17 November 2026

What US Manufacturing Can Learn from China

The National Interest | Jianli Yang

American tariff policies implemented between 2018 and 2019 caused higher component costs and foreign trade retaliation that eliminated approximately 230,000 domestic manufacturing jobs. An August 2026 Chicago Federal Reserve study further confirmed that protective tariffs failed to generate short-term employment growth across industrial sectors. Reviving national production capacity requires shifting from defensive trade barriers to a proactive industrial policy.

China expanded its global manufacturing share from 3 percent in 1990 to 31.8 percent in 2023, while the United States retained 15 percent, according to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Beijing built this dominance following Deng Xiaoping's 1978 reforms by pairing foreign capital investment with mandatory joint ventures, including a 50 percent foreign ownership cap in automobile manufacturing. Tariffs alone cannot rebuild supply chains. Reversing this deficit requires absorbing foreign battery, solar, and robotics expertise directly into domestic production networks to maintain technological leadership, defense preparedness, and long-term economic resilience.

Comment

Atrophied surge capacity in weapon manufacturing stems from structural deficits in sub-tier component supply chains rather than final assembly line throughput. At the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant, expanding monthly production of 155mm M795 artillery shells required importing specialised machine tools and raw forged bodies from overseas suppliers. Without domestic tooling fabrication and specialized metallurgical casting, capital injections under Defense Production Act Title III face multi-year lead-time bottlenecks before yielding actual output.

This sub-tier dependency restricts rapid equipment replacement during high-intensity conflict. In naval shipyards, the delivery schedule for Arleigh Burke-class destroyers hinges on single-source suppliers for propulsion reduction gears and main engines. Inward technology transfer that targets component-level machine tooling alters this structural bottleneck faster than subsidising final hull assembly at Huntington Ingalls or Bath Iron Works.

Strategic Question for Discussion
If Defense Production Act Title III funding cannot overcome sub-tier machine tooling shortages at facilities like the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant, which mechanism offers a faster path to restoring munition surge capacity — joint-venture technology transfers or direct public ownership of critical supply chains?
The available evidence points toward joint-venture technology transfers as the faster mechanism for compressing production lead times, particularly where foreign firms already hold advanced tooling IP. While public capital through Title III can build infrastructure, developing domestic machining expertise from scratch historically introduces multi-year delays that emergency defense procurement cannot afford. My assessment is that foreign technical integration addresses the immediate skills gap at component suppliers far more rapidly than state-managed capacity expansion.
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