China’s economic and social blueprint. On March 12, the National People’s Congress approved China’s fifteenth Five-Year Plan, which covers this year through 2030. Central to the plan—Xi’s third as president—is the elevation of “high quality” development that approximates a “Xi doctrine” on the economy. The term is pervasive in the latest plan, appearing at least 50 percent more than in the previous iteration. It has clearly become an organizing principle associated with Xi himself, making its significance as much political as it is economic.

In many ways like a large corporation, China operates on five-year planning cycles that also overlap with its five-year political cycles. The plans are painstakingly put together across multiple government agencies over at least two years and reflect the top leadership’s political mandate. Once the plan is out, China aims to stick with it and marshals the entire bureaucracy and provinces to execute, with the intent of minimizing major corrections within the timeframe. Though the plan is sufficiently flexible to allow for adaptation to local conditions, every level of government is expected to execute within the parameters of the plan—their performance and political prospects depend on it.

Xi has attempted to reset the Chinese economy for years now with mixed success. First, he took the controversial step to water down the importance of the GDP target in the fourteenth Five-Year Plan, then he forced a rapid correction in the property market a couple years later that surprised many. Shortly after, he followed with a crackdown on China’s big tech companies that spooked investors. Throughout his tenure so far, Xi has repeatedly withheld major stimulus—to the frustration of markets.

Of course, resetting the Chinese economy isn’t simply a matter of having optimal policies. China has plenty of policies that are diligently read and analyzed by many. But the gap between what’s in a plan (what Beijing says) and what actually gets realized (what the rest of China does) is a political economy problem, not a policy one.

Why Russia and China Aren’t Helping Iran

Justin Mitchell

Both Moscow and Beijing stand to benefit from a prolonged war between the United States and Iran.

Iran is isolated, fighting a war for its survival. Yet China and Russia, Iran’s supposed partners, are conspicuously absent. Both countries condemned the attacks on Iran and called for an end to hostilities, but both stopped short of sending significant military aid. Meanwhile, the United States deploys additional personnel to the Middle East, including Marines and the 82nd Airborne Division, in preparation for a potential ground invasion.

Analysts comment that China’s lack of action isthe clearest sign of Beijing’s disorientation” and that Russia’s inability to aid a “key ally is undoubtedly embarrassing.”

Rather than indifference or neglect, however, both countries have more disciplined definitions of their national interests that restrain them from direct involvement. Additionally, both powers are likely to gain strategic advantages the longer the United States is involved in the war.

China regards Asia and its immediate neighbors as the central focus of its foreign policy and military strategy. While the Middle East is important to China’s energy and trade, Beijing has never viewed it as more critical than Taiwan, Japan, or Europe. Throughout its modern history, China avoided formal alliances. The only security treaty China has is with North Korea, dating to 1961, and the strength of that commitment is questionable.

While China has delivered arms to Iran over the years, its security relationship pales in comparison to China’s security ties with Russia or North Korea. Iran is neither a deep security partner nor located in China’s priority theater, giving Beijing little reason to intervene on its behalf.

Energy is the primary driver of China’s relations with Iran. In 2025 alone, China purchased over 80 percent of Iran’s oil exports, representing 13.4 percent of its overall oil imports. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which would cut off most oil exports from Iran and the other Gulf states, will affect China’s energy portfolio.