Nuclear Statecraft: The Saudi Deal and U.S.-China Competition

Center for Strategic and International Studies | Heather Williams, Jane Nakano

On August 24, 2026, the Trump administration submitted a landmark civil nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia to Congress, initiating a 90-day review process under the Atomic Energy Act. The controversial "123 Agreement" could grant Riyadh uranium enrichment capabilities, positioning the United States to counter growing Chinese and Russian influence in the Middle Eastern energy sector.

This strategic move addresses Saudi Arabia's long-term economic diversification goals. Nuclear energy offers vital desalination solutions for the water-scarce kingdom. However, the deal introduces severe regional proliferation risks. It could trigger a regional nuclear race, particularly if Iran's program remains active. The agreement also lacks the International Atomic Energy Agency's "Additional Protocol" for enhanced inspections, potentially weakening global nonproliferation norms. Furthermore, it may prompt the United Arab Emirates and South Korea to renegotiate their own restrictive U.S. nuclear cooperation terms, complicating Washington's broader nonproliferation framework across both regions.

Comment

The concession of uranium enrichment options to Riyadh under the new bilateral framework directly threatens the integrity of Washington's established nonproliferation alliances. By departing from the strict non-enrichment standard set in the 2009 U.S.-UAE 123 Agreement, the United States inadvertently weakens its leverage over other key partners. This policy shift creates immediate friction with allies who have long accepted stringent restrictions in exchange for American nuclear cooperation.

Specifically, the mechanism of this friction lies in the "most-favoured-nation" style clauses embedded in regional agreements, which allow the United Arab Emirates to demand renegotiation of its own enrichment waivers. In East Asia, Seoul will likely exploit this precedent to press for similar enrichment and reprocessing rights, undermining the restrictive terms of the amended 1972 U.S.-South Korea civil nuclear pact. Consequently, the bilateral concessions designed to exclude the National Nuclear Corporation of China from the Saudi energy market will complicate Washington's efforts to maintain the 2009 gold standard across its global alliance network.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If Washington permits Saudi Arabia to bypass the non-enrichment benchmarks established in the 2009 U.S.-UAE 123 Agreement, how can the United States logically defend the retention of similar restrictions within the 1972 U.S.-South Korea civil nuclear pact?

The available evidence suggests that Washington will struggle to maintain this double standard, as Seoul has already signalled its intent to leverage any Saudi concessions to secure domestic reprocessing rights. My assessment is that the United States will be forced to transition from a rigid nonproliferation template to a highly transactional, case-by-case alliance management strategy. This shift will likely erode the credibility of American security guarantees by decoupling civil nuclear cooperation from uniform global standards.

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