The ‘Extinct Volcanoes’ Problem: Why Unit Strength Is Not Combat Power

RUSI | Roger N. McDermott

Ukrainian and Russian armed forces facing severe attrition in prolonged combat highlight a critical distinction between nominal personnel headcount and true unit combat power. A recent RUSI assessment revealed that approximately one-sixth of Ukraine’s 120 active brigades suffer from chronic underperformance due to frontline combat deployments exceeding 200 days without sufficient unit rotation.

This systemic operational degradation directly mirrors Imperial Russian commander Aleksandr Svechin’s 1915 analysis of "extinct volcanoes"—depleted formations maintaining administrative strength while losing real fighting energy. Paper numbers mislead. Repeatedly inserting individual replacement recruits into exhausted units cannot restore depleted non-commissioned officer cadres, command trust, or specialized battalion staff planning expertise. As a result, both belligerents continuously struggle to translate raw manpower mobilization and defense industrial throughput into effective combined-arms tactical performance. Future defense planning and Western military aid assessments must prioritize organizational cohesion, leadership quality, and structured rotational cycles over simple order-of-battle unit tallies.

Comment

Force regeneration frameworks that measure capability through raw personnel numbers obscure the rapid decay of command networks and tactical cohesion under high-attrition conditions. In high-intensity warfare, unit effectiveness degrades along a non-linear curve when casualties eliminate senior non-commissioned officers and experienced company commanders. Replacing frontline losses with individual augmentees maintains structural tallies on paper, but it disintegrates the tacit trust and informal communication channels required to execute complex combined-arms manoeuvres. The ongoing operational strain observed across Ukrainian frontline brigades reveals that administrative unit preservation often actively masks operational paralysis.

This operational failure directly replicates the institutional breakdown documented during the Russian Imperial Army's Great Retreat of 1915. When Aleksandr Svechin assumed command of the 6th Finnish Rifle Regiment, official strength reports listed over 1,600 bayonets despite the loss of organic machine guns and tactical cohesion. Svechin's historical diagnosis demonstrates that treating hollowed-out formations as combat-ready forces commanders to employ administrative husks incapable of executing synchronized fire and movement along the Donbas front.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If modern military force generation continues to prioritize individual replacement pipelines over full brigade reorganization, does Aleksandr Svechin's 1915 diagnosis of 'extinct volcanoes' become the primary driver of operational stagnation along the Donbas front?

The historical precedent of the 6th Finnish Rifle Regiment indicates that repeatedly patching heavily depleted formations generates an order-of-battle illusion that masks severe tactical degradation. The available evidence suggests that consolidating personnel into high-performing Ukrainian brigades preserves critical non-commissioned officer networks and command trust far more effectively than maintaining nominal unit structures. Consequently, military force generation that ignores internal organizational decay guarantees operational paralysis during prolonged high-intensity combat.

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