Indian Strategic Studies

26 March 2026

United States nuclear weapons, 2026

Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight-Boyle

The United States has embarked on a wide-ranging nuclear modernization program that will ultimately see every nuclear delivery system replaced with newer versions over the coming decades. In this issue of the Nuclear Notebook, we estimate that the United States maintains a stockpile of approximately 3700 warheads—an unchanged estimate from the previous year. Of these, only about 1770 warheads are deployed, while approximately 1930 are held in reserve. Additionally, approximately 1342 retired warheads are awaiting dismantlement, giving a total inventory of approximately 5042 nuclear warheads.

Of the approximately 1770 warheads that are deployed, 400 are on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, roughly 970 are on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 300 are at bomber bases in the United States, and approximately 100 tactical bombs are at European bases. The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, associate director Matt Korda, and senior research associates Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight-Boyle.

Pragmatism in the PRC’s South Asia Party Diplomacy

Shantanu Roy-Chaudhury

The International Liaison Department (ILD) of the Chinese Communist Party held 33 engagements in 2025 with representatives from South Asian countries. The department pursued particular interests in each country, reaching out to institutional, incumbent, and peripheral actors.

The greatest shift in the ILD’s South Asia strategy has been rapprochement with India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This, alongside meetings with opposition and peripheral parties, as well as media, think tanks, and youth groups, suggests that the CCP views party diplomacy not merely as a tool for building influence with smaller neighbors, as in previous years, but as a mechanism for managing major power relations.

Nepal’s Electoral Transformation

Martin Duffy

As I have learnt, observing Nepal’s elections, its dual-election system all but excludes “knock-out” victory. Typically, counting continues tediously for weeks. Party bosses sit cheek by jowl, quarrelling over paltry, disputed ballots. The 5 March election was called after youth protests in September 2025 forced the resignation of K. P. Sharma Oli. This year, the Gen Z vote brought seismic change. From e-day 5 March 2026, it was apparent that the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) under rapper-turned-politician, Balendra Shah, had broken the glass ceiling. The country’s allegedly corrupt political elite and entrenched power structures fell. Symbolically, Balendra himself trounced Oli even on his home turf. Thus, the barely four-year-old RSP pulled off a decisive majority. The CPN (Nepal’s Communist Party) simply folded like a box of cards.

How did Nepal electorally transform, and why is Gen Z so important? The immediate catalyst for the unrest was the Cabinet decision on 4 September 2025 to ban major social media platforms, including YouTube, Facebook, and WhatsApp, citing their failure to register under new, restrictive digital laws. This digital blackout was widely perceived as an attempt to stifle dissent and stymy communication networks used by activists. In response, a leaderless movement, predominantly organised by students, erupted on 8 September 2025. Protesters converged at Maitighar Mandala and marched toward the Federal Parliament Building, demanding an end to both the digital embargo and the Council of Ministers.

Opinion – Can the BRICS Adapt to a Transactional World?

Emilio Rodriguez

Over the last 15 years, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have become a relevant player in world politics. The origins of the bloc can be traced back to a 2001 Goldman Sachs report that highlighted the economic potential of Brazil, India, China, and Russia. With South Africa’s inclusion in 2011, the BRICS have since become an active and increasingly powerful actor in global affairs, aiming to represent the “voice” of the Global South. Led by China’s unrelenting rise in global trade, infrastructure finance, investment, technological innovation, and thirst for natural resources, the bloc has been seen as a potential counterbalance to the US-led liberal international order.

During the last decade, the commercial and financial interactions within the group have increased significantly, accounting for a significant share (20%) of the South-South trade. Moreover, the bloc has been searching to institutionalize with the creation of the New Development Bank (the so-called BRICS Bank) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), both alternatives to the World Bank and the IMF, respectively. These institutions have been accompanied by initiatives to involve their civil societies through projects focusing on education, science, sports, and culture. Indeed, the potential of the BRICS has become so appealing that various countries in the Global South have sought to become another letter in the acronym. In 2023, the BRICS invited several countries to join the bloc, and by 2026, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) became full members, while Bolivia, Cuba, Thailand, Vietnam, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uganda, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Uzbekistan became partner countries.

US intel doubts China will invade Taiwan in 2027

Gabriel Honrada

The March report, entitled 2026 Annual Threat Assessment of US Intelligence Community, says China has no fixed timetable for forcible unification and instead prefers to achieve it without force, even as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to build capabilities for a cross-strait campaign.

It assesses that Chinese officials view an amphibious assault as highly risky and complex, particularly given the likelihood of US intervention. China’s approach is shaped by PLA readiness, Taiwan’s domestic politics and uncertainty over US response, with conflict carrying major global economic consequences.

Trump is showing Beijing how to seize Taiwan

Brahma Chellaney

Since returning to office last year, U.S. President Donald Trump has ordered military strikes from the Caribbean and eastern Pacific to Africa and the Middle East, targeting alleged drug-smuggling boats and suspected terrorist groups. He has attacked Venezuela and kidnapped its leader, Nicolas Maduro. And he has joined Israel in a large-scale assault on Iran that amounts to a major escalation from last year’s strikes, which supposedly “obliterated” the country’s nuclear facilities. Meanwhile, he is tightening a noose around Cuba, in the hopes that the resulting humanitarian crisis will open the way for a “friendly takeover” of the island by the United States.

As Trump acts with open contempt for international law, China is taking notes. The Cuba model, in particular, offers a useful blueprint for Chinese President Xi Jinping to apply in pursuing his “historic mission” of “unification” with Taiwan. This is a live demonstration of how a superpower can strangle a country into submission.

Taiwan concerned by depletion of US missile stocks during Iran war

Kathrin Hille

Taiwan is concerned that the Iran war is depleting stocks of long-range cruise missiles that would be vital for the US to help defeat any Chinese invasion, making the country more vulnerable. The US is estimated to have fired hundreds of so-called Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs) during weeks of conflict in the Middle East, as well as ship-launched Tomahawk missiles.

Defence experts said both would be crucial in any conflict over Taiwan because they can be fired from outside the range of an enemy’s air defences, diminishing the risk for an attacking aircraft or naval vessel. “My concern is first and foremost that US forces are using up a lot of munitions which one assumes they would need so that an assault on Taiwan could be blunted,” a senior Taiwanese defence official told the FT. “This erodes deterrence.”

The U.S. has the world’s most advanced military, but the unforgiving economics of wars in Iran and Ukraine show quantity has a quality all its own

Jason Ma

The U.S. war on Iran has laid bare a dichotomy in the world’s most advanced military: high-tech weapons and AI have delivered stunning blows at unprecedented speed, while defending against the swarm of missiles and drones launched in retaliation have come at unsustainably lopsided costs.

Led by a massive air campaign, the U.S. has claimed more than 7,000 strikes on key sites, with Israel conducting a comparable number of sorties, as AI tools like Anthropic’s Claude recommend targets “much quicker in some ways than the speed of thought.” The relentless bombardment has decimated Iran’s military and leadership.

But helped by the mass production of cheap drones, the forces that are left still retain enough combat power to attack Gulf neighbors and scare away commercial tankers from the Strait of Hormuz, keeping 20% of the world’s oil bottled up.

A brave Marine colonel took on the Pentagon — and paid the price for it

Shyam Sankar

Everything about how Marine Colonel Drew Cukor ran Project Maven, the Department of Defense’s upstart AI initiative, put a target on his back. He infuriated the acquisition community, which is a powerful enemy in the Pentagon. Ultimately, the firestorm of criticism triggered a series of unfounded but unrelenting IG reports that would harry Cukor until his retirement. Some of the details that follow may seem obscure, but they’re essential to understanding the bureaucratic inertia and pettiness that hold our military back.

When Cukor launched Maven in 2017, the government still bought software like it bought hardware. This posed a problem. The phases of a hardware program are research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), followed by production and sustainment. Costs are very high initially, and then they decline. The Department of Defense treated software the same way. It paid a lot up front for a systems integrator to build software, then it paid very little when the software went into production for patches and minor security upgrades. Software was treated as a static, finished product once it entered production.

Ukrainian Air Defense Expertise: A Global Commodity

Kyiv’s deployment of air defense teams to Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and a U.S. base in Jordan reflects a shift in the global security marketplace, where operational experience is as valuable as hardware, reports Reuters’ Yuliia Dysa and Max Hunder. Rostyslav Khotin, Senior Editor of the Ukrainian Service at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, digs deeper into this transfer of expertise in a March 14 interview with Poland’s TVP World.

Here are a few of our takeaways from this story:

Demand Signal from the Gulf

Recent Iranian strikes have exposed gaps in Gulf air defense postures, particularly against low-cost, high-volume drone threats. In response, at least six regional actors requested Ukrainian support, according to Ukrainian officials

An air power expert explains why Iran is more powerful now than before the war

Zeeshan Aleem

President Donald Trump’s war with Iran is not going well. He began the conflict with a promise to use an air campaign to initiate regime change in as little as “two or three days.” But about three weeks in, Iran’s government, military and security forces remain highly functional. No popular uprising has emerged. And Iran’s government has seized control of the Strait of Hormuz, sending global oil prices surging and Trump into a panic.

Robert Pape, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, is one of the analysts who saw this situation coming a long way off. An expert on air power and regime change who has also taught at the U.S. Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Pape is exceptionally well suited to address the core dynamics underlying how the war on Iran is unfolding. His scholarship and his newsletter, “The Escalation Trap,” all point in one direction: Trump’s goal of toppling Iran’s regime from the air alone is doomed, because fighting a war only with air power is by its very nature ill suited to win hearts and minds.

AI in the information ecosystem and its impact on nuclear escalation

Herbert Lin

In recent years, analysts and scholars have noted that corruption or dysfunction in the global information ecosystem could have the effect of increasing nuclear risk.[1] In these works, corruption and dysfunction are interpreted broadly to include mis- and dis- information but also other information-related phenomena such as provocative or intemperate content, true-but-misleading information, or attentional diversions.

Now, the recent explosion in the capabilities of artificial intelligence—specifically, large language models (LLMs)—has led to the automated generation of novel text in enormous volumes and, increasingly, images and videos. For those interested in the creation of content to corrupt the information environment, there may be no better tool than a large language model. LLMs put former approaches to generating such content to shame. Also, LLM tools require far less expertise to produce and use, making the capabilities they afford much more broadly accessible and therefore expanding the number of possible threat actors as promoters of information dysfunction.

Cyber Scams and Human Security: Towards an India-Thailand-ASEAN Agenda

Sreeparna Banerjee

The rapid expansion of cybercrime and online scam networks across mainland Southeast Asia has emerged as one of the most complex non-traditional security challenges confronting the region today. What initially appeared as a digital and financial crime problem blurred the line between human slavery and organised transnational cybercrimes. For India, whose citizens are primary targets of online scams and victims of cyber slavery and are also at times complicit in the crime, this trend poses direct human security and diplomatic challenges. Within this context, India–Thailand cooperation, embedded in the broader Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) framework, assumes renewed strategic relevance as Thailand functions as a geographic gateway, key enforcement partner, and bridge within ASEAN, enabling India to address these networks more effectively at their source, transit corridors, and digital nodes rather than responding only reactively.

Beyond financial fraud, these operations increasingly generate multidimensional human security risks. Individuals trafficked into scam compounds face threats to their personal security through confinement, violence, and coercion, while victims of online fraud experience significant economic insecurity through large financial losses. At the same time, deceptive recruitment practices targeting young jobseekers and migrants expose structural vulnerabilities within digital labour markets and migration pathways across Asia.

25 March 2026

Moscow Reconsidering Europe’s Role in Ending War Against Ukraine

Pavel K. Baev

Russian President Vladimir Putin believes negotiating an end to his war against Ukraine directly with the United States will maximize his chances of success. Putin’s understanding that Washington’s attention has shifted to Iran informs his perception that the “situational pause” could be indefinite.

Kremlin narratives have long rejected European participation. Increasing diplomatic activism by actors linked to European Union initiatives and outreach by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, however, is gradually reshaping Russian expectations about negotiation formats that include Europe.

Forget Trump’s flailing — Iran’s the one without an endgame

RN Prasher

Much has been written about President Donald Trump’s alleged lack of clearly defined goals and strategic objectives in the war with Iran. But the more pressing and consequential question has received far less attention: Does the Iranian regime have an endgame at all?

So far, Iran has shown no interest in a ceasefire while doing everything in its diminished power to expand the war across much of the Middle East and beyond — in the process torpedoing the global economy. Iran’s goals, on the other hand, are less clear. Ayatollah Khamenei talked tough at the start of this war, threatening the US with a “strong punch.” A message, purportedly by his son and successor Mojtaba Khamenei, who has not been seen in public since his elevation, rejected any talk of de-escalation and avowed to bring the US and Israel to “their knees.”

Caught Between India’s Military Ambitions and Green Promises: The Future of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands

Genevieve Mallet

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands stretch across the Bay of Bengal, between the Indian mainland and the Strait of Malacca. Of the 836 islands and rocky outcrops that make up the archipelago, only 31 are inhabited, home to around 400,000 people. Known for their turquoise waters, dense forests and multicoloured pigeons, the islands are also home to six indigenous tribes, including the isolated Sentinelese.

Yet beyond their natural beauty, the islands have become central to India’s maritime strategy and development ambitions, placing them at the heart of a growing tension between environmental preservation, renewable energy goals and military expansion.

In 2021 the Indian government announced the Great Nicobar Island Development Project, a plan to construct an international Container Transshipment Terminal, a civil and military airport, a township, and a 450 MVA gas and solar based power plant by 2050. In February of this year, the National Green Tribunal cleared the way for this ₹92,000 crore (USD $10 billion) mega-infrastructure project, citing its “strategic importance”, despite the risks posed to the islands’ biodiversity and indigenous populations.

China’s National Party Congress 2026: defence remains a priority amid fiscal challenges

Lucie Béraud-Sudreau

On 5 March, Premier Li Qiang delivered his government work report at the opening session of the National People’s Congress (NPC). The speech contained economic growth targets for 2026, including for 4.5% real-terms growth in GDP, the slowest since 1991.

This more modest economic objective is unsurprising in the light of the current headwinds in the Chinese economy. As highlighted in recent IISS Charting China analysis, the government is grappling with weak consumer confidence, high urban unemployment and a falling property market. The goal also aligns with the latest International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections. The IMF’s January 2026 forecasts indicated an estimated 4.5% GDP growth in 2026, followed by a slowdown to 4% in 2027.

The central bank’s governor, Pan Gongsheng, and Minister of Finance Lan Foan reportedly indicated in 2025 that China would require an annual growth rate of at least 4.17% over the next decade to become a medium-level developed country in terms of GDP per capita by 2035. GDP targets are therefore unlikely to dip significantly below 4.5% in the near term.

Iran: Relearning the Importance of Waging a War, Not Just Fighting One

James Michael Dubik

Our operations in Iran are again teaching that war involves more than fighting. Wars must be fought and waged. Fighting is a necessary part of war, and the U.S. military is very good at it. Our military won every tactical engagement in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. American citizens have every reason to ask, therefore, if we fight so successfully, why did we lose in Vietnam and Afghanistan and why was success in Iraq so limited? And will the same thing happen in Iran?

These are questions are about America’s war-waging capacity. Fighting succeeds when military forces integrate and synchronize, among themselves and with allies, seven important battlefield functions—intelligence, maneuver, fires (air and ground), protection (from enemy ground, air, cyber, and space threats), mobility/counter-mobility, sustainment, and command and control. Successful fighting requires that all seven stay in synch, as much as possible, from start to finish. This requires constant adaptation because fighting is unpredictable. Change, fear, fog, friction, and surprise are the only constants in fighting. Perfection is never the standard; being better than your enemy is. Even allowing for inevitable mistakes, the U.S. military, fighting as a joint force and usually with coalition partners, are expert professionals at fighting well.

The Stunning Failure of Iranian Deterrence

Nicole Grajewski and Ankit Panda

Although it was the United States and Israel that instigated attacks on Iran on February 28, leaders in Tehran deserve some of the blame for failing to effectively deter their adversaries. As the now deceased commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, once put it, maintaining deterrence is like riding a bicycle: “You have to keep pedaling all the time, or else the bicycle will fall.” Over the past three years, Iran has started to lose its balance; now it has tipped over.

In recent decades, Tehran developed what it believed was a system of layered deterrence. It invested in conventional forces and air defenses to protect its nuclear program and retaliate against Israel and U.S. bases throughout the region. Through a sprawling network of partners known as the axis of resistance—Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Houthi forces in Yemen, and Shiite militias in Iraq—Iran promised to escalate any attack on its homeland into a regional affair. And Iran’s nuclear program would function as the ultimate backstop. Tehran hoped that the mere development of an advanced civil nuclear program—not an actual weapon—would make the country too dangerous for adversaries to ignore, even as the ambiguity of the program would make it hard for adversaries to justify an attack against it. If necessary, Iran’s civilian nuclear program could be quickly repurposed for military use.

WARDEN’S FIVE RINGS AND REGIME CHANGE IN IRAN

Jacob Stoil

In 1995 Colonel John Warden published The Enemy as a System, in which he posited a five-ring model for understanding and targeting enemy states, with leadership at the center and fielded forces as the outermost ring. In between were rings representing the population, infrastructure, and resources like energy. His work followed the tradition of B.H. Liddel Hart’s The Strategy of Indirect Approach and Giulio Douhet’s Command of the Air in searching for a way to defeat an enemy without the costly and ultimately attritional endeavor of grinding down their military to achieve victory. The result of this model was the concept that when properly applied, the use of airpower could allow the United States to bypass the outermost rings and target the enemy leadership directly. This “decapitation” would at the very least cause complete strategic paralysis in the enemy and possibly even cause regime collapse but in either case, it would bring victory.

The war in Iran began with one of the most effective decapitation strikes in history, but while it may have caused temporary paralysis, it neither brought down the regime nor brought victory. This is because while Warden’s five ring model may apply, the importance of the rings changes radically based on the nature of the state and the system. Bringing down a robust regime like Iran is still possible but requires a radically different approach from defeating a fragile one.

Broader Lessons of the Middle East War

Alan Dowd

The U.S. and Europe spent much of the last 20 years trying to induce and incentivize Iran to behave like a normal country. In response, Iran trained, funded and equipped Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and militias in Iraq; supported brutal dictators (Syria) and undermined nascent democracies (Iraq); continued its drive for nuclear weapons; locked out IAEA inspectors; harbored al-Qaeda’s leader; used proxies to kill Americans; attacked international shipping; bankrolled the beastly Hamas assault of October 7, 2023; tried to assassinate a former U.S. president; and massacred 36,000 of its own people.

In response to the U.S.-Israel air campaign, Iran would be justified to strike Israeli and U.S. military targets. But in keeping with its outlaw nature, Iran sprayed the entire region with terror weapons—striking desalination facilities in Bahrain; unfettering Hezbollah (again) to pound Israel with rockets; hitting civilian airports in Azerbaijan, the UAE and Kuwait; bombing hotels in the UAE and Iraq; attacking commercial ships; firing cluster-munitions at population centers.

How Iranian Missiles Could Secure Israel-GCC Normalization

Joseph Epstein

Three weeks ago, it would have been unthinkable for Al Jazeera to run an op-ed arguing that the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran was working. The Qatari state-funded outlet has been at the vanguard of the information war against Israel since the Hamas terror attacks of October 7, 2023. Indeed, it employed at least six journalists who simultaneously served as operatives in Hamas’ military wing and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, giving terrorist fighters cover as credentialed press.

Yet on March 16, Al Jazeera published exactly that article—written from Doha by an academic living under Iranian missile alerts. When the house organ of Qatari soft power begins making the case for American and Israeli war aims, something fundamental has shifted.

U.S. Risks Repeating Its Iraq Errors in Iran

Robert Ellis

George Santayana’s sage observation, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it,” has come back to haunt us. In this case, the Trump administration’s war with Iran is a repeat performance of the war with Iraq in 2003, but with a global impact.

Robert Draper’s definitive account, To Start a War, is a helpful reminder. The book deals with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz’s “Sisyphean quest” to bring down Iraq’s leader Saddam Hussein, which culminated in the invasion of Iraq. The process involved convincing the Bush administration as well as the American public that Saddam was behind the 9/11 attacks and in possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

What constitutes victory in an ‘asymmetric’ war with Iran?

Ned Temko

“Gone” was President Donald Trump’s verdict this week on the state of Iran’s navy, its air force, its anti-aircraft batteries, its radar installations – and “perhaps most importantly, its leaders.” And on all of the above, with just a bit of his trademark hyperbole, he was absolutely right. Yet even with tit-for-tat attacks on energy facilities threatening to widen the conflict further, Mr. Trump has been making another, broader claim: “We won.”

Why We Wrote This

In the “asymmetric” Iran war, victory looks different for each side: The U.S. and Israel must decisively win – or convincingly claim they have – while the Iranian regime only has to survive.

And that isn’t true. At least not yet.

Nearly three weeks into the conflict, he has come face-to-face with the sobering complexities of what security experts call “asymmetric war” – an overwhelmingly powerful military force pitted against an ostensibly far weaker adversary.

Ukraine Wants to Cash in on Iran’s Drone Threat

Sam Skove

Iran’s aerial assault on Arab Gulf states—now in its third week—has been dominated by waves of Shahed drones, which are cheaper and easier to mass produce than the ballistic missiles Tehran has also launched. So much so that data released by several Gulf states indicate they have thus far faced roughly three Iranian drones for every ballistic missile.

Ukraine, which has been dealing with similar drones from Russia over four years of war, is looking to cash in on that experience—in terms of earning both goodwill and actual investment by dispatching teams of experts to the Middle East and fielding requests to its companies making counterdrone technology.

How the Iran War Could Hit AI—and Then the Economy

Andrew R. Chow

The AI industry, and specifically its data center investments, are essentially holding up the U.S. economy, accounting for ‌39% of U.S. GDP growth in the first three quarters of last year, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The Iran War could threaten that growth in several ways. Paul Kedrosky, an investor and research fellow at MIT’s Institute for the Digital Economy, tells TIME that the onset of the war has made him “vastly more” concerned about the systemic economic risks related to AI, because “the consequences are unknowable in terms of how this ripples through this highly interconnected energy and information grid.”

Energy— Many AI data centers, which train AI systems like ChatGPT and process their queries, are powered by natural gas. While Iran’s first big resource strain has been on oil, gas facilities have been targeted in the Gulf. Analysts say they could take months to repair, leading to higher gas prices worldwide. European natural gas prices surged by as much as 30 percent on Thursday.

The Industrial Window of War: How to Measure Russia’s Munitions Throughput—and How to Disrupt It

Cosimo Meneguzzo and Fabrizio Minniti

Russia’s battlefield endurance in Ukraine is determined not by the size of Soviet‑era stockpiles but by a temporary industrial window—a period when production plus imports outpaces daily shell consumption. In 2025 Russian factories churned out about seven million artillery, mortar, tank and rocket rounds, excluding guided multiple-launch rocket system and loitering munitions—roughly nineteen thousand rounds per day—while open‑source estimates put Russian expenditure at ten to fifteen thousand rounds per day. As long as production and imports meet or exceed consumption, Moscow can sustain the war and rebuild reserves. When throughput falls below usage, the window closes and operational tempo shrinks.

Allied strategy, therefore, should not be guided by counting stockpiles, but by measuring—and taking steps to influence—throughput. Public intelligence reports, defense journalism, and other open‑source data combine to offer a view of that throughput. In some instances, audited totals are available; elsewhere educated estimates are necessary. But by combining these and acknowledging the distinction, it is possible not only to identify a range of the most likely current throughput, but also to assign a degree of certainty to it. The industrial window concept can then be applied to both Russia and its opponents, highlighting how cross‑theater demands shape ammunition availability and offering practical implications for planners.

My Introduction to Michael Smith's “Accountability Is Not Dead—It’s Just Selective,”

Donald Vandergriff

Michael Smith’s latest article, “Accountability Is Not Dead—It’s Just Selective,” strikes at the heart of a profound crisis in contemporary American institutions. Smith rightly observes that what was once a foundational principle, personal and institutional accountability rooted in rigid standards, has devolved into selective enforcement where rules apply only to some.

As he powerfully states, “When the rules only apply to some people, they aren’t rules anymore. They’re preferences.”¹ This selective accountability is not merely a media failing, as illustrated by the CNN episode involving Abby Phillip and Ana Navarro during coverage of the recent ISIS-inspired attack in New York. It is a symptom of a deeper cultural and structural decay that permeates our society, including our most critical institution: the United States military.

Influence by Design A Network Strategy for Integrated Deterrence

Robert S. Hinck

The 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Security Strategy place integrated deterrence as the centerpiece of U.S. strategy. Integrated deterrence—which “entails working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, all instruments of U.S. national power, and [America’s] network of Alliances and partnerships”—is to be tailored to specific circumstances and applies a coordinated, multifaceted approach to reducing competitors’ perceptions of the net benefits of aggression relative to restraint.1 As this lengthy description suggests, integrated deterrence draws on multiple approaches to deterrence to create a holistic strategy in pursuit of American national interests.2 It represents a far broader view than previous U.S. approaches to deterrence—one that can succeed if made actionable.

While the strategic vision laid out in the NDS is praiseworthy in its scope and direction, criticisms remain.3 First, operational concerns include the apparent tasking of the Department of Defense (DOD)—now the Department of War (DOW)—with the execution of integrated deterrence. This tasking is problematic given the stated intent to align all instruments of national power, not just the military. It also leads to doubt as to whether the interagency community is capable of coordinating a unity of effort

Japan’s Next Moonshot: Leadership in High-Performance Computing Coupled with Quantum Computing Technology

Ulrike Schaede

Through public-private collaboration, Japan is pushing the technology frontier in next-generation high-performance computing (HPC) and quantum computing, beyond current-generation artificial intelligence (AI). Sizable investments are beginning to yield results, from building the infrastructure for next-generation hardware to new start-ups. This new moonshot leverages Japan’s long-standing core competencies in high-level precision manufacturing, hardware excellence, system-level engineering, computing design innovation, and industrial policy. It is also a central piece in Japan’s response to the rise of geoeconomics. Rather than viewing the world in only zero-sum terms, Japan’s positioning begins with a conviction that nobody can win alone in the new world of HPC and quantum computing. To balance power relations in the U.S.-Japan security umbrella, Japan’s national economic security strategy is centered on forging inextricable tie-ups with the United States.

Japan’s New Moonshot: Quantum and High-Performance Computing

AI is on everybody’s mind, in Japan just as much as everywhere else. While Japan may have been late in developing its own AI, there is now substantial investment and activity around domestic AI design. These are often specialized to certain areas; for example, the NEC cotomi focuses on helping companies accelerate their digital transformation. In October 2025 a new government push was announced to build more domestic AI in order to reduce dependency on U.S. and Chinese AI models.[1]

Starlink Has Privatized Geopolitics

Robert Muggah

Starlink is far more than a commercial connectivity service. It is strategic infrastructure that increasingly shapes how wars are fought, how states manage internal unrest, and how criminal networks operate in ungoverned spaces. What makes Starlink so politically consequential is not just its globe-spanning reach but also the governance model behind it.

A private company is now a gatekeeper in orbit, helping decide who connects as well as where, under what conditions, and with what technical constraints. In a growing number of conflicts, these decisions carry military and political effects that states struggle to replicate or control. If many strategic supply chains now depend on private firms, Starlink is an unusually concentrated case of private discretion over public security functions.

After Chagos Deal, PRC Seeks to Alter Indian Ocean Balance

Mauritius supports the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on virtually every geopolitical issue while receiving Chinese diplomatic and economic support for its own priorities, particularly over its claim to sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. This allows Beijing to secure reliable political backing and a strategically positioned partner in the Indian Ocean at relatively low cost, strengthening its influence in a region where U.S. and Indian interests intersect.

Beijing has built a substantial economic and institutional presence in Mauritius. Through a landmark 2019 free trade agreement, the first Beijing signed with an African state, and Chinese state-led investments, it has amassed long-term economic leverage and strategic access abroad. Huawei is the island’s primary partner for surveillance, connectivity, and digital infrastructure. Concentrating these partnerships under one vendor lowers technical barriers to potential data access or network exploitation.

Credibility vs. Speed: Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Information War

Ashraf Aldmour

The Gaza conflict underscores a central fact of modern war. The decisive contest is often fought in the information environment, where attention, emotion, and perceived legitimacy shape what governments can do and what publics will tolerate. US doctrine increasingly treats information as a foundational element of military activity and calls on the Joint Force to operationalize informational power to shape perceptions and behavior through the Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment (JCOIE) and the DoD OIE Strategy. Operations in the information environment are defined as integrated actions intended to affect drivers of behavior by informing audiences and influencing relevant actors, as described in a CRS report.

That environment was especially contested in Gaza because the war unfolded under intense global visibility and constant online scrutiny. Every strike, casualty report, and humanitarian convoy could trigger immediate diplomatic pressure and rapid amplification on social platforms. In practice, Israel and Hamas ran parallel campaigns to shape interpretation, mobilize supporters, deter adversaries, and limit external intervention. Hamas was a central driver of messaging from Gaza, but it was not the only source.

Seven U.S. allies back potential Strait of Hormuz coalition

Barak Ravid

Seven U.S. allies announced in a joint statement on Thursday their support for a potential coalition to reopen the strait of Hormuz for commercial ships and oil tankers. Reality check: The statement does not include any commitment to send naval vessels or other resources to make that happen. For now, it's largely a gesture to placate President Trump, who has railed against allies for declining to help secure the strait and warned that a failure to do so could undermine the future of NATO.

Why it matters: The strait closure has become the main crisis for the White House in the war.As long as the Iranian blockade holds and Gulf oil remains trapped, President Trump can't end the war and declare victory even if he wants to.

Driving the news: The White House has been trying both military and diplomatic means to unlock the Hormuz crisis.The U.S. military is conducting strikes on Iranian anti-ship positions along the shores of the Strait of Hormuz to decimate Iran's ability to attack oil tankers.

Meanwhile, the White House and State Department have tried to build a coalition of countries to provide ships, other military assets and political backing for a mission to escort ships or otherwise provide a secure route for shipping in and out of the Gulf.

The Weight of War and Reclaiming Combat Agility

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Aaron McClendon argues in this latest Special Warfare Journal article that the U.S. Army must prioritize mobility and agility over excessive protection and equipment as it transitions from the Global War on Terror to large-scale combat operations. McClendon explains that modern soldiers carry significantly heavier loads than previous generations, which degrades mobility, increases fatigue, and reduces lethality.

He situates this problem within a broader institutional transition in which the Army must rethink doctrine, force structure, and sustainment practices. Overreliance on protection, logistics, and technological solutions can create vulnerabilities rather than advantages. Ultimately, McClendon contends that combat effectiveness depends on an agile force capable of rapid maneuver, risk acceptance, and operational adaptability in contested environments.

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