Shoot the Archer: Unable to Shoot Down the Missiles, Ukraine Now Wants to Destroy the Launchers Before They Ever Fire

National Security Journal  |  Jack Buckby

Ukrainian forces facing critical shortages of Patriot air defense interceptors following a devastating Russian ballistic missile strike on Kyiv that killed 17 people are adopting a new strategy to target Russian launch systems before missiles are launched. Volodymyr Zelenskyy emphasized that ballistic missile interception rates have fallen drastically, leaving Ukrainian cities vulnerable ahead of winter.

A chronic deficit of Western-supplied air defense munitions has forced Kyiv to pivot from purely defensive surface-to-air engagements toward preemptive strikes against mobile Russian launchers deep inside enemy territory. With allies unable to supply sufficient interceptors, Ukraine is seeking authorization to buy long-range strike platforms from private American defense contractors. Russian forces continue combining ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones to overwhelm air defenses, making kinetic counter-launcher operations essential to preserving critical civil and energy infrastructure. Ukrainian leaders maintain that establishing credible deep-strike capabilities against Russian launchers is a crucial prerequisite for forcing Moscow into serious peace negotiations.

Comment

Shifting from terminal intercept to offensive counter-battery against ballistic missile launchers marks a fundamental transition from air defence to left-of-launch operational doctrine. Destroying mobile Transporter Erector Launchers, such as Russia's 9K720 Iskander-M systems, requires a sensor-to-shooter loop far tighter than conventional deep-strike missions. The primary operational constraint lies not in long-range strike munitions, but in persistent real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance across vast launch concealment zones. Without continuous overhead target tracking, mobile Iskander batteries disperse within minutes after firing, negating standoff strike capabilities.

This reconnaissance challenge demands integration of satellite synthetic aperture radar with uncrewed aerial systems operating inside contested airspace. During Operation Desert Storm, Coalition forces executed over 1,400 sorties against Iraqi Scud launchers yet failed to confirm a single mobile TEL destruction due to swift displacement tactics. Modern offensive counter-launcher doctrine consequently hinges on automated target recognition systems capable of identifying Iskander-M camouflage before missile erecting sequences commence.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which factor carries more weight in suppressing 9K720 Iskander-M mobility — persistent overhead synthetic aperture radar satellite coverage or autonomous strike assets stationed inside contested airspace — and what would tip that operational balance?

The operational evidence points toward persistent overhead synthetic aperture radar as the decisive factor, as real-time tracking is required before target acquisition protocols can be initiated. Strike platforms themselves are ineffective if target coordinates for mobile 9K720 Iskander-M units expire before weapon release. Consequently, sensor density along Russia's border regions will likely dictate suppression efficacy far more than the total inventory of long-range precision munitions.

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