India and Bangladesh face severe diplomatic friction following the August 2024 overthrow of Sheikh Hasina, threatening the renewal of the 30-year Ganges Waters Treaty expiring on 12 December. New Delhi has refused Dhaka's extradition demand regarding Hasina's November 2025 death sentence, while Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman has cultivated ties with China and Turkey.
Water sharing under the 1996 treaty relies on obsolete 1949–1988 hydrological data, leaving existing allocations vulnerable to climate change and rising domestic demand. Indian state governments in West Bengal and Bihar press competing demands for Hooghly navigation and Ganges desiltation. Meanwhile, Dhaka seeks a predictable dry-season allocation of 40,000 cusecs alongside enhanced flood-data sharing mechanisms. Bilateral trust remains degraded. Despite technical discussions through the Joint Rivers Commission during a May 2026 meeting in Kolkata, political gridlock risks scuttling a science-based, basin-wide agreement before the treaty deadline.
New Delhi's refusal to extradite Sheikh Hasina trades short-term transboundary cooperation for long-term partner reliability across South Asia. Protecting a former head of government preserves Indian diplomatic credibility with regional elites, yet directly imperils negotiations over the Farakka Barrage. The resulting gridlock exposes Indian border infrastructure along the Siliguri Corridor to broader diplomatic friction with Bangladesh.
A similar structural trade-off occurred following the 1977 Ganges waters interim agreement after the Farakka Long March. When political alignment between New Delhi and Dhaka collapsed, technical river management at the Farakka Barrage immediately transformed into high-stakes sovereign leverage.
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