18 November 2026

Russia, China And The Risks Of Normalizing The Taliban – OpEd

Eurasia Review | Dr. Hamza Khan

The eighth Moscow Format consultations on 5 October 2026 failed to produce a joint statement after Taliban representatives refused to accept text linking Afghanistan to cross-border terrorism. Pakistan insisted on retaining the security language, exposing deepening diplomatic friction between Kabul and regional powers. This impasse followed earlier diplomatic maneuvers, including Russia removing the Taliban from its banned organizations list in April 2025 and granting formal recognition in July 2025.

Moscow sought regional stability, yet Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu estimated in May 2026 that 18,000 to 23,000 militants operate across 20 armed groups in Afghanistan, including 3,000 ISKP fighters. The threat remains active. An August 2026 UN monitoring report confirmed Taliban support for Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, while Pakistan recorded 1,369 militant attacks through 29 October 2026, causing 553 civilian and 563 security fatalities. Consequently, major regional initiatives like the $1.2 billion CASA-1000 power grid face severe security bottlenecks.

Comment

The Taliban regime's refusal to curb Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) operational sanctuaries demonstrates the structural limits of regional counter-terrorism cooperation along the Durand Line. Relocating roughly 2,000 TTP fighters away from border zones alters immediate tactical distance without dismantling the group's staging bases in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This displacement leaves command nodes intact while preserving sanctuary mechanisms that sustain cross-border raids.

This persistence of cross-border staging directly elevates security overhead for infrastructure development like the CASA-1000 power transmission lines across eastern provinces. Commercial contractors face heightened force-protection requirements that inflate operational costs and delay physical installation. Substation nodes along the route remain vulnerable to standoff attacks from ISKP cells, turning transit infrastructure into static high-value targets.

Strategic Question for Discussion
Which carries more weight in determining the viability of CASA-1000 infrastructure—the Taliban's willingness to suppress ISKP standoff attacks, or Pakistan's capacity to harden electrical substations against cross-border raids?
The available evidence points toward Taliban operational tolerance as the decisive variable. While defensive hardening of static substations can mitigate small-arms harassment, uninterrupted power transmission across rural corridor sectors remains impossible without active counter-insurgency operations against ISKP staging areas. Consequently, risk premiums for international contractors will likely keep physical grid completion stalled regardless of border fortification efforts.
Share your assessment in the comments below.
💬
Ask me
Ask Strategic Study India New chat ×