Forecasting the Next World War: Between Theory and Practice

E-International Relations | Raphaël Dosson

International Relations theory oscillates alongside structural power shifts, driving cyclical transitions between peaceful liberal institutionalism and conflict-driven realism. Critical historical junctures—such as the collapse of the League of Nations and the failure of the Munich Agreement—demonstrate how idealist frameworks fail to deter revisionist powers. This recurring divergence between theoretical assumptions and material conditions repeatedly precipitates systemic rupture.

Theoretical paradigms adapt as systemic pressures intensify. During the Cold War, structural friction pushed security analysis toward Kenneth Waltz’s 1979 neorealist framework following peripheral confrontations in Korea, Vietnam, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The subsequent 1989–1991 collapse of the Soviet Union exposed the predictive limits of structural models, shifting academic discourse toward reflectivist approaches. Long-term historical cycles—including 50–60 year Kondratieff economic waves and 80–100 year Power Transition Theory models—indicate that contemporary geopolitical friction threatens another major systemic realignment. Understanding this co-evolution between theory and practice remains essential for anticipating future global conflict.

Comment

The failure of institutional collective security prior to the 1938 Munich Agreement demonstrates the severe vulnerabilities inherent in doctrine that decouples diplomatic engagement from hard material capabilities. When peace-oriented doctrines prioritise process over power balance, revisionist actors exploit the resulting deterrence gaps to alter territorial balances without immediate military cost. Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement reflected a fundamental misalignment between norm-based theoretical expectations and aggressive state practice.

Mechanistically, this doctrinal friction occurs because institutional frameworks rely on reciprocal compliance mechanisms that collapse under non-cooperative bargaining strategies. In anarchic systems, diplomatic assurances without credible counter-balancing forces merely subsidise revisionist rearmament timelines. Consequently, the League of Nations' covenant mechanisms proved structurally incapable of constraining state behavior once coercive leverage replaced legal arbitration.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If normative frameworks like those embedded in the League of Nations covenant routinely lag behind shifts in material capabilities, which mechanism offers a more reliable indicator of impending systemic crisis—the breakdown of diplomatic consensus or accelerated rearmament cycles?

Historical patterns suggest that physical rearmament cycles consistently provide a more immediate signal of structural instability than formal diplomatic breakdowns. While institutional negotiations, such as those preceding the Munich Agreement, often mask underlying friction through rhetoric, material force generation directly reflects a state's operational intent. My assessment is that monitoring physical capability shifts remains far more predictive of systemic rupture than tracking diplomatic consensus.

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