1 October 2026

What Machiavelli Would Say About Trump

Foreign Policy | Stephen M. Walt

United States President Donald Trump is defying Niccolò Machiavelli’s foundational principles of effective statecraft, embodying a guide on how to be a very bad prince. While Machiavelli argued that it is better to be feared than loved, Trump’s blunders, such as the war with Iran, and the general inconstancy of his regime have caused other countries to lose their fear and push back against his predatory approach.

Trump has increasingly become hated and despised due to his attacks on subjects' property and women, his fiscal spendthrift habits, and his ignorance of military affairs. He is mired in an unwinnable conflict that damages the U.S. position while weaponizing the Justice Department for arbitrary personal vendettas. Furthermore, whereas Machiavelli advised that a ruler must conceal deception behind an appearance of virtue, Trump’s public prevarications fail the basic requirements of successful statecraft.

Comment

Niccolò Machiavelli’s discourse on the preservation of power rests on the disciplined management of perception, where the appearance of virtue masks cold utility. When applied to contemporary executive overreach, the systemic failure lies not merely in broken promises, but in the blatant public display of transactional volatility. Leaders who discard the veneer of legitimacy invite predictable institutional erosion across the Department of Justice and the armed forces.

Institutional compliance purchased through unqualified political appointees ultimately hollows out operational command. Without rigorous pre-decision assessments, strategic missteps in campaigns like the Iran war expose profound structural vulnerabilities that external adversaries such as China readily exploit.

Strategic Question for Discussion
If executive decision-making relies on compliant military commanders and untrained loyalists rather than rigorous institutional assessments, how does a state maintain strategic deterrence against peer adversaries like China?
The available evidence points toward rapid degradation of credible signaling when institutional filters are systematically bypassed. Peer adversaries interpret this internal friction not as tactical flexibility, but as an exploitable structural vulnerability.
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