Who are Hamas’s adversaries in Gaza?

The Jerusalem Post  |  Neville Teller

Hamas’s internal security service, the Radaa Force, issued a public directive on August 6 urging Gazans to assassinate leaders of rival anti-Hamas militias operating across the strip. The most prominent opposition group, the Popular Forces, comprises up to 700 fighters led by Ghassan Duhine following the December 2025 death of founder Yasser Abu Shabab.

Emerging from Rafah's Tarabin tribal network, the Popular Forces received Israeli weapons, intelligence, and logistical support after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed activating local clans in June 2025. Meanwhile, Hussam al-Astal’s Khan Yunis-based Counter-Terrorism Strike Force, which assassinated senior Hamas police officer Mahmoud al-Astal on January 12, 2026, presents an institutional security challenge. Additional resistance stems from the Fatah-aligned Hellis and Jundeya networks in Shejaia, alongside the al-Majayda and Doghmosh clans. While these fragmented armed networks challenge Hamas’s post-ceasefire authority and secure aid distribution routes, their objectives align only partially with broader diplomatic proposals such as the 20-point Trump peace plan.

Comment

Delegating local security responsibilities to decentralized tribal proxies like the Popular Forces introduces severe command-and-control friction into counter-insurgency operations. While leveraging the Tarabin tribal network in Rafah grants tactical access and intelligence without a direct footprint, non-state militias prioritize clan survival over external strategic objectives. The January 2026 assassination of Mahmoud al-Astal by the Counter-Terrorism Strike Force illustrates how localized feuds inevitably supplant central operational directives.

This reliance on fragmented client groups restricts long-term governance synthesis, as competing factions like the Hellis and Jundeya networks in Shejaia build autonomous enclaves rather than integrated security institutions. When patronage flows without formal command structures, state sponsors risk creating self-interested warlords who actively resist subsequent stabilization efforts in Khan Yunis and southern Gaza.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If external sponsors rely on non-ideological proxies like the Popular Forces for local security, does clan autonomy inevitably undermine long-term governance, or can tribal structures maintain order in Khan Yunis without formal state integration?

The pattern suggests that relying on localized formations like the Popular Forces provides immediate tactical disruption against Hamas but inherently fragments territorial control. Because entities such as the Tarabin clan prioritize local patronage and tribal survival over institutional state-building, these proxies are prone to turning into self-perpetuating armed enclaves. Consequently, tactical reliance on militia networks in Khan Yunis and Rafah creates long-term operational resistance against any unified post-conflict administrative structure.

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