Ukraine Advances: The Tank Isn’t Finished Yet

Center for European Policy Analysis | David Kirichenko

Ukrainian armored maneuvers in recent offensive operations demonstrate that the main battle tank remains an indispensable asset on the modern battlefield despite the widespread proliferation of first-person view (FPV) drones. While critics have declared the tank obsolete due to its high vulnerability to cheap loitering munitions, armoured platforms provide unmatched mobile protected firepower.

Tanks are evolving rapidly. To survive this highly transparent combat environment, frontline units are integrating electronic warfare jamming suites, advanced explosive reactive armour, and steel counter-drone cages directly onto vehicle hulls. These tactical adaptations are reshaping armoured warfare doctrine, forcing military planners to combine heavy armour with decentralised drone defence networks and localised air defence assets. Ultimately, the survival of armoured formations will depend on rapid industrial adaptation and the integration of active protection systems. This technological race will decide the feasibility of future large-scale ground offensives in contested European theatres.

Comment

The deployment of Leopard 2A6 tanks in Ukraine demonstrates that armoured survivability requires integration into multi-layered electronic warfare networks rather than relying on passive steel. This operational shift forces a revision of combined arms doctrine, where heavy armour cannot operate without dedicated, localised counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) escorts. Consequently, the integration of the Trophy active protection system has transitioned from a specialised upgrade to a fundamental doctrinal necessity for high-intensity European contingencies.

This doctrinal evolution carries significant procurement consequences for NATO members, as seen in the German Bundeswehr's efforts to integrate Trophy onto its newer Leopard 2A8 variants. These active protection suites and jamming pods raise unit costs. Consequently, the Bundeswehr's procurement of the Leopard 2A8 reflects a broader European shift toward smaller, highly protected fleets rather than massed, unprotected armour.

Strategic Question for Discussion

How will the trade-off between high unit costs for Trophy-equipped Leopard 2A8 tanks and the necessity for mass affect NATO's force planning for prolonged attrition campaigns?

The trajectory indicates that NATO planners will increasingly favour survivability over mass, accepting smaller fleet sizes of highly protected platforms like the Leopard 2A8. This shift assumes that advanced active protection systems can offset numerical deficits by drastically reducing combat loss rates. However, my assessment is that this trade-off remains highly risky in a prolonged conflict where industrial attrition eventually dominates tactical technological advantages.

Share your assessment in the comments below.

To read in details click here