1 October 2026

Exclusive: The Admiral Who Must Prevent War With China

Time | Eric Cortellessa

Admiral Samuel Paparo, who leads the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, is now facing the historic task of preventing a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as Beijing proceeds with its huge military build-up. With some 400,000 personnel and extensive naval resources under his command, Paparo intends to show credible strength by using a policy of deterrence through denial and by threatening to turn the Taiwan Strait into a drone-filled hellscape similar to the situation in modern warfare in Ukraine.

Even though the war games show that the United States and its allies will achieve a victory over an amphibious attack, the possible costs are still extremely high, particularly since other conflicts around the world are using up vital munitions. Paparo has to keep his pre-eminence and state of readiness over a huge area covering half the globe, balancing his classified capabilities with his overt deterrent in order to avoid a catastrophic great-power conflict.

Comment

The reliance which Admiral Samuel Paparo places on a defence network composed of a large number of drones is similar to the attritional denial methods used by the USS Charlotte and Ukraine's territorial defence forces. By using a large number of autonomous systems to clog the maritime approach, the object is to prevent enemy landing vessels from attaining the positional stability needed for amphibious landings.

This operational concept is based on distributed kill chains, which transfer targeting authority away from the carrier strike groups. Yet the requirement to maintain such a high level of expenditure under the constraint of simultaneous operations in multiple theatres places a strain on the logistical capacity of the regional hubs.

Strategic Question for Discussion
What is the way in which naval logistics planners are able to keep adequate reserves of precision-guided munitions at forward staging sites in the Indo-Pacific region when global contingencies, occurring at the same time, cause the inventory to be drawn down more quickly than the domestic defence industrial base is able to replenish it?
There is enough evidence to indicate that there is serious friction in the present industrial pipelines, which means that the various operational commitments will certainly lead to hard decisions regarding the priority given to the European and Pacific commands. The existence of this structural shortcoming shows that theatre commanders will have to depend more and more on dispersed, attritional systems rather than on highly sophisticated platforms if they are to hold the contested littorals.
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