Armed by China: The Dependency Behind Pakistan’s Military

The Heritage Foundation | Kriti Upadhyaya

Pakistan's armed forces during the 2025 conflict with India marked the first reported combat deployment of advanced Chinese weapon systems, including HQ-9 air-defense networks, PL-15 air-to-air missiles, and J-10 fighter jets. Chinese suppliers supplied 82 percent of Pakistani defense imports between 2019 and 2023, highlighting a structural shift in regional military alignment.

Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute details four major waves of arms transfers since 1965, resulting in nearly 46,000 delivered systems across land, air, and sea domains. Domestic Pakistani manufacturing now produces eight of twelve major military platform categories under Chinese license, culminating in joint fighter manufacturing and eight Hangor-class air-independent propulsion submarines. Beijing thoroughly controls Pakistan's military supply chain. Consequently, any outside security cooperation risks subsidizing Chinese defense technology, obligating Washington and international partners to manage Pakistan's force structure as permanently bound to Beijing's geopolitical ambitions.

Comment

Licence-built manufacturing of Chinese platforms like the JF-17 fighter and Hangor-class submarine creates a structural industrial lock-in for the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works. By co-producing eight of twelve major platform categories, local facilities transition from indigenous design hubs into assembly nodes reliant on Chinese sub-components and technical oversight. This integration ties depot-level maintenance and spare parts supply directly to Beijing's state-owned defense enterprise pipeline.

Consequently, any attempt to diversify procurement or integrate Western avionics into platforms like the JF-17 requires Beijing's explicit architectural approval and source-code access. This structural bottleneck restricts sovereign modification rights while ensuring that supply chain disruptions within AVIC or CSIC immediately constrain operational readiness across Pakistan's JF-17 and Hangor-class fleets.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which factor imposes a greater operational constraint on the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex — the lack of sovereign source-code access for JF-17 avionics integration, or complete supply chain reliance on Chinese sub-components for depot-level maintenance?

The available evidence points toward source-code restrictions as the primary operational vulnerability, as it prevents the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex from integrating non-Chinese radar and electronic warfare suites onto the JF-17. While sub-component logistics can be stockpiled to mitigate short-term supply disruptions from AVIC, architectural lock-in permanently restricts independent tactical adaptation during high-intensity operations.

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