20 November 2026

Uncertain Precedents for Redrawing Russian–Ukrainian Border in Post-Soviet Space

The Jamestown Foundation | Paul Goble

Russian and Ukrainian forces continue fighting the largest war in Europe since 1945 without either side achieving its maximalist territorial goals. To end the protracted conflict, mediators are floating border compromises that echo administrative realignments common during the Soviet era. From 1921 to 1980, central authorities recorded 90 major inter-republican territorial transfers alongside numerous internal administrative boundary shifts.

Central Asian states have since demonstrated that negotiated border adjustments can foster regional cooperation and stability. However, replicating those peaceful outcomes along the Russian-Ukrainian front faces severe domestic resistance, hardening regional identities, and deep distrust regarding external security guarantees like the Budapest Memorandum. Territorial revisions imposed without genuine Ukrainian participation risk igniting veteran backlash and perpetuating armed conflict indefinitely.

Comment

Territorial adjustments in post-Soviet environments regularly encounter entrenched institutional resistance once administrative lines harden into national borders. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum demonstrated how formal security assurances fail to survive shifting military balances when territorial integrity remains contested. Veterans groups in both Russia and Ukraine possess the domestic political leverage to punish leaders who accept territorial compromises. Consequently, discussions involving boundary revisions along the line of contact generate immediate friction rather than diplomatic momentum.

Strategic Question for Discussion
How do existing veterans networks in Russia and Ukraine constrain political flexibility regarding territorial concessions, and what mechanisms could bypass those domestic veto points during peace negotiations?
Combat veterans maintain significant moral authority and internal cohesion in both states, making any territorial compromise politically perilous for incumbent leaders. The available evidence suggests that external security guarantees alone cannot offset the domestic fallout generated by frontline realignments.
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