Building an Edge in Modern War With Fast Following

Futura Doctrina | Mick Ryan

The Australian Defence Force can generate a decisive military edge by systematically adopting fast following rather than relying solely on pioneering technological innovation. Research indicates that commercial first movers fail roughly 47% of the time, compared to an 8% failure rate for early followers who observe, copy, and rapidly refine proven systems.

Modern battlefields compress imitation cycles from years to weeks due to cheap sensors, open-source intelligence, and rapid unmanned production. Speed dictates survival. In Ukraine, rapid emulation has shaped tactical and institutional warfare across both sides. Russia adapted Iran’s Shahed-136 into the Geran-2, while Ukraine fielded 30km-range fibre-optic drones following Russian deployments at Kursk in 2024. Furthermore, Ukrainian Magura and Sea Baby uncrewed vessels disabled a third of the Black Sea Fleet, prompting immediate counter-drone adjustments. To replicate this adaptive velocity, Canberra should establish an intermediary modeled on Ukraine’s Brave1, systematically analyze foreign conflicts, and reform leadership promotion structures.

Comment

The creation of specialised uncrewed formations like Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces alters traditional command hierarchies by shifting weapon modification directly into frontline echelons. This architecture detaches tactical uncrewed aerial vehicle integration from rigid combined-arms headquarters, granting field detachments direct horizontal access to Brave1-affiliated software engineers. Such direct liaison bypassed the rigid staff approvals that previously delayed counter-electronic warfare adaptations during the 2023 Zaporizhzhia operations.

At the tactical level, this mechanism functions through dedicated operational nodes like Moscow’s Rubicon Center, which captures telemetry from front-line engagements to push immediate software patches. Frontline data from fibre-optic FPV drone strikes around Kursk directly recalibrates local frequency hopping, eliminating the multi-month administrative reviews typical of Main Missile and Artillery Directorate pipelines. Russian operations near Pokrovsk demonstrate that field-level coordination between strike operators and technical teams compresses the sensor-to-shooter loop far faster than Soviet-era military district hierarchies ever permitted.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If specialised nodes like Moscow's Rubicon Center and Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces continue to absorb procurement and tactical adaptation, does conventional combined-arms command retain its central authority, or does operational control fracture permanently toward autonomous technical units?

The trajectory indicates that operational command will not fracture completely, but will bifurcate between tactical uncrewed attrition campaigns and coordinated combined-arms manoeuvre. Formations like the Rubicon Center demonstrate that rapid technical adaptation can operate as a specialised support enabler without supplanting divisional fire plans. The pattern suggests that armies capable of integrating these technical nodes under standard operational headquarters will maintain higher combat coherence than those allowing tactical drone cadres to drift into administrative isolation.

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