The state of back-channel talks between India and Pakistan

IISS | Staff Writer

The India-Pakistan military conflict in May 2025, triggered by an April attack in Pahalgam, established a dangerous baseline between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. India now considers subsequent terrorist attacks an act of war, whereas Pakistan views any curtailment of river flow under the Indus Waters Treaty identically. Historical back-channel talks, spanning early diplomatic efforts during the 1999 Kargil conflict to intelligence summits in Jordan and Interlaken, previously stabilized bilateral relations during high-intensity crises.

Secret dialogue produced a draft Kashmir settlement framework by 2008 and enabled the February 2021 Line of Control ceasefire reaffirmation following high-level intelligence meetings in London and the United Arab Emirates. Formal diplomatic negotiations remain frozen. Without secret communication channels, future terrorist incidents or water disputes risk rapid, unmanaged military escalation. Forthcoming multilateral forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation provide the sole near-term opportunity for Indian and Pakistani officials to quietly re-establish back-channel dialogue mechanisms.

Comment

Direct engagement between the Research and Analysis Wing and the Inter-Services Intelligence creates an inherent operational tension between collection priorities and crisis management. During bilateral flare-ups along the Line of Control, intelligence services are tasked with active target acquisition while simultaneously maintaining de-escalation channels. This functional dualism weakens communication reliability, as operational actions by either agency repeatedly derail sensitive negotiations before diplomatic objectives are secured.

Shifting primary de-escalation responsibilities from foreign ministries to intelligence leadership alters institutional decision-making during high-intensity confrontations. Because covert communication mechanisms rely heavily on personal rapport between agency heads, political leadership lacks standardized, institutionalised protocols during sudden security shocks. Consequently, high-stress escalations like the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot standoff force decision-makers to conduct emergency messaging through third-party intermediaries rather than established bilateral hotlines.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which factor carries greater weight when utilizing back-channels between the Research and Analysis Wing and the Inter-Services Intelligence during severe crises — preserving operational security or enabling rapid executive-level de-escalation?

The operational record suggests that executive de-escalation imperatives briefly override agency security concerns during acute nuclear-threshold crises. However, because the Research and Analysis Wing and the Inter-Services Intelligence prioritise target tracking and intelligence protection during non-crisis periods, these channels routinely collapse once immediate military risks recede. Sustained strategic stability therefore remains unachievable as long as covert agencies serve as the primary substitute for formal diplomatic engagement.

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