China’s Maritime and Military Strategy in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean

Institute for Security and Development Policy | J. Mohan Malik

China is expanding its naval presence and infrastructure across the Bay of Bengal to secure critical sea lanes and project power into the wider Indian Ocean. This strategic push directly addresses Beijing's vulnerability at the Strait of Malacca, where sixty-five per cent of Chinese seaborne crude oil and gas imports must pass through a narrow chokepoint.

To mitigate this geographic bottleneck, the People's Liberation Army Navy is operationalising its "far seas protection" doctrine by developing a layered network of commercial ports and logistics hubs. These facilities span Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, India is countering this expansion by reinforcing its Andaman and Nicobar Command and developing the Great Nicobar Project. This initiative establishes a formidable forward-operating hub capable of sea denial. Geopolitical volatility in Bangladesh and Myanmar further complicates this maritime rivalry. The strategic competition is intensifying rapidly. Ultimately, the region is transforming into a contested arena where commercial access and military power projection are inextricably linked.

Comment

The operationalisation of the PLA Navy's "far seas protection" doctrine in the Indian Ocean reveals a structural shift from temporary deployments to a permanent, infrastructure-backed presence. By integrating commercial port investments in Myanmar and Sri Lanka with potential military access, Beijing is establishing a resilient logistics network designed to bypass the Strait of Malacca. This dual-use infrastructure model provides the logistical depth required to sustain prolonged naval operations far from mainland bases.

The second-order consequence of this Chinese footprint is the rapid militarisation of India's Andaman and Nicobar Command. New Delhi's development of the Great Nicobar Project serves as a direct counter-docking capability, transforming a defensive outpost into a forward-operating base for sea denial. Consequently, the Andaman and Nicobar Command is positioned to monitor and potentially intercept Chinese vessels transiting the Six Degree Channel during a crisis.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the Great Nicobar Project successfully establishes a dual-use forward-operating hub, how will the PLA Navy adapt its transit protocols through the Six Degree Channel to maintain its far seas protection objectives?

The trajectory indicates that the PLA Navy will likely increase its reliance on underwater transits and stealth capabilities to bypass the surveillance network of the Andaman and Nicobar Command. Additionally, Beijing is expected to accelerate the development of alternative overland connectivity corridors through Myanmar to reduce its exposure to Indian sea denial capabilities at the Six Degree Channel. This shift would effectively distribute China's strategic risk across both maritime and continental axes.

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