The Price of Russian Paranoia: Spy Hunting Shores Up Putin’s Power—but Paralyzes the State

Foreign Affairs | Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan

The Russian Federal Security Service has systematically pivoted from counterterrorism to aggressive counterespionage operations to enforce internal regime discipline during the war in Ukraine. Prosecutions under Article 275 reached 361 convictions in 2024 and 143 state security cases in the first quarter of 2026 alone, targeting political opponents, civil servants, and defense corporate executives.

Drawing on Soviet-era doctrines of comprehensive counterintelligence coverage, security agencies have penetrated deeply into state institutions and private enterprises through intrusive surveillance and preemptive sting operations. Paranoia now governs Russian administrative life. High-profile treason and corruption arrests, including former Deputy Minister Maxim Parshin and top executives at Gazprom Energoholding, signal that high-level professional standing offers no immunity from repression. Consequently, fearful civil servants and industrial leaders routinely withhold critical operational data, delay vital strategic decisions, and pivot entirely to self-preservation. This pervasive climate of domestic mistrust ultimately paralyzes routine state governance and severely degrades institutional capacity across the broader wartime economy.

Comment

The expansion of the FSB Department of Military Counterintelligence into routine civil-military administration transforms internal command structures into mechanisms of systematic risk aversion. When security operatives embed directly within procurement departments and technical ministries, operational initiative gives way to institutional self-preservation. Bureaucratic subordinates deliberately suppress bad news regarding supply delays or technical failures, preferring administrative stasis to the risk of treason allegations.

This structural friction degrades command responsiveness across critical defense infrastructure. The mechanism operates through delayed reporting cycles, where regional officials refuse to clear dual-use transport logistics or energy allocation schedules without formal clearances from local FSB counterintelligence units. Consequently, Kremlin oversight ensures absolute political submission while crippling the throughput of FSB-monitored defense projects.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which factor poses a greater long-term constraint on wartime mobilization — the physical degradation of industrial infrastructure, or the decision-making paralysis induced by FSB counterintelligence oversight?

The trajectory indicates that institutional paralysis represents the more systemic constraint, as physical infrastructure can be repaired or substituted, whereas systemic fear permanently suppresses accurate operational reporting. Without reliable data flowing through state channels, senior leadership loses the capacity to allocate defense resources effectively regardless of available industrial output. Consequently, counterintelligence oversight creates an internal structural feedback loop that compounds wartime logistics bottlenecks.

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