23 May 2026

The War Against Iran

The war between the United States, Israel, and Iran commenced on February 28, 2026, following a June 2025 12-day conflict that targeted Iran’s nuclear assets. This war reflects decades of diplomatic failure, the culmination of events since October 7, 2023, and a crumbling international order, driven by Iran’s ideological delusions, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s security obsession, and US President Donald Trump’s high-risk improvisation. The conflict began with the Israeli Air Force’s decapitation strike against Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and top commanders. The joint US–Israeli campaign systematically erased Iran’s conventional capabilities, defense-industrial base, energy facilities, and civilian infrastructure. Despite immense damage, Iran’s system proved resilient, retaliating by directing over 80% of its projectiles at Gulf states—44% against the UAE, 24% against Kuwait, and 10% against Bahrain—damaging critical infrastructure and disrupting maritime traffic. A new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, was elected. The war risks Iran accelerating its nuclear breakout, leaving a weakened, militarized, and angry Iranian regime poised to disrupt regional geo-economic and geopolitical relationships, with no clear American victory in sight.

5 Iran War Scenarios as Trump Weighs Options

President Donald Trump is facing a critical juncture regarding the ongoing ceasefire with Iran, which appears on the brink of collapse after weeks of a testy pause in fighting. Trump has warned Tehran that "the clock is ticking" and threatened "much harder" strikes unless Iran improves its offer for a deal, with a national security team meeting scheduled for Tuesday to discuss military options. Five plausible scenarios are outlined: renewed U.S. strikes for a narrower initial deal, an Iranian compromise driven by economic pain, a managed stalemate with continued shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf states entering as open combatants, or the ceasefire surviving in name while economic pressure quietly damages Iran. The article suggests the fifth scenario, a "War as Ceasefire," is already taking shape, where economic coercion continues without a formal return to war, blurring constitutional lines regarding the War Powers Resolution and potentially becoming Trump's most durable Iran policy.

What Caused a Midair Crash That Killed Six U.S. Troops in the Iran War?

The Atlantic  |  Nancy Youssef, Shane Harris
On March 12, two U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotankers, functioning as flying gas stations, collided high over Iraq, two weeks into the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran. One plane crashed, killing six service members, constituting almost half of U.S. military fatalities in the conflict. U.S. Central Command initially claimed the incident occurred in “friendly airspace” without hostile fire. However, initial intelligence reports, described by two current and one former official, suggested Iran-backed militias fired anti-aircraft weapons in the western Anbar province around the collision time, potentially forcing evasive actions. CENTCOM leaders, citing different, more highly classified information, dismissed these initial reports, asserting militias never fired surface-to-air missiles capable of threatening the aircraft, suggesting detected launches were aimed at ground targets. An Air Force-led investigation is expected to conclude the disaster was an “avoidable mishap” by pilots operating in congested airspace.

It’s Time the United States Put the ‘Pivot to Asia’ Behind

Real Clear Defense  |  Andrew A. Michta
The Trump administration's decision to halt U.S. rotational deployment to Poland highlights a persistent strategic shortsightedness, exacerbated by the "pivot to Asia" policy initiated in 2012. This "Asia First" strategy, driven by cost concerns after the $8 trillion GWOT, has dangerously underfunded the U.S. military in both Atlantic and Pacific theaters, depleting munitions and reducing deterrence capabilities. Dismissing European NATO allies, despite their rearmament efforts and Europe's role as an indispensable strategic platform, further undermines U.S. global power projection. Attempts to reset relations with Russia based on personal diplomacy rather than structural realities also reflect a poor understanding of Moscow's imperial outlook. Europe remains crucial for U.S. global power projection, offering a cost-effective way to impose costs on Russia and limit China's influence. A revanchist Russia, supported by China, Iran, and North Korea, threatens the post-1945 security system, with immediate implications for American homeland defense via Atlantic routes. The U.S. must refocus on core geostrategic principles, recognizing NATO's importance and the interconnectedness of Atlantic and Pacific theaters.

Asking the wrong question about Qatar

Asia Times  |  Leon Hadar
The recurring Washington argument over Qatar's alignment reveals US foreign policy's struggle to categorize states outside binary friend/foe frameworks. Qatar, a small peninsula nation of roughly 300,000 citizens, strategically hedges its position, hosting the largest American military installation in the Middle East, Al Udeid Air Base, while also facilitating indirect channels to groups like Hamas and the Taliban at explicit US request. This "outsourced diplomatic ambiguity" allows the US to engage adversaries for purposes such as Afghanistan withdrawal negotiations, post-October 7 hostage talks, and Gaza reconstruction architecture, despite finding some Qatari relationships distasteful. Legitimate concerns exist regarding the Qatar Investment Authority’s enormous footprint in American universities and lobbying firms, and historical terror financing permissiveness, though this has improved markedly since the mid-2010s. The US must define its interests and redlines precisely, evaluating the strategic bargain's costs and benefits rather than questioning Qatar's character.

Five Clocks, One Empire: A Converging Multipolar World challenging the American Hegemony

Niti Shastra  |  Navroop Singh, Himja Parekh
The ongoing Iran conflict, now prolonged for over two months, has closed the Strait of Hormuz, triggering a convergence of global economic and strategic pressures challenging U.S. hegemony. Washington faces simultaneous crises: surging Japanese Government Bond (JGB) yields, with the 30-year JGB yield crossing 4.10 percent, are unwinding the yen carry trade, leading to significant Japanese sales of U.S. Treasuries, including ¥4.67 trillion ($29.6 billion) in Q1. Concurrently, U.S. Treasury yields are climbing, with the 30-year hitting 5.19 percent, driven by inflation (PPI at 6.0 percent, CPI at 3.8 percent) and a $1.2 trillion deficit in H1 FY2026. Global crude oil shortages are imminent as the Hormuz blockade cuts 20 million barrels per day, depleting U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to 384.1 million barrels, nearing critical levels. These dynamics accelerate de-dollarization efforts and threaten global financial stability, with China and other nations reducing U.S. Treasury holdings.

Iran as Vietnam, Ukraine as Korea

Foreign Affairs  |  Gideon Rose
The Trump administration's intervention in Iran has rapidly mirrored the Johnson administration's Vietnam policy, progressing through entry, escalation, frustrated stalemate, and negotiations within just two months. The article posits that the conflict is now on a trajectory akin to the Nixon administration's extrication efforts, suggesting a swift, unsatisfying deal and a conclusion within another few months, followed by inevitable recriminations. While acknowledging inherent differences between the conflicts in Iran and Vietnam, such as distinct regions and ideologies, the analysis draws a compelling parallel between their strategic dynamics. Furthermore, the piece extends this comparative framework to the Ukraine conflict, likening its potential outcome to the Korean War, thereby suggesting that similar geopolitical engagements often conclude in comparable, often unsatisfactory, ways for intervening powers. This rapid historical compression underscores the article's central argument about the predictable patterns of protracted military interventions.

How the Hormuz Energy Crisis Is Reshaping US, South Korea, and Japan Energy Cooperation

National Interest  |  Jane Nakano
The Iran War has created significant momentum for the United States, South Korea, and Japan to establish shared strategic oil and LNG reserve arrangements, driven by the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz and damage to Persian Gulf energy infrastructure. South Korea and Japan, highly reliant on Middle Eastern oil (over 70% and 90% respectively) and natural gas (20% and 11% respectively as of 2025), face severe energy security challenges. The United States has emerged as a critical backstop, with crude exports jumping from 4 million barrels per day (mm bpd) in 2025 to 5.2 mm bpd in March and April, and Asia-bound shipments increasing by 65% year-over-year. US naphtha exports to Japan reached their highest since December 2021, and the US became South Korea's largest naphtha supplier. US LNG exports also surged by 15% in March to 11 million tons, with Asia-bound shipments increasing 175% since late February. Trilateral cooperation could involve leasing storage for US oil in South Korea and Japan, offering priority purchasing rights, or establishing virtual strategic gas reserves to enhance economic resilience and US national security interests.

Does Iran Hold All the Cards in the Strait of Hormuz?

National Interest  |  Paul J. Saunders
Iran's leaders, like Russia before them, are learning that threatening an oil crisis loses leverage once the crisis begins. President Donald Trump claims to have secured Chinese President Xi Jinping's commitment to forgo arming Iran, while the US and Iran engage in a half-hearted cease-fire and talks. The article argues that while a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz would be costly globally, it would be far more disastrous for Iran, which is already in a dire economic state. Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine and subsequent cut-off of pipeline gas to Europe demonstrated that Europe adapted, creating a new energy system and diminishing Russia's leverage. The US, with its singular leadership and superior military capabilities compared to Europe's combined forces, would likely harden its position and escalate if Iran forces a global oil crisis, potentially leading to demands for decisive action against Tehran. A Strait of Hormuz shutdown is a card, not a checkmate.

Beyond Russian Gas: Trade-Offs in EU Liquefied Natural Gas Diversification

Center for Strategic and International Studies  |  Raj Sawhney, Joseph Majkut
The European Union's pursuit of liquefied natural gas (LNG) diversification, moving beyond its historical reliance on Russian pipeline gas, presents significant strategic trade-offs. This shift, accelerated by geopolitical events, necessitates substantial investment in new regasification infrastructure and long-term supply contracts, primarily from the United States and Qatar. While enhancing energy security and reducing Moscow's leverage, increased LNG dependence introduces new vulnerabilities, including exposure to volatile global spot markets and potential competition with Asian buyers. Furthermore, the long-term environmental implications of expanding fossil fuel infrastructure conflict with the EU's climate goals, creating a policy dilemma. The strategic decision involves balancing immediate energy needs and geopolitical imperatives against future decarbonization targets and the risk of stranded assets. This complex energy transition requires careful consideration of economic costs, supply chain resilience, and diplomatic relations with key energy producers.

Salvific User Error: A Classical Take on AI and Nuclear Deterrence

IISS | Nathan Orlando
Incorporating artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear protocols risks disastrously suppressing human reason, which historically prevented nuclear war despite rapid technological innovations. While no government publicly endorses AI making launch decisions, its complete exclusion is unrealistic given the number of nuclear actors, innovation incentives, and verification difficulties. AI offers operational advantages like speed, potentially reducing decision windows to three minutes with advanced hypersonic systems, and could perfect a "Dead Hand" system, especially tempting for nations like China with smaller, more vulnerable arsenals. However, historical incidents, including the 1960 NORAD false alarm, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis near-misses (e.g., Vasili Arkhipov's veto on B-59, the Duluth bear incident, U-2 error, Okinawa launch order), 1979-1980 NORAD computer errors, Stanislav Petrov's 1983 judgment, and the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident, demonstrate human fallibility but also the critical role of prudential judgment in averting nuclear catastrophe. These events underscore the danger of fully automating nuclear responses.

Strange Days: AI and the Next Industrial Revolution

IISS | Paul Fraioli
Advanced artificial intelligence (AI) and converging technologies are propelling humanity into a new industrial revolution, mirroring the transformative scale of the Second Industrial Revolution. AI agents, capable of sustained, multi-step autonomous action, are rapidly maturing, with large language models improving by a factor of 21 every two years since 2010. This technological shift is underpinned by simultaneous advancements in lithium-ion batteries (costs down to $108/kWh), solar photovoltaics (now $0.26/watt), specialized semiconductors (NVIDIA's parallel processing), sophisticated sensors (LIDAR from $75,000 to under $200), and efficient brushless electric motors. These foundational developments enable the mass production of advanced and humanoid robots, capable of operating tools and systems designed for humans. China possesses a significant advantage in industrial scale, installing 54% of industrial robots in 2024 and leading in open-weight AI models and electricity generation. In the West, Elon Musk's companies (xAI, Tesla, SpaceX) are vertically integrating these core technologies, with xAI's Colossus facility alone requiring 300 megawatts for 200,000 advanced graphics chips. This convergence is projected to dramatically alter economic growth and labor dynamics by the late 2020s or early 2030s.

The Growing Gap Between SOF Missions and SOF Resources

Real Clear Defense  |  Rep. Ronny Jackson
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) faces a significant and growing disparity between its expanding global mission requirements and its stagnant budget, which has seen a 14% reduction in purchasing power since 2019. Despite SOF being central to America's counterterrorism strategy and increasingly critical in great power competition against adversaries like China, Iran, and Russia, its budget accounts for just over 1% of the total Department of War Budget. Recent high-risk operations, such as the rescue of two downed airmen in Iran and a precision mission targeting Venezuelan dictator Nicolรกs Maduro, underscore SOF's unique capabilities in complex environments. However, USSOCOM was forced to deny approximately 70 requests for SOF capabilities last year due to resource limitations. A proposed increase to approximately 2% of the defense budget is advocated to ensure SOF maintains readiness, resilience, and capability in an evolving security landscape, providing precise, scalable, and effective options for national security.

US Army’s 7th Infantry Division, 1st MDTF to merge as Multi-Domain Command-Pacific

Defense News  |  J.D. Simkins
The U.S. Army is establishing the Multi-Domain Command-Pacific (MDC-PAC), a new two-star command, by merging the 7th Infantry Division and the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force. Announced at the 2026 Land Forces of the Pacific Symposium and Exposition in Hawaii, this reorganization aims to position the service for future conflicts, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Lt. Gen. Matthew McFarlane, commanding general of I Corps, stated the MDC-PAC will integrate the 7th ID’s two Stryker brigades and a combat aviation brigade with a multidomain task force to share fires, space, electronic warfare, cyber, and intelligence capabilities across the joint operational area. The transition, beginning in mid-June, will see 1st MDTF soldiers re-patch into the 7th ID. This strategic move enhances long-range sense and strike capabilities, crucial for curtailing emerging threats from China and North Korea. It also underscores the importance of Indo-Pacific collaboration, as highlighted by Brig. Gen. William Parker of the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, and follows the multinational Exercise Balikatan 2026, which included the U.S., Philippines, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, France, and Canada.

Air Force MQ-9 fleet drops to 135 aircraft after Iran combat losses

Defense News  |  Michael Scanlon
The U.S. Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper fleet has decreased to approximately 135 aircraft due to combat attrition during "Operation Epic Fury" against Iran, as reported by Lt. Gen. David Tabor to the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Airland. Despite these losses, the service maintains its commitment to 56 combat lines worldwide and is actively seeking to backfill the inventory of MQ-9As this fiscal year. Recognizing the Reaper's vulnerability in contested airspace, Maj. Gen. Christopher Niemi signed a requirements document on May 11 for a next-generation, more attritable platform. This successor aims for modularity, open architecture, and mass production, with a target cost significantly lower than the current $50 million MQ-9. An April 14 Request for Information for "Attritable ISR Aircraft" garnered over 50 industry responses, emphasizing a need for low-cost, fast-to-field ISR mass with a threshold range of 200 km and 4-hour loiter time. This initiative marks the most significant step towards replacing the Reaper in over five years, following previous shelved efforts.

From Kill Chain to Kill Web: What the New Era of Air and Missile Defense Really Demands

Operation Epic Fury and subsequent regional defense against Iranian retaliation validated the urgent need for a strategic shift from a linear "kill chain" to a networked "kill web" in air and missile defense. Retired U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Matthew Isler's assessment highlights the current architecture's structural limits against modern, massed threats like ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, which overwhelm decision-making and exhaust interceptor magazines. While coalition defenses achieved tactical success, they revealed "strategic fragility" and unsustainable interceptor consumption rates, with attacks penetrating critical assets at fifteen U.S. military sites. The kill web concept, where any sensor cues any shooter and the network acts as the fire-control system, demands integrated offensive-defensive operations to reduce attack salvo at its source. Overcoming institutional and cultural barriers, including sovereign data reluctance and ingrained "kill chain" mental models, is crucial for adopting architectures like IBCS, ensuring coalition interoperability, and achieving network-speed transitions from defense to offense.

20 Characteristics of Special Operations by LTG Samuel V. Wilson

Maxoki161  |  LTG Samuel V. Wilson 
LTG Samuel V. Wilson's foundational insights delineate 20 characteristics, planning suggestions, six requirements, and seven principles for special operations. Special operations are inherently political, strategic in impact, and high-risk/high-gain, often controlled by National Command Authorities and the State Department. They are multi-disciplined, intel-driven, and demand centralized planning with decentralized execution. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are elite, highly trained for specific missions, and operate at the leading edge of operational and technical art, frequently requiring specialized equipment and tactics. Effective planning necessitates unity of command, strict operational security via BIGOT lists, proactive media response strategies, and the early integration of diverse expertise including intelligence, communications, and logistics. Wilson stresses detailed war-gaming, learning from historical failures, fostering initiative, and actively preventing micromanagement from senior levels. Core requirements include elite forces, overwhelming security, robust force protection, secure communications, specialized equipment, and high-level political patronage. Principles emphasize initiative, surprise, intelligence, speed, coordination, and delegation.

The next war will be won — or lost — in orbit

SpaceNews  |  Graeme Ritchie
The conflict in Ukraine has highlighted the critical dependence of modern defense on space systems, particularly Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) capabilities, which are vulnerable to disruption. The United Kingdom, despite pledging to raise defense spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027 and adding £2.2 billion for 2025–26, lacks sufficient space resilience. Its current architecture is fragile, with a few systems carrying the bulk of the load and many relying on constant human control, making them susceptible to degradation or denial in conflict. To address this, the UK needs to proliferate crucial system elements for redundancy, sharing vital tasks across the fleet to prevent single points of failure. Furthermore, improving space domain awareness through autonomous systems is essential for accurate attribution and timely response to disruptions, moving beyond an outdated worldview of space as a peaceful domain.

Pentagon classified AI push expected to drive demand for rugged embedded computing

Military & Aerospace Electronics  |  Jamie Whitney
The Department of Defense (DoD) is deploying advanced artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities on classified military networks, specifically Impact Level 6 (IL6) and Impact Level 7 (IL7) environments, through agreements with SpaceX, OpenAI, Google, NVIDIA, Reflection, Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, and Oracle. This initiative aims to support warfighting, intelligence, and enterprise missions, fostering an "AI-first fighting force." This strategic shift is expected to significantly drive demand for rugged embedded computing, secure AI infrastructure, edge-processing hardware, and trusted computing architectures across the defense electronics industry. Military applications require substantial computing resources, including GPU acceleration and high-bandwidth memory, operating under demanding environmental, security, and Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP) constraints. Key requirements include hardware-rooted trust, secure boot technologies, encrypted data pipelines, Zero Trust architectures, and anti-tamper protections. The Pentagon also emphasizes avoiding AI vendor lock and the critical role of edge AI processing for real-time tactical applications like ISR analysis and counter-UAS targeting. Thermal management and power systems are increasingly vital as AI workloads expand within deployed military systems. The GenAI.mil platform has seen rapid adoption, with over 1.3 million personnel using it.

Netanyahu pushes for US military aid drawdown

FDD  |  Bradley Bowman, Justin Leopold-Cohen
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu advocates for phasing out US military aid to Israel, proposing "joint projects" instead of the current $3.8 billion annual assistance under the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which runs until 2028. This includes $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and $500 million for missile defense. Netanyahu's stance, articulated on May 10 to 60 Minutes, comes amidst re-election efforts and shifting US public opinion. While FMF has been crucial for Israel's military preeminence and operations against adversaries like Iran, its proportion of Israel's defense budget spiked to 35% in 2024 after the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, but is projected to fall below 10% by 2026. Israel's 2026 defense budget increased to $49 billion, a 6% rise, yet the country already spends 7% of its GDP on defense, far exceeding NATO members. A premature FMF reduction could leave Israel less secure, diminish the US's capable partner in the Middle East, and challenge the maintenance of Israel’s qualitative military edge, as required by US law.

Iran War Puts Saudi Arabia at Odds With Growing Israel-UAE Axis

Newsweek  |  Tom O'Connor
The ongoing war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran significantly strains Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) cohesion, particularly as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) become increasingly involved. The UAE's growing ties with Israel, formalized in 2020 via the Abraham Accords, create contention with Riyadh, despite their longstanding partnership. This rift is evident in the UAE's alleged role in aiding non-state actors in Libya, Sudan, and Yemen, where Saudi Arabia recently dismantled a UAE-tied secessionist movement. Experts like Nawaf Obaid describe this as a regional "Thucydides Trap," with the UAE expanding influence against Saudi Arabia, the central Arab power. The UAE's recent exit from OPEC+ and reported hosting of Israeli troops and Iron Dome systems, alongside defense collaboration, underscore its strategic pivot. While Saudi Arabia seeks broader alliances with Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan, Israel views the UAE as its top Arab partner. This dynamic, exacerbated by the October 2023 Hamas attack derailing Saudi-Israel normalization, creates a "zero-sum game" in the Middle East, with fluid coalitions and risks of strategic miscalculation amidst Iran's formidable presence.

22 May 2026

Air India: Crisis deepens ahead of final Ahmedabad crash report

BBC News  |  Nikhil Inamdar
India's Air India faces a deepening crisis ahead of the final report on the fatal June 2025 Ahmedabad crash of flight AI-171, which claimed 260 lives. The airline, now under Tata Group ownership, is grappling with a leadership vacuum following CEO Campbell Wilson's resignation, mounting financial losses reportedly reaching $2.4 billion for the year ending March 2026, and a series of operational lapses and safety violations. External challenges, including supply chain shortages delaying new aircraft deliveries, a depreciating rupee impacting costs, and a Middle Eastern fuel shock, further exacerbate its precarious position. Singapore Airlines, a 25.1% shareholder, is reportedly deepening its involvement, with Tata Group considering cost-cutting measures and innovative financing to address the significant financial burden. The impending crash report, while not expected to add financial liabilities, could severely damage Air India's already tarnished reputation, requiring substantial effort to repair.

UAE Gifts Cerebras Superchip To India

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) gifted India a Cerebras superchip, the foundational processing unit for Condor Galaxy India, an 8-exaflop AI supercomputing cluster comprising 64 Cerebras CS-3 systems, formalized on May 15, 2026, during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Abu Dhabi. This development coincided with the UAE’s announcement of $5 billion in fresh investments in India across energy, defence, infrastructure, shipping, and advanced technology, reaffirming a strategic defence partnership. The Cerebras CS-3, the largest chip ever manufactured, offers 125 petaflops of peak AI performance per unit, enabling India to train sovereign AI models at a scale Pakistan cannot approach. This technological transfer highlights a strategic categorization where the UAE views India as a peer in the emerging digital order, while Pakistan remains primarily a labor corridor. Pakistan’s deep infrastructure partnership with China, which G42 explicitly distanced itself from due to US pressure, places it outside the US-aligned technology architecture chosen by Abu Dhabi, creating a compounding asymmetry in foundational AI capabilities. Pakistan's fiscal constraints further limit its investment in computational infrastructure, reinforcing a cycle of technological dependency.

The Unresolved Challenges in U.S.–India Semiconductor Cooperation

Carnegie India | Shruti Mittal
The U.S. and India, despite launching initiatives like the Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology (TRUST) and Pax Silica to build resilient semiconductor supply chains, face significant unresolved challenges. Three primary friction points hinder effective cooperation: differing export control regimes, the absence of a clear economic case for collaboration, and U.S. anxieties about India potentially becoming a strategic technology competitor akin to China. India's export control architecture, while evolving, lacks the institutional depth of the U.S. system, leading to slower license approvals, particularly for Indian companies. Economically, while the strategic rationale for cooperation is clear, a concrete commercial return for firms on both sides remains undefined, with India focusing on legacy nodes for domestic needs while U.S. investment favors advanced nodes. Mechanisms like the International Technology Security and Innovation Fund and India's proposed ISM 2.0 need clearer programmatic and financial commitments. Addressing the 'Second China' concern requires a robust governance architecture with legal safeguards for jointly generated intellectual property and transparent end-use mechanisms, rather than relying solely on good faith. Resolving these issues demands sustained technical alignment and political will.

Imran Khan Cypher, Iran, China, & More

Frame the Globe News  |  Waqas Ahmed, Murtaza Hussain, Ryan Grim
A classified Pakistani diplomatic cable, designated I-0678 and dated March 7, 2022, was publicly released by Drop Site News on May 17, 2026, revealing US pressure for the removal of then-Prime Minister Imran Khan. The cable documented a meeting where US Assistant Secretary of State Donald Lu reportedly indicated improved US-Pakistan relations if Khan was ousted. This disclosure, part of a broader investigation into the five-year US-Pakistan relationship, highlights a significant rupture beginning with Khan's 2021 refusal of US drone bases. Following Khan's April 2022 no-confidence vote, the subsequent military-backed government reversed his policies, aligning with US interests by supplying artillery to Ukraine, signing a defense pact with Saudi Arabia, and stalling the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor's second phase. The investigation also notes former President Trump's private urging of General Asim Munir to resolve Khan's detention. Ironically, the generals who engineered Khan's removal to mend ties with Washington are now lauded for mediating between the US and Iran, a role requiring the independent foreign policy stance Khan was removed for attempting. This exposes the strategic maneuvering behind Pakistan's current diplomatic 'triumph'.

Pakistan’s Sovereign Debt Machine, the Fees It Doesn’t Disclose, and Why the Government Talked About Everything Except the Questions

Pakistan's governments, since 1958, have consistently engaged in sovereign borrowing, framing each instance as a "victory" despite a lack of tangible improvement in national performance. The article critically examines Pakistan's "sovereign debt machine," highlighting the significant issue of undisclosed fees associated with these loans. It points out that successive administrations have failed to provide transparency regarding these financial charges, deliberately avoiding direct questions on the matter. This systemic lack of disclosure and accountability perpetuates a cycle of debt, raising concerns about the nation's long-term economic stability and governance. The continuous reliance on syndicated loans, presented as proof of international confidence, masks underlying financial vulnerabilities and a persistent failure to address core economic challenges. This pattern suggests a deep-seated problem in Pakistan's fiscal management and its engagement with international financial markets.

How The 2026 Iran War Deepens Polycrisis In Myanmar

Eurasia Review  |  Khant Eaint Hmoo
The 2026 Israel-Iran war, initiated on February 28, 2026, by coordinated Israeli and U.S. attacks, has profoundly impacted global energy markets, leading to severe fuel shortages and rising costs in Myanmar. Myanmar, heavily reliant on over 90% imported fuel and with only 3% domestic production, faces extreme vulnerability due to instability in the Strait of Hormuz, which blocks a quarter of global crude oil shipments. This crisis has disrupted agriculture, increasing fertilizer costs (Myanmar imports over USD 500 million annually) and threatening food security, with farmers struggling with diesel prices nearing 4,000 kyats per litre. The junta, led by President Min Aung Hlaing, implemented ineffective measures like odd-even license plate policies and a flawed QR fuel distribution system, while crony-controlled EV markets saw prices surge from 195 million to 285 million kyats. The National Unity Government's fuel transit permit system, aimed at weakening the regime, has also caused local shortages.

The Trump–Xi Summit: Defining Favorable and Unfavorable Outcomes

Heritage Foundation  |  Andrew Harding, Jeff Smith
The upcoming May 14-15, 2026, summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping in Beijing is framed as a compliance checkpoint, not a breakthrough, following their October 30, 2025, meeting in Busan, South Korea. The Trump Administration aims to assess compliance with previous agreements, including China's commitments to halt fentanyl precursor flow, eliminate rare earth export controls, end retaliation against U.S. semiconductor companies, and open markets to U.S. agricultural exports. China, in turn, seeks greater U.S. market access, tariff reductions, and eased sanctions, potentially pushing for a shift on Taiwan. While China has met some verifiable commitments, like soybean purchases, its actions on fentanyl and the Nexperia semiconductor dispute suggest a pattern of tactical cooperation rather than fundamental policy shifts. The U.S. must remain vigilant against China's strategy of horse-trading on negotiable items while avoiding concessions on strategic priorities like intellectual property theft, cyberattacks, and military coercion.

America Gave Up the Factory. China Made It the Weapon.

China, facing US export controls on advanced semiconductors, has achieved significant technological self-sufficiency and algorithmic innovation, particularly in AI. In January 2025, DeepSeek V3 released an open-source AI model trained for less than $6 million, outperforming American systems and causing a $600 billion drop in Nvidia's market cap. By April 2026, DeepSeek V4, partly trained on Huawei’s domestically produced Ascend processors made by SMIC, performed near leading American models at a tenth of the cost. This demonstrates how US restrictions inadvertently accelerated China's vertical integration across its technology stack, from chips to AI. Furthermore, China's dominance in manufacturing, exemplified by BYD and CATL in EVs and batteries, and its control over critical minerals like gallium and rare earths, has created strategic leverage. Beijing has weaponized this by imposing export controls on key minerals, impacting US defense supply chains for systems like the F-35 and Tomahawk missile, highlighting the military consequences of American deindustrialization and reliance on Chinese production.

Improving the U.S.-China Trade Relationship

RealClearWorld  |  Shanker A. Singham, Alden F. Abbott
The May 14-15 summit between President Trump and President Xi Jinping in Beijing produced familiar outcomes, including discussions of a new U.S.-China “Board of Trade,” anticipated Chinese purchases of American agricultural products, and potential tariff reductions on non-sensitive goods. However, the summit failed to secure meaningful commitments on industrial subsidies, state-directed overcapacity, or broader distortions within China’s economic system. Beijing's state-directed economy leverages capital, credit, land, energy, and regulation to fuel industrial policy, resulting in chronic overcapacity in sectors like steel, aluminum, solar panels, shipbuilding, electric vehicles, and batteries. This surplus is pushed globally at non-market prices, undermining American manufacturers who cannot compete against state-backed rivals. The U.S. should avoid a repeat of the 2020 Phase One deal's managed trade approach, instead focusing the proposed Board of Trade on market distortions. Washington must press China for comprehensive subsidy accounting, sector-by-sector capacity discipline, an end to discriminatory local-content requirements, and allowing loss-making firms to exit. Enforcement mechanisms, including deadlines, benchmarks, and automatic tariff snap-backs for noncompliance, are crucial. Coordination with allies is also vital to prevent excess capacity from being rerouted. A durable trade peace necessitates structural reform, transparency, and equal competitive conditions.

Xi Just threw Iran Under the Bus—Russia Should be Worried | Opinion

Newsweek  |  Joseph Epstein
President Donald Trump's Beijing summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping revealed China's opposition to any Iranian militarization or toll charges in the Strait of Hormuz, a stance tacitly accepted by Beijing despite its own readout omitting the detail. This exposed the China-Russia-Iran "axis" as a partnership of convenience, suggesting Beijing could also be pried from Moscow. Russia, fixated on the West, overlooks China's growing long-term threat, particularly since the Ukraine invasion. China surpassed Russia as Central Asia's largest trading partner in 2023, with trade hitting a record $106 billion by 2025, more than double Moscow's regional turnover. Chinese capital now finances significant infrastructure across Central Asia and the South Caucasus, prioritizing the Middle Corridor, which saw cargo volume jump roughly 70 percent in 2024, bypassing Russia and Iran. Inside Russia, dependency is structural: Chinese goods comprise around 40 percent of imports, supplying 60-90 percent of key sanctioned war economy sectors. Beijing is Moscow's largest creditor and energy customer, forcing steep discounts. Leaked Russian military files from 2008-2014 show war-game scenarios rehearsing tactical nuclear strikes against China in the event of a southern invasion, including nuclear strikes on Chinese cities.

When Two Superpowers Meet: A Conversation With Nicholas Burns

Donald Trump's impending summit with Xi Jinping in China has significantly disrupted the previously established bipartisan consensus on a hard line against Beijing in American foreign policy, creating considerable uncertainty regarding his objectives and Xi's reciprocal aims. Dan Kurtz-Phelan engaged Nicholas Burns, who served as U.S. Ambassador to China until January 2025, to provide insights into China's strategic posture for the summit and the array of policy options available to U.S. decision-makers. In this special bonus episode, recorded on Thursday, May 7, Burns meticulously discusses the central issues poised to take center stage during the Trump-Xi encounter, encompassing critical areas such as trade, advanced technology, Iran's nuclear program, the status of Taiwan, and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The discussion emphasizes the profound and enormous stakes for the future trajectory of U.S.-Chinese competition, underscoring potential shifts in global power dynamics.

Spheres by Default: How U.S. Concessions Are Quietly Becoming Chinese Influence

Foreign Affairs  |  Rebecca Lissner, Mira Rapp-Hooper
U.S. President Donald Trump's administration is inadvertently facilitating the expansion of Chinese influence in Asia through a de facto sphere of influence strategy, despite ongoing debates over its intentionality. While the Trump administration asserts its claim over the Western Hemisphere, including through military and influence campaigns in Venezuela and Cuba, it appears to be ceding ground for China to broaden its political, military, and economic sway across Asia. This strategic dynamic is highlighted by the "lavish but substantively modest" summit between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing in May 2026, which analysts suggest underscores a pattern where U.S. concessions, whether explicit or implicit, quietly contribute to the consolidation of Chinese power in its regional periphery. This approach risks establishing a new global order where great powers divide regions into privileged blocs, potentially undermining the sovereignty and interests of smaller states and reshaping the international system.

The Grey Rhino: Strategic Neglect and the Collapse of Energy Security – E-International Relations

E-International Relations | Mordechai Chaziza and Roie Yellinek

The global energy crisis, triggered by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and escalating confrontation with Iran, represents a "grey rhino" event—a predictable, high-impact threat that policymakers failed to adequately address. Western energy systems, optimized for short-term efficiency, lacked resilience due to an overreliance on deterrence, premature weakening of legacy redundancy during the energy transition, and democratic fiscal constraints hindering costly preparedness. This systemic failure has propagated price volatility across global supply chains, impacting agriculture and manufacturing, and causing a "triple shock" of rising energy prices, food insecurity, and slowing growth, particularly in developing economies. In contrast, China has pursued a comprehensive hedging strategy, diversifying supply sources, expanding overland pipelines, accumulating strategic oil reserves, and investing heavily in both fossil and renewable energy infrastructure. This approach prioritizes resilience alongside efficiency, creating an asymmetry where states with greater buffering capacity gain strategic leverage. Energy security must become a core component of grand strategy, focusing on diversification, long-term planning, technological innovation, and integrated economic security to manage future shocks.

A New Order for the Gulf: The Region Must Build Its Own Security, Not Buy It

Foreign Affairs | David B. Roberts
The U.S.-Israeli war with Iran has placed Gulf states in a precarious position, making American forces they host targets for Iranian attacks and necessitating a new regional security paradigm. Gulf leaders must abandon the century-old assumption that security is a commodity to be brokered, instead building their own capabilities and directly engaging Iran. A proposed treaty involves a phased U.S. military withdrawal from major Gulf bases (Al Udeid, Fifth Fleet HQ, Al Dhafra, Ali Al Salem, Camp Arifjan, Prince Sultan) over five years, serving as the cornerstone for a comprehensive regional bargain. In exchange, Tehran would offer concessions on its nuclear and missile programs, halt belligerence, and move towards diplomatic normalization, alongside phased international sanctions relief. Gulf militaries must retune for warfighting, developing capabilities like mine-hunting and counter-drone tactics, rather than relying on external patrons whose interests often diverge. This "win-win-win" scenario offers a dignified U.S. exit, economic recovery for Iran, and self-defined security for Gulf monarchies, who must be principals in the treaty.