4 September 2026

The Faceless War: How Artificial Intelligence Rewrote the Map of Power

Small Wars Journal | Francisco Carneiro JΓΊnior

Private technology firms now supply the critical semiconductor, cloud, and orbital infrastructure underpinning modern military operations and cognitive warfare. In July 2025, the U.S. Army awarded Palantir a $10 billion software contract for the Maven Smart System, consolidating seventy-five prior programs onto commercial enterprise platforms. Transferring software control for programs like the $22 billion IVAS program to Anduril Industries anchors military readiness within private civilian supply chains.

Operational wargaming at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College revealed that large language models process doctrine effectively when guided by broad commander's intent rather than micromanaged steps. Software replaces traditional general staffs. Simultaneously, the June 2025 Israel-Iran conflict demonstrated how synthetic media and recirculated authentic footage skew perception at near-zero marginal cost, prompting Israel to form the Sphera unit. Non-aligned mid-sized powers like Brazil must construct sovereign data governance frameworks to mitigate absolute dependency on foreign technology oligopolies.

Comment

Integration of the Maven Smart System into front-line targeting architectures fundamentally shifts how command and control functions in high-intensity operations. By delegating operational data synthesis to private commercial software, staff headquarters transition from manual decision-making nodes into supervisory verification hubs. This structural shift collapses the sensor-to-shooter cycle, yet it introduces operational fragility if commercial data pipelines face electronic disruption or vendor platform outages.

The second-order consequence for command structures is a shift in operational authority from field headquarters back toward centralised commercial network nodes. As software like Anduril’s Lattice command platform autonomously adjudicates target priorities, field commanders face diminished tactical latitude during communications-degraded engagements. Consequently, battle-command continuity under severe electromagnetic degradation hinges on a unit's structural ability to execute decentralised mission command without active Starshield satellite links.

Strategic Question for Discussion
Which factor presents a greater operational risk to mission command during high-intensity conflict — the loss of real-time targeting feeds from the Maven Smart System, or the doctrine-degrading over-reliance on automated course-of-action models?
Available operational evidence suggests that loss of real-time targeting feeds from the Maven Smart System creates immediate tactical friction, but the deeper vulnerability stems from cognitive over-reliance on automated planning tools. When field staffs uncritically accept machine-generated course-of-action assessments, command staff lose the procedural competence needed to execute manual adjudication under severe electronic warfare conditions. The trajectory indicates that doctrinal decay in staff planning represents a far more enduring strategic risk than temporary sensor denial.
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