How the U.S. Can Alter Putin’s Calculus on Ukraine

Council on Foreign Relations | Thomas Graham

The United States can compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to abandon his maximalist war aims in Ukraine by deploying a coordinated strategy of resistance, deterrence, and dialogue. This comprehensive approach leverages Washington's unique geopolitical influence to reconfigure Moscow's risk-reward matrix as unilateral economic sanctions fail to halt the Kremlin's ongoing aggression.

Historically, economic resilience has allowed Russia to dedicate 6-8 percent of its GDP to defense spending despite mounting budgetary shortfalls and refinery strikes. Sanctions alone will not suffice. With Ukraine facing dwindling interceptor stockpiles and Europe threatened by populist shifts like the rise of the Alternative for Germany, Washington must lead. The proposed strategy requires facilitating indirect weapons transfers, securing Starlink access, and fortifying NATO's frontier to deter hybrid warfare. Crucially, Washington must pair this resistance with diplomatic dialogue, offering conditional normalization and strategic stability talks to incentivize a lasting ceasefire.

Comment

The proposed US strategy of routing military aid through European intermediaries to alter Moscow's calculus exposes deep coordination challenges within NATO's European pillar. Relying on European allies to manage the logistics of transferring Patriot air defence systems to Kyiv assumes a level of industrial and political alignment that does not currently exist. This reliance risks exacerbating existing divisions between Baltic states and Western European capitals over the acceptable threshold of escalation.

Downstream, this decentralised procurement model will likely strain NATO's standardisation frameworks as member states independently source non-standardised munitions to meet immediate Ukrainian demands. Interoperability bottlenecks will therefore directly degrade the combat readiness of multinational battlegroups deployed in Tapa and Ādaži.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If European allies continue to independently source non-standardised munitions for Kyiv, how will NATO maintain tactical interoperability within the multinational battlegroups deployed at Tapa and Ādaži?

The current trajectory indicates that NATO will likely rely on localised workarounds and ad-hoc communication protocols to bridge equipment disparities at the tactical level. However, my assessment is that these temporary measures will fail to prevent friction in joint fire-support coordination during high-intensity drills. Over time, this operational divergence risks creating a two-tier readiness structure within the alliance's eastern flank.

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