Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye: a new defence pact

International Institute for Strategic Studies  |  Hasan Alhasan, Asna Wajid

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement on 7 August 2026, establishing a mutual defence pact that treats an attack on one member as an attack on all. Formalised amidst rising regional instability following the 7 October 2023 conflict, the alliance aims to establish a regional deterrence framework independent of Washington.

The trilateral agreement transitions Saudi-Turkish relations from diplomatic rapprochement into an explicit mutual security architecture, anchored by Pakistan's nuclear umbrella, Saudi financial capital, and Türkiye's military-industrial capacity. Operationally, the signatories plan to establish a ministerial committee and general secretariat to enhance military interoperability, joint exercises, and defense-industrial co-development. However, strategic divergence over primary threat perceptions—with Ankara focused on Israel and Riyadh on Iran—creates structural vulnerabilities regarding alliance cohesion during multi-front crises. Expanding on previous bilateral accords, the arrangement positions these middle powers to balance against Iranian drone salvos and Israeli military overreach without relying on traditional US-centric regional security architectures.

Comment

Trilateral defence-industrial collaboration built around platforms like the TAI KAAN fighter aircraft and MILGEM-class corvettes demonstrates how joint capital allocation attempts to bypass Western arms export restrictions. While Saudi sovereign wealth accelerates Turkish production scaling, local absorption capacity across regional assembly lines remains constrained by fragmented technical standards. Integrating Pakistani manufacturing infrastructure into high-end aerospace production requires deep tooling alignment that current trilateral protocols have not established.

Beyond immediate financial commitments, structural bottlenecks persist in critical subsystem procurement, particularly Western-sourced avionics and propulsion. Relying on US-supplied F110 turbofans for the TAI KAAN directly exposes the alliance's broader export aspirations to Washington's regulatory veto.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which subsystem bottleneck—such as US export controls on F110 turbofans for the TAI KAAN—presents the greater barrier to autonomous trilateral production, and how might alternative engine sourcing alter that trajectory?

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